Configurable Mirror Descent: Towards a Unification of Decision Making

Decision-making