Abstract:Graph Transformer is a new architecture that surpasses GNNs in graph learning. While there emerge inspiring algorithm advancements, their practical adoption is still limited, particularly on real-world graphs involving up to millions of nodes. We observe existing graph transformers fail on large-scale graphs mainly due to heavy computation, limited scalability and inferior model quality. Motivated by these observations, we propose TorchGT, the first efficient, scalable, and accurate graph transformer training system. TorchGT optimizes training at different levels. At algorithm level, by harnessing the graph sparsity, TorchGT introduces a Dual-interleaved Attention which is computation-efficient and accuracy-maintained. At runtime level, TorchGT scales training across workers with a communication-light Cluster-aware Graph Parallelism. At kernel level, an Elastic Computation Reformation further optimizes the computation by reducing memory access latency in a dynamic way. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TorchGT boosts training by up to 62.7x and supports graph sequence lengths of up to 1M.
Abstract:Recently, deep learning-based Image-to-Image (I2I) networks have become the predominant choice for I2I tasks such as image super-resolution and denoising. Despite their remarkable performance, the backdoor vulnerability of I2I networks has not been explored. To fill this research gap, we conduct a comprehensive investigation on the susceptibility of I2I networks to backdoor attacks. Specifically, we propose a novel backdoor attack technique, where the compromised I2I network behaves normally on clean input images, yet outputs a predefined image of the adversary for malicious input images containing the trigger. To achieve this I2I backdoor attack, we propose a targeted universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) generation algorithm for I2I networks, where the generated UAP is used as the backdoor trigger. Additionally, in the backdoor training process that contains the main task and the backdoor task, multi-task learning (MTL) with dynamic weighting methods is employed to accelerate convergence rates. In addition to attacking I2I tasks, we extend our I2I backdoor to attack downstream tasks, including image classification and object detection. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the I2I backdoor on state-of-the-art I2I network architectures, as well as the robustness against different mainstream backdoor defenses.
Abstract:Recently, code-oriented large language models (Code LLMs) have been widely and successfully used to simplify and facilitate code programming. With these tools, developers can easily generate desired complete functional codes based on incomplete code and natural language prompts. However, a few pioneering works revealed that these Code LLMs are also vulnerable, e.g., against backdoor and adversarial attacks. The former could induce LLMs to respond to triggers to insert malicious code snippets by poisoning the training data or model parameters, while the latter can craft malicious adversarial input codes to reduce the quality of generated codes. However, both attack methods have underlying limitations: backdoor attacks rely on controlling the model training process, while adversarial attacks struggle with fulfilling specific malicious purposes. To inherit the advantages of both backdoor and adversarial attacks, this paper proposes a new attack paradigm, i.e., target-specific and adversarial prompt injection (TAPI), against Code LLMs. TAPI generates unreadable comments containing information about malicious instructions and hides them as triggers in the external source code. When users exploit Code LLMs to complete codes containing the trigger, the models will generate attacker-specified malicious code snippets at specific locations. We evaluate our TAPI attack on four representative LLMs under three representative malicious objectives and seven cases. The results show that our method is highly threatening (achieving an attack success rate of up to 89.3\%) and stealthy (saving an average of 53.1\% of tokens in the trigger design). In particular, we successfully attack some famous deployed code completion integrated applications, including CodeGeex and Github Copilot. This further confirms the realistic threat of our attack.
Abstract:Large-scale pre-trained generative models are taking the world by storm, due to their abilities in generating creative content. Meanwhile, safeguards for these generative models are developed, to protect users' rights and safety, most of which are designed for large language models. Existing methods primarily focus on jailbreak and adversarial attacks, which mainly evaluate the model's safety under malicious prompts. Recent work found that manually crafted safe prompts can unintentionally trigger unsafe generations. To further systematically evaluate the safety risks of text-to-image models, we propose a novel Automatic Red-Teaming framework, ART. Our method leverages both vision language model and large language model to establish a connection between unsafe generations and their prompts, thereby more efficiently identifying the model's vulnerabilities. With our comprehensive experiments, we reveal the toxicity of the popular open-source text-to-image models. The experiments also validate the effectiveness, adaptability, and great diversity of ART. Additionally, we introduce three large-scale red-teaming datasets for studying the safety risks associated with text-to-image models. Datasets and models can be found in https://github.com/GuanlinLee/ART.
