ARENA: Automated Red-Teaming for Large Audio Language Models

Large audio-language models (LALMs) make it possible to interact with language models through speech, music, and environmental sound, but they also introduce a safety surface that is difficult to expose with text-only red-teaming. We study automated audio-grounded red-teaming, where a text query must remain safe in isolation while the joint text-audio input induces harmful target behavior. We propose ARENA, a closed-loop framework that trains a controller on an independent 2,000case text-audio dataset. MD-Judge supplies training rewards and adaptive search feedback, while a separate, non-adaptive Llama Guard 3 evaluator alone labels final outcomes. On 520 held-out AdvBench objectives, ARENA achieves FDR/PSR of 87.9/100.0%, 71.5/96.3%, 68.1/100.0%, and 75.4/98.5% on Audio Flamingo 3, Qwen2-Audio, MiMo-Audio, and GPTAudio, respectively. Ablations show that feedback-based refinement and audio-variant search substantially improve attack discovery.

Never Stop Speaking: a Denial-of-Service Attack on End-to-End Speech Language Models

Many studies have shown that specially crafted inputs can induce large language models (LLMs) to generate excessively long outputs, resulting in significant computational overhead and resource consumption. While most existing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks target text-only LLMs, end-to-end (E2E) speech LLMs are rapidly emerging. Existing text-based DoS attacks primarily rely on prompt engineering, such as adversarial suffixes or semantic inducement, which exploit the discrete nature of text inputs and therefore cannot be directly transferred to continuous speech inputs. Moreover, prior studies on speech model security mainly focus on ASR or TTS systems, leaving the DoS vulnerability of E2E speech LLMs largely unexplored. To address this gap, we propose the perturbation-based DoS attack targeting E2E speech models. Instead of inducing long outputs through prompt manipulation, our method optimizes imperceptible acoustic perturbations to directly influence the model's autoregressive generation process while preserving the original input length. Specifically, we formulate the attack as a composite optimization objective that jointly suppresses EOS generation, encourages prolonged decoding, and largely preserves semantic consistency by integrating weighted EOS loss, top-k logit loss, length loss, and semantic alignment loss. To further improve stealthiness, we employ voice activity detection (VAD) to inject perturbations only into voiced regions. Extensive experiments on three open-source E2E speech LLMs demonstrate that our method achieves stable attack success rate while significantly increasing generation length and GPU resource consumption, revealing security risks in modern ALLMs.

DiffSafeMerge: Mitigating Backdoor Inheritance in Diffusion Model Merging

Unconditional diffusion checkpoint merging assumes benign sources, yet a compromised public checkpoint can transfer a dormant backdoor while clean generation appears normal. Mitigation is difficult without knowing the compromised source, trigger, or target, and broad sanitization may degrade image quality. We introduce DiffSafeMerge (DSM), which uses a small unlabeled clean set and fixed, attack-agnostic stress probes to score source blocks, shrink suspicious contributions toward a trusted reference, and select attenuation under a clean denoising-loss budget. We evaluate four attacks, two datasets, and 21 target conditions. Intended merging already has zero worst-target ASR in 10 of 14 source cases; DSM preserves these outcomes and records no target match in the remaining four over three seeds, including three with baseline ASR of 48--100\%. Among methods with zero worst-target ASR on both datasets, DSM obtains the lowest case-averaged FID in the matched seed-0 comparison.

EvoTrustRAG: Evolution-Aware Conflict Attribution and Evidence Handling for Reliable Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves the factuality of large language models with external knowledge, yet conflicting evidence remains a fundamental challenge in dynamic and adversarial environments. Existing approaches often treat conflicts as static inconsistencies and select more reliable knowledge, overlooking that the same conflict may arise from legitimate knowledge evolution, malicious manipulation, or unresolved uncertainty. We formulate conflict origin attribution as a new problem in RAG: identifying which explanation of conflicting evidence is supported by observable context rather than simply which fact should be trusted. We propose EvoTrustRAG, a training-free framework for evolution-aware conflict attribution and evidence handling before answer generation. EvoTrustRAG represents span-grounded retrieved facts as a conflict evidence graph, evaluates grounded evolution and directional intervention hypotheses using temporal relations, support structure, and auxiliary consistency, and projects local decisions onto a globally consistent explanation of each conflict group. The attribution determines whether earlier and later states are preserved as temporal knowledge, an intervention candidate is separated from the primary context, or an unresolved conflict remains visible to the generator. Unlike provenance-based approaches focused on post-hoc analysis, EvoTrustRAG determines during inference whether conflicting evidence follows plausible knowledge evolution, exhibits intervention-like support, or cannot be reliably attributed. Experiments show that EvoTrustRAG achieves 81.4% average accuracy on benchmark-native conflict settings, improves attribution macro-F1 from 72.2% to 79.1% over the strongest baseline, and reduces the error rate under the strongest coordinated attack from 31.2% to 16.0%.

