University of Southern California
Abstract:Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection identifies test samples that fall outside a model's training distribution, a capability critical for safe deployment in high-stakes applications. Standard OOD detectors are trained on a specific in-distribution (ID) dataset and detect deviations from that single domain. In contrast, we study few-shot cross-domain OOD detection: given a \emph{single} pre-trained model, can we perform OOD detection on \emph{arbitrary} new ID-OOD task pairs using only a handful of ID samples at inference time, with no additional training? We propose \textbf{UFCOD}, a unified framework that achieves this goal through information-geometric analysis of diffusion trajectories. Our key insight is that diffusion noise predictions are score functions (gradients of log-density), and we extract two energy features: \emph{Path Energy} (integrated score magnitude) and \emph{Dynamics Energy} (score smoothness), that form a discrete Sobolev norm capturing how samples interact with the learned diffusion process. The central contribution is a \textbf{train-once, deploy-anywhere} paradigm: a diffusion model trained on a single dataset (e.g., CelebA) serves as a universal feature extractor for OOD detection across semantically unrelated domains (e.g., CIFAR-10, SVHN, Textures). At deployment, each new task requires only $\sim$100 unlabeled ID samples for inference: no retraining, no fine-tuning, no task-specific adaptation. Using 100 ID samples per task, UFCOD achieves 93.7\% average AUROC across 12 cross-domain benchmarks, competitive with methods trained on 50k--163k samples, demonstrating $\sim$500$\times$ improvement in sample efficiency. See our code in https://github.com/lili0415/UFCOD.
Abstract:User simulation has long played a vital role in computer science due to its potential to support a wide range of applications. Language, as the primary medium of human communication, forms the foundation of social interaction and behavior. Consequently, simulating conversational behavior has become a key area of study. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly catalyzed progress in this domain by enabling high-fidelity generation of synthetic user conversation. In this paper, we survey recent advancements in LLM-based conversational user simulation. We introduce a novel taxonomy covering user granularity and simulation objectives. Additionally, we systematically analyze core techniques and evaluation methodologies. We aim to keep the research community informed of the latest advancements in conversational user simulation and to further facilitate future research by identifying open challenges and organizing existing work under a unified framework.
Abstract:Learning from preference-based feedback has become an effective approach for aligning LLMs across diverse tasks. However, high-quality human-annotated preference data remains expensive and scarce. Existing methods address this challenge through either self-rewarding, which scales by using purely AI-generated labels but risks unreliability, or active learning, which ensures quality through oracle annotation but cannot fully leverage unlabeled data. In this paper, we present CoAct, a novel framework that synergistically combines self-rewarding and active learning through strategic human-AI collaboration. CoAct leverages self-consistency to identify both reliable self-labeled data and samples that require oracle verification. Additionally, oracle feedback guides the model to generate new instructions within its solvable capability. Evaluated on three reasoning benchmarks across two model families, CoAct achieves average improvements of +13.25% on GSM8K, +8.19% on MATH, and +13.16% on WebInstruct, consistently outperforming all baselines.
Abstract:LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.
Abstract:Learning a robust Variational Autoencoder (VAE) is a fundamental step for many deep learning applications in medical image analysis, such as MRI synthesizes. Existing brain VAEs predominantly focus on single-modality data (i.e., T1-weighted MRI), overlooking the complementary diagnostic value of other modalities like T2-weighted MRIs. Here, we propose a modality-aware and anatomically grounded 3D vector-quantized VAE (VQ-VAE) for reconstructing multi-modal brain MRIs. Called NeuroQuant, it first learns a shared latent representation across modalities using factorized multi-axis attention, which can capture relationships between distant brain regions. It then employs a dual-stream 3D encoder that explicitly separates the encoding of modality-invariant anatomical structures from modality-dependent appearance. Next, the anatomical encoding is discretized using a shared codebook and combined with modality-specific appearance features via Feature-wise Linear Modulation (FiLM) during the decoding phase. This entire approach is trained using a joint 2D/3D strategy in order to account for the slice-based acquisition of 3D MRI data. Extensive experiments on two multi-modal brain MRI datasets demonstrate that NeuroQuant achieves superior reconstruction fidelity compared to existing VAEs, enabling a scalable foundation for downstream generative modeling and cross-modal brain image analysis.
Abstract:LLM-based agents increasingly operate across repeated sessions, maintaining task states to ensure continuity. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users within a team or organization, reusing a shared knowledge layer across user identities. This shared persistence expands the failure surface: information that is locally valid for one user can silently degrade another user's outcome when the agent reapplies it without regard for scope. We refer to this failure mode as unintentional cross-user contamination (UCC). Unlike adversarial memory poisoning, UCC requires no attacker; it arises from benign interactions whose scope-bound artifacts persist and are later misapplied. We formalize UCC through a controlled evaluation protocol, introduce a taxonomy of three contamination types, and evaluate the problem in two shared-state mechanisms. Under raw shared state, benign interactions alone produce contamination rates of 57--71%. A write-time sanitization is effective when shared state is conversational, but leaves substantial residual risk when shared state includes executable artifacts, with contamination often manifesting as silent wrong answers. These results indicate that shared-state agents need artifact-level defenses beyond text-level sanitization to prevent silent cross-user failures.
