Vision-language pre-training (VLP) models exhibit remarkable capabilities in comprehending both images and text, yet they remain susceptible to multimodal adversarial examples (AEs). Strengthening adversarial attacks and uncovering vulnerabilities, especially common issues in VLP models (e.g., high transferable AEs), can stimulate further research on constructing reliable and practical VLP models. A recent work (i.e., Set-level guidance attack) indicates that augmenting image-text pairs to increase AE diversity along the optimization path enhances the transferability of adversarial examples significantly. However, this approach predominantly emphasizes diversity around the online adversarial examples (i.e., AEs in the optimization period), leading to the risk of overfitting the victim model and affecting the transferability. In this study, we posit that the diversity of adversarial examples towards the clean input and online AEs are both pivotal for enhancing transferability across VLP models. Consequently, we propose using diversification along the intersection region of adversarial trajectory to expand the diversity of AEs. To fully leverage the interaction between modalities, we introduce text-guided adversarial example selection during optimization. Furthermore, to further mitigate the potential overfitting, we direct the adversarial text deviating from the last intersection region along the optimization path, rather than adversarial images as in existing methods. Extensive experiments affirm the effectiveness of our method in improving transferability across various VLP models and downstream vision-and-language tasks (e.g., Image-Text Retrieval(ITR), Visual Grounding(VG), Image Captioning(IC)).
Adversarial attack methods based on point manipulation for 3D point cloud classification have revealed the fragility of 3D models, yet the adversarial examples they produce are easily perceived or defended against. The trade-off between the imperceptibility and adversarial strength leads most point attack methods to inevitably introduce easily detectable outlier points upon a successful attack. Another promising strategy, shape-based attack, can effectively eliminate outliers, but existing methods often suffer significant reductions in imperceptibility due to irrational deformations. We find that concealing deformation perturbations in areas insensitive to human eyes can achieve a better trade-off between imperceptibility and adversarial strength, specifically in parts of the object surface that are complex and exhibit drastic curvature changes. Therefore, we propose a novel shape-based adversarial attack method, HiT-ADV, which initially conducts a two-stage search for attack regions based on saliency and imperceptibility scores, and then adds deformation perturbations in each attack region using Gaussian kernel functions. Additionally, HiT-ADV is extendable to physical attack. We propose that by employing benign resampling and benign rigid transformations, we can further enhance physical adversarial strength with little sacrifice to imperceptibility. Extensive experiments have validated the superiority of our method in terms of adversarial and imperceptible properties in both digital and physical spaces. Our code is avaliable at: https://github.com/TRLou/HiT-ADV.
The proliferation of face forgery techniques has raised significant concerns within society, thereby motivating the development of face forgery detection methods. These methods aim to distinguish forged faces from genuine ones and have proven effective in practical applications. However, this paper introduces a novel and previously unrecognized threat in face forgery detection scenarios caused by backdoor attack. By embedding backdoors into models and incorporating specific trigger patterns into the input, attackers can deceive detectors into producing erroneous predictions for forged faces. To achieve this goal, this paper proposes \emph{Poisoned Forgery Face} framework, which enables clean-label backdoor attacks on face forgery detectors. Our approach involves constructing a scalable trigger generator and utilizing a novel convolving process to generate translation-sensitive trigger patterns. Moreover, we employ a relative embedding method based on landmark-based regions to enhance the stealthiness of the poisoned samples. Consequently, detectors trained on our poisoned samples are embedded with backdoors. Notably, our approach surpasses SoTA backdoor baselines with a significant improvement in attack success rate (+16.39\% BD-AUC) and reduction in visibility (-12.65\% $L_\infty$). Furthermore, our attack exhibits promising performance against backdoor defenses. We anticipate that this paper will draw greater attention to the potential threats posed by backdoor attacks in face forgery detection scenarios. Our codes will be made available at \url{https://github.com/JWLiang007/PFF}
In recent years, LiDAR-camera fusion models have markedly advanced 3D object detection tasks in autonomous driving. However, their robustness against common weather corruption such as fog, rain, snow, and sunlight in the intricate physical world remains underexplored. In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of fusion models from the perspective of fusion strategies on the corrupted dataset. Based on the evaluation, we further propose a concise yet practical fusion strategy to enhance the robustness of the fusion models, namely flexibly weighted fusing features from LiDAR and camera sources to adapt to varying weather scenarios. Experiments conducted on four types of fusion models, each with two distinct lightweight implementations, confirm the broad applicability and effectiveness of the approach.
Diffusion models have been widely deployed in various image generation tasks, demonstrating an extraordinary connection between image and text modalities. However, they face challenges of being maliciously exploited to generate harmful or sensitive images by appending a specific suffix to the original prompt. Existing works mainly focus on using single-modal information to conduct attacks, which fails to utilize multi-modal features and results in less than satisfactory performance. Integrating multi-modal priors (MMP), i.e. both text and image features, we propose a targeted attack method named MMP-Attack in this work. Specifically, the goal of MMP-Attack is to add a target object into the image content while simultaneously removing the original object. The MMP-Attack shows a notable advantage over existing works with superior universality and transferability, which can effectively attack commercial text-to-image (T2I) models such as DALL-E 3. To the best of our knowledge, this marks the first successful attempt of transfer-based attack to commercial T2I models. Our code is publicly available at \url{https://github.com/ydc123/MMP-Attack}.