InkShield: Writing Style Protection Against Unauthorized Handwriting Mimicry

Recent handwritten text generators can reproduce a writer's style from publicly available references, posing risks of document forgery and identity misuse. An attacker may use a publicly available handwritten note or signature sample to generate forged recommendation letters or authorization forms, leading to document fraud, identity misuse, and misleading decisions. However, existing protections against unauthorized image editing or synthesis transfer poorly to handwriting style mimicry. Designed for natural images with complex backgrounds, they often optimize perturbations over the whole image. For sparse handwriting images, such global perturbations become conspicuous in blank background regions and largely degrade the visual quality. In this work, we propose InkShield, a proactive writing-style defense that protects reference images before release. InkShield selects a decoy writer to define a style-displacement direction, optimizes perturbations with a frozen handwriting-generation surrogate, and confines them to ink-stroke edges to avoid conspicuous background artifacts. On IAM, the average Top-1/Top-5 rates at which generated samples are retrieved as the target writer by two independent writer evaluators decrease from 11.94%/36.52% to 2.03%/8.79%. Meanwhile, the protected references remain visually close to the originals (LPIPS 0.0078), and the generated text remains readable. InkShield also exhibits transferability to other handwriting generators. Overall, InkShield provides practical protection against unauthorized handwriting style mimicry.

Beyond Native Success: Auditing Deployment-Interface Exposure of CLIP Backdoors

Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training models are widely reused across downstream interfaces, including feature extraction, retrieval, reranking, and selection. Existing CLIP backdoor, however, usually validate attacks on a small attack-native task, leaving unclear whether the same poisoned checkpoint remains exposed, weakens, or becomes not applicable when reused through other interfaces. We introduce DIFE, a Deployment-Interface Footprint Evaluation framework that audits backdoored CLIP checkpoints across deployment interfaces. DIFE makes various evaluations comparable by specifying each interface's component readout, trigger channel, target event, reference condition, and metric. DIFE also introduces effective-footprint diagnosis to identify the reusable CLIP component or component combination that carries exposure and explains where risk transfers. Auditing reproduced CLIP backdoors with DIFE reveals a structured landscape: native success is not a checkpoint-level risk certificate, exposure follows component footprints, text-side poisoning does not yield textual-encoder control, and some coupled attacks remain mechanism-bound. This audit reveals a import gapin existing CLIP backdoors: a textual encoder that itself becomes a reusable carrier of adversarial behavior. We therefore introduce BadTextTower to fill this gap. BadTextTower produces strong text-conditioned retrieval, reranking, and selection exposure while leaving visual-only reuse nearly clean.

When Poison Fails After Retrieval: Revisiting Corpus Poisoning under Chunking and Reranking Pipelines

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate downstream model outputs through malicious knowledge injection. Existing studies mainly evaluate poisoning under simplified retrieval settings, overlooking practical RAG pipelines involving document chunking, dense retrieval, reranking, and grounded generation. In this paper, we revisit corpus poisoning under realistic multi-stage retrieval pipelines and show that many existing attacks substantially degrade after reranking despite achieving high retrieval-stage relevance. We identify retrieval granularity mismatch as a key reason for this failure: document-level adversarial signals are often fragmented during chunking, while rerankers favor locally coherent and answer-bearing passages rather than globally optimized semantic similarity. Based on this observation, we propose Chunk-aware and Rerank-Consistent Poisoning (CRCP), a poisoning framework that jointly optimizes retrieval relevance, reranker consistency, and chunk-boundary robustness. CRCP explicitly models chunking transformations during optimization to generate locally self-contained adversarial passages that remain effective under varying chunking configurations. Experiments on standard RAG benchmarks with multiple retrievers and rerankers show that existing poisoning methods are highly sensitive to chunk size and reranking strategies, whereas CRCP achieves substantially higher attack success rates and stronger robustness across realistic retrieval pipelines. Our findings highlight an important realism gap in current RAG security evaluation and suggest that poisoning in modern RAG systems should be studied as a multi-stage retrieval consistency problem rather than a retrieval-only problem.