Abstract:Self-supervised learning has emerged as a powerful tool for pretraining deep networks on unlabeled data, prior to transfer learning of target tasks with limited annotation. The relevance between the pretraining pretext and target tasks is crucial to the success of transfer learning. Various pretext tasks have been proposed to utilize properties of medical image data (e.g., three dimensionality), which are more relevant to medical image analysis than generic ones for natural images. However, previous work rarely paid attention to data with anatomy-oriented imaging planes, e.g., standard cardiac magnetic resonance imaging views. As these imaging planes are defined according to the anatomy of the imaged organ, pretext tasks effectively exploiting this information can pretrain the networks to gain knowledge on the organ of interest. In this work, we propose two complementary pretext tasks for this group of medical image data based on the spatial relationship of the imaging planes. The first is to learn the relative orientation between the imaging planes and implemented as regressing their intersecting lines. The second exploits parallel imaging planes to regress their relative slice locations within a stack. Both pretext tasks are conceptually straightforward and easy to implement, and can be combined in multitask learning for better representation learning. Thorough experiments on two anatomical structures (heart and knee) and representative target tasks (semantic segmentation and classification) demonstrate that the proposed pretext tasks are effective in pretraining deep networks for remarkably boosted performance on the target tasks, and superior to other recent approaches.
Abstract:Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.
Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) have presented impressive performance across several transformative tasks. However, it is non-trivial to efficiently utilize large-scale cluster resources to develop LLMs, often riddled with numerous challenges such as frequent hardware failures, intricate parallelization strategies, and imbalanced resource utilization. In this paper, we present an in-depth characterization study of a six-month LLM development workload trace collected from our GPU datacenter Acme. Specifically, we investigate discrepancies between LLMs and prior task-specific Deep Learning (DL) workloads, explore resource utilization patterns, and identify the impact of various job failures. Our analysis summarizes hurdles we encountered and uncovers potential opportunities to optimize systems tailored for LLMs. Furthermore, we introduce our system efforts: (1) fault-tolerant pretraining, which enhances fault tolerance through LLM-involved failure diagnosis and automatic recovery. (2) decoupled scheduling for evaluation, which achieves timely performance feedback via trial decomposition and scheduling optimization.
Abstract:Federated learning (FL) facilitates collaborative training of machine learning models among a large number of clients while safeguarding the privacy of their local datasets. However, FL remains susceptible to vulnerabilities such as privacy inference and inversion attacks. Single-server secure aggregation schemes were proposed to address these threats. Nonetheless, they encounter practical constraints due to their round and communication complexities. This work introduces Fluent, a round and communication-efficient secure aggregation scheme for private FL. Fluent has several improvements compared to state-of-the-art solutions like Bell et al. (CCS 2020) and Ma et al. (SP 2023): (1) it eliminates frequent handshakes and secret sharing operations by efficiently reusing the shares across multiple training iterations without leaking any private information; (2) it accomplishes both the consistency check and gradient unmasking in one logical step, thereby reducing another round of communication. With these innovations, Fluent achieves the fewest communication rounds (i.e., two in the collection phase) in the malicious server setting, in contrast to at least three rounds in existing schemes. This significantly minimizes the latency for geographically distributed clients; (3) Fluent also introduces Fluent-Dynamic with a participant selection algorithm and an alternative secret sharing scheme. This can facilitate dynamic client joining and enhance the system flexibility and scalability. We implemented Fluent and compared it with existing solutions. Experimental results show that Fluent improves the computational cost by at least 75% and communication overhead by at least 25% for normal clients. Fluent also reduces the communication overhead for the server at the expense of a marginal increase in computational cost.
Abstract:Deep neural networks (DNNs) have revolutionized various industries, leading to the rise of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS). In this paradigm, well-trained models are typically deployed through APIs. However, DNNs are susceptible to backdoor attacks, which pose significant risks to their applications. This vulnerability necessitates a method for users to ascertain whether an API is compromised before usage. Although many backdoor detection methods have been developed, they often operate under the assumption that the defender has access to specific information such as details of the attack, soft predictions from the model API, and even the knowledge of the model parameters, limiting their practicality in MLaaS scenarios. To address it, in this paper, we begin by presenting an intriguing observation: the decision boundary of the backdoored model exhibits a greater degree of closeness than that of the clean model. Simultaneously, if only one single label is infected, a larger portion of the regions will be dominated by the attacked label. Building upon this observation, we propose Model X-ray, a novel backdoor detection approach for MLaaS through the analysis of decision boundaries. Model X-ray can not only identify whether the target API is infected by backdoor attacks but also determine the target attacked label under the all-to-one attack strategy. Importantly, it accomplishes this solely by the hard prediction of clean inputs, regardless of any assumptions about attacks and prior knowledge of the training details of the model. Extensive experiments demonstrated that Model X-ray can be effective for MLaaS across diverse backdoor attacks, datasets, and architectures.
Abstract:With the prevalence of text-to-image generative models, their safety becomes a critical concern. adversarial testing techniques have been developed to probe whether such models can be prompted to produce Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. However, existing solutions face several challenges, including low success rate and inefficiency. We introduce Groot, the first automated framework leveraging tree-based semantic transformation for adversarial testing of text-to-image models. Groot employs semantic decomposition and sensitive element drowning strategies in conjunction with LLMs to systematically refine adversarial prompts. Our comprehensive evaluation confirms the efficacy of Groot, which not only exceeds the performance of current state-of-the-art approaches but also achieves a remarkable success rate (93.66%) on leading text-to-image models such as DALL-E 3 and Midjourney.