Emergence of Social Norms in Large Language Model-based Agent Societies

The emergence of social norms has attracted much interest in a wide array of disciplines, ranging from social science and cognitive science to artificial intelligence. In this paper, we propose the first generative agent architecture that empowers the emergence of social norms within a population of large language model-based agents. Our architecture, named CRSEC, consists of four modules: Creation & Representation, Spreading, Evaluation, and Compliance. Our architecture addresses several important aspects of the emergent processes all in one: (i) where social norms come from, (ii) how they are formally represented, (iii) how they spread through agents' communications and observations, (iv) how they are examined with a sanity check and synthesized in the long term, and (v) how they are incorporated into agents' planning and actions. Our experiments deployed in the Smallville sandbox game environment demonstrate the capability of our architecture to establish social norms and reduce social conflicts within large language model-based multi-agent systems. The positive outcomes of our human evaluation, conducted with 30 evaluators, further affirm the effectiveness of our approach.

Multi-Agent, Human-Agent and Beyond: A Survey on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

The study of cooperation within social dilemmas has long been a fundamental topic across various disciplines, including computer science and social science. Recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have significantly reshaped this field, offering fresh insights into understanding and enhancing cooperation. This survey examines three key areas at the intersection of AI and cooperation in social dilemmas. First, focusing on multi-agent cooperation, we review the intrinsic and external motivations that support cooperation among rational agents, and the methods employed to develop effective strategies against diverse opponents. Second, looking into human-agent cooperation, we discuss the current AI algorithms for cooperating with humans and the human biases towards AI agents. Third, we review the emergent field of leveraging AI agents to enhance cooperation among humans. We conclude by discussing future research avenues, such as using large language models, establishing unified theoretical frameworks, revisiting existing theories of human cooperation, and exploring multiple real-world applications.

Individual-Level Inverse Reinforcement Learning for Mean Field Games

The recent mean field game (MFG) formalism has enabled the application of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) methods in large-scale multi-agent systems, with the goal of inferring reward signals that can explain demonstrated behaviours of large populations. The existing IRL methods for MFGs are built upon reducing an MFG to a Markov decision process (MDP) defined on the collective behaviours and average rewards of the population. However, this paper reveals that the reduction from MFG to MDP holds only for the fully cooperative setting. This limitation invalidates existing IRL methods on MFGs with non-cooperative environments. To measure more general behaviours in large populations, we study the use of individual behaviours to infer ground-truth reward functions for MFGs. We propose Mean Field IRL (MFIRL), the first dedicated IRL framework for MFGs that can handle both cooperative and non-cooperative environments. Based on this theoretically justified framework, we develop a practical algorithm effective for MFGs with unknown dynamics. We evaluate MFIRL on both cooperative and mixed cooperative-competitive scenarios with many agents. Results demonstrate that MFIRL excels in reward recovery, sample efficiency and robustness in the face of changing dynamics.

The Evolutionary Dynamics of Independent Learning Agents in Population Games

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic interactions of a large population comprising small and anonymous agents. This paper presents a formal relation between stochastic processes and the dynamics of independent learning agents who reason based on the reward signals. Using a master equation approach, we provide a novel unified framework for characterising population dynamics via a single partial differential equation (Theorem 1). Through a case study involving Cross learning agents, we illustrate that Theorem 1 allows us to identify qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics, to analyse steady states, and to gain insights into the expected behaviour of a population. In addition, we present extensive experimental results validating that Theorem 1 holds for a variety of learning methods and population games.