The field of few-shot learning (FSL) has shown promising results in scenarios where training data is limited, but its vulnerability to backdoor attacks remains largely unexplored. We first explore this topic by first evaluating the performance of the existing backdoor attack methods on few-shot learning scenarios. Unlike in standard supervised learning, existing backdoor attack methods failed to perform an effective attack in FSL due to two main issues. Firstly, the model tends to overfit to either benign features or trigger features, causing a tough trade-off between attack success rate and benign accuracy. Secondly, due to the small number of training samples, the dirty label or visible trigger in the support set can be easily detected by victims, which reduces the stealthiness of attacks. It seemed that FSL could survive from backdoor attacks. However, in this paper, we propose the Few-shot Learning Backdoor Attack (FLBA) to show that FSL can still be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Specifically, we first generate a trigger to maximize the gap between poisoned and benign features. It enables the model to learn both benign and trigger features, which solves the problem of overfitting. To make it more stealthy, we hide the trigger by optimizing two types of imperceptible perturbation, namely attractive and repulsive perturbation, instead of attaching the trigger directly. Once we obtain the perturbations, we can poison all samples in the benign support set into a hidden poisoned support set and fine-tune the model on it. Our method demonstrates a high Attack Success Rate (ASR) in FSL tasks with different few-shot learning paradigms while preserving clean accuracy and maintaining stealthiness. This study reveals that few-shot learning still suffers from backdoor attacks, and its security should be given attention.
Current Visual-Language Pre-training (VLP) models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. These adversarial examples present substantial security risks to VLP models, as they can leverage inherent weaknesses in the models, resulting in incorrect predictions. In contrast to white-box adversarial attacks, transfer attacks (where the adversary crafts adversarial examples on a white-box model to fool another black-box model) are more reflective of real-world scenarios, thus making them more meaningful for research. By summarizing and analyzing existing research, we identified two factors that can influence the efficacy of transfer attacks on VLP models: inter-modal interaction and data diversity. Based on these insights, we propose a self-augment-based transfer attack method, termed SA-Attack. Specifically, during the generation of adversarial images and adversarial texts, we apply different data augmentation methods to the image modality and text modality, respectively, with the aim of improving the adversarial transferability of the generated adversarial images and texts. Experiments conducted on the FLickr30K and COCO datasets have validated the effectiveness of our method. Our code will be available after this paper is accepted.
Vision-language pre-training (VLP) models demonstrate impressive abilities in processing both images and text. However, they are vulnerable to multi-modal adversarial examples (AEs). Investigating the generation of high-transferability adversarial examples is crucial for uncovering VLP models' vulnerabilities in practical scenarios. Recent works have indicated that leveraging data augmentation and image-text modal interactions can enhance the transferability of adversarial examples for VLP models significantly. However, they do not consider the optimal alignment problem between dataaugmented image-text pairs. This oversight leads to adversarial examples that are overly tailored to the source model, thus limiting improvements in transferability. In our research, we first explore the interplay between image sets produced through data augmentation and their corresponding text sets. We find that augmented image samples can align optimally with certain texts while exhibiting less relevance to others. Motivated by this, we propose an Optimal Transport-based Adversarial Attack, dubbed OT-Attack. The proposed method formulates the features of image and text sets as two distinct distributions and employs optimal transport theory to determine the most efficient mapping between them. This optimal mapping informs our generation of adversarial examples to effectively counteract the overfitting issues. Extensive experiments across various network architectures and datasets in image-text matching tasks reveal that our OT-Attack outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods in terms of adversarial transferability.
Transferability of adversarial examples on image classification has been systematically explored, which generates adversarial examples in black-box mode. However, the transferability of adversarial examples on semantic segmentation has been largely overlooked. In this paper, we propose an effective two-stage adversarial attack strategy to improve the transferability of adversarial examples on semantic segmentation, dubbed TranSegPGD. Specifically, at the first stage, every pixel in an input image is divided into different branches based on its adversarial property. Different branches are assigned different weights for optimization to improve the adversarial performance of all pixels.We assign high weights to the loss of the hard-to-attack pixels to misclassify all pixels. At the second stage, the pixels are divided into different branches based on their transferable property which is dependent on Kullback-Leibler divergence. Different branches are assigned different weights for optimization to improve the transferability of the adversarial examples. We assign high weights to the loss of the high-transferability pixels to improve the transferability of adversarial examples. Extensive experiments with various segmentation models are conducted on PASCAL VOC 2012 and Cityscapes datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. The proposed adversarial attack method can achieve state-of-the-art performance.
The emergence of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has revolutionized various domains, enabling the resolution of complex tasks spanning image recognition, natural language processing, and scientific problem-solving. However, this progress has also exposed a concerning vulnerability: adversarial examples. These crafted inputs, imperceptible to humans, can manipulate machine learning models into making erroneous predictions, raising concerns for safety-critical applications. An intriguing property of this phenomenon is the transferability of adversarial examples, where perturbations crafted for one model can deceive another, often with a different architecture. This intriguing property enables "black-box" attacks, circumventing the need for detailed knowledge of the target model. This survey explores the landscape of the adversarial transferability of adversarial examples. We categorize existing methodologies to enhance adversarial transferability and discuss the fundamental principles guiding each approach. While the predominant body of research primarily concentrates on image classification, we also extend our discussion to encompass other vision tasks and beyond. Challenges and future prospects are discussed, highlighting the importance of fortifying DNNs against adversarial vulnerabilities in an evolving landscape.