DIVER:Diving Deeper into Distilled Data via Expressive Semantic Recovery

Dataset distillation aims to synthesize a compact proxy dataset that is unreadable or non-raw from the original dataset for privacy protection and highly efficient learning. However, previous approaches typically adopt a single-stage distillation paradigm, which suffers from learning specific patterns that overfit on a prior architecture, consequently suppressing the expression of semantics and leading to performance degradation across heterogeneous architectures. To address this issue, we propose a novel dual-stage distillation framework called ${\textbf{DIVER}}$, which leverages the pre-trained diffusion model to dive deeper into $\textbf{DI}$stilled data $\textbf{V}$ia $\textbf{E}$xpressive semantic $\textbf{R}$ecovery, an entire process of semantic inheritance, guidance, and fusion. Semantic inheritance distills high-level semantics of abstract distilled images into the latent space to filter out architecture-specific ``noise" and retain the intrinsic semantics. Furthermore, semantic guidance improves the preservation of the original semantics by directing the reverse procedure. Finally, semantic fusion is designed to provide semantic guidance only during the concrete phase of the reverse process, preventing semantic ambiguity and artifacts while maintaining the guidance information. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness and efficiency of DIVER in improving classical distillation techniques and significantly improving cross-architecture generalization, requiring processing time comparable to raw DiT on ImageNet (256$\times$256) with only 4 GB of GPU memory usage. Code is available: https://github.com/einsteinxia/DIVER.

CBV: Clean-label Backdoor Attacks on Vision Language Models via Diffusion Models

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable success in tasks such as image captioning and visual question answering (VQA). However, as their applications become increasingly widespread, recent studies have revealed that VLMs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attacks on VLMs primarily rely on data poisoning by adding visual triggers and modifying text labels, where the induced image-text mismatch makes poisoned samples easy to detect. To address this limitation, we propose the Clean-Label Backdoor Attack on VLMs via Diffusion Models (CBV), which leverages diffusion models to generate natural poisoned examples via score matching. Specifically, CBV modifies the score during the reverse generation process of the diffusion model to guide the generation of poisoned samples that contain triggered image features. To further enhance the effectiveness of the attack, we incorporate the textual information of the triggered images as multimodal guidance during generation. Moreover, to enhance stealthiness, we introduce a GradCAM-guided Mask (GM) that restricts modifications to only the most semantically important regions, rather than the entire image. We evaluate our method on MSCOCO and VQA v2 with four representative VLMs, achieving over 80% ASR while preserving normal functionality.

The Art of (Mis)alignment: How Fine-Tuning Methods Effectively Misalign and Realign LLMs in Post-Training

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) raises significant ethical and safety concerns. While LLM alignment techniques are adopted to improve model safety and trustworthiness, adversaries can exploit these techniques to undermine safety for malicious purposes, resulting in \emph{misalignment}. Misaligned LLMs may be published on open platforms to magnify harm. To address this, additional safety alignment, referred to as \emph{realignment}, is necessary before deploying untrusted third-party LLMs. This study explores the efficacy of fine-tuning methods in terms of misalignment, realignment, and the effects of their interplay. By evaluating four Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and two Preference Fine-Tuning (PFT) methods across four popular safety-aligned LLMs, we reveal a mechanism asymmetry between attack and defense. While Odds Ratio Preference Optimization (ORPO) is most effective for misalignment, Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) excels in realignment, albeit at the expense of model utility. Additionally, we identify model-specific resistance, residual effects of multi-round adversarial dynamics, and other noteworthy findings. These findings highlight the need for robust safeguards and customized safety alignment strategies to mitigate potential risks in the deployment of LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/zhangrui4041/The-Art-of-Mis-alignment.