Abstract:What should a developer inspect before deploying an LLM agent: the model, the tool code, the deployment configuration, or all three? In practice, many security failures in agent systems arise not from model weights alone, but from the surrounding software stack: tool functions that pass untrusted inputs to dangerous operations, exposed credentials in deployment artifacts, and over-privileged Model Context Protocol (MCP) configurations. We present Agent Audit, a security analysis system for LLM agent applications. Agent Audit analyzes Python agent code and deployment artifacts through an agent-aware pipeline that combines dataflow analysis, credential detection, structured configuration parsing, and privilege-risk checks. The system reports findings in terminal, JSON, and SARIF formats, enabling direct integration with local development workflows and CI/CD pipelines. On a benchmark of 22 samples with 42 annotated vulnerabilities, Agent Audit detects 40 vulnerabilities with 6 false positives, substantially improving recall over common SAST baselines while maintaining sub-second scan times. Agent Audit is open source and installable via pip, making security auditing accessible for agent systems. In the live demonstration, attendees scan vulnerable agent repositories and observe how Agent Audit identifies security risks in tool functions, prompts, and more. Findings are linked to source locations and configuration paths, and can be exported into VS Code and GitHub Code Scanning for interactive inspection.
Abstract:When a multi-agent system produces an incorrect or harmful answer, who is accountable if execution logs and agent identifiers are unavailable? Multi-agent language systems increasingly rely on structured interactions such as delegation and iterative refinement, yet the final output often obscures the underlying interaction topology and agent contributions. We introduce IET (Implicit Execution Tracing), a metadata-independent framework that enables token-level attribution directly from generated text and a simple mechanism for interaction topology reconstruction. During generation, agent-specific keyed signals are embedded into the token distribution, transforming the text into a self-describing execution trace detectable only with a secret key. At detection time, a transition-aware scoring method identifies agent handover points and reconstructs the interaction graph. Experiments show that IET recovers agent segments and coordination structure with high accuracy while preserving generation quality, enabling privacy-preserving auditing for multi-agent language systems.
Abstract:Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks. Practitioners deploy defense-trained models to protect against prompt injection attacks that manipulate agent behavior through malicious observations or retrieved content. We reveal a fundamental \textbf{capability-alignment paradox}: defense training designed to improve safety systematically destroys agent competence while failing to prevent sophisticated attacks. Evaluating defended models against undefended baselines across 97 agent tasks and 1,000 adversarial prompts, we uncover three systematic biases unique to multi-step agents. \textbf{Agent incompetence bias} manifests as immediate tool execution breakdown, with models refusing or generating invalid actions on benign tasks before observing any external content. \textbf{Cascade amplification bias} causes early failures to propagate through retry loops, pushing defended models to timeout on 99\% of tasks compared to 13\% for baselines. \textbf{Trigger bias} leads to paradoxical security degradation where defended models perform worse than undefended baselines while straightforward attacks bypass defenses at high rates. Root cause analysis reveals these biases stem from shortcut learning: models overfit to surface attack patterns rather than semantic threat understanding, evidenced by extreme variance in defense effectiveness across attack categories. Our findings demonstrate that current defense paradigms optimize for single-turn refusal benchmarks while rendering multi-step agents fundamentally unreliable, necessitating new approaches that preserve tool execution competence under adversarial conditions.
Abstract:Understanding the distance between human languages is central to linguistics, anthropology, and tracing human evolutionary history. Yet, while linguistics has long provided rich qualitative accounts of cross-linguistic variation, a unified and scalable quantitative approach to measuring language distance remains lacking. In this paper, we introduce a method that leverages pretrained multilingual language models as systematic instruments for linguistic measurement. Specifically, we show that the spontaneously emerged attention mechanisms of these models provide a robust, tokenization-agnostic measure of cross-linguistic distance, termed Attention Transport Distance (ATD). By treating attention matrices as probability distributions and measuring their geometric divergence via optimal transport, we quantify the representational distance between languages during translation. Applying ATD to a large and diverse set of languages, we demonstrate that the resulting distances recover established linguistic groupings with high fidelity and reveal patterns aligned with geographic and contact-induced relationships. Furthermore, incorporating ATD as a regularizer improves transfer performance in low-resource machine translation. Our results establish a principled foundation for testing linguistic hypotheses using artificial neural networks. This framework transforms multilingual models into powerful tools for quantitative linguistic discovery, facilitating more equitable multilingual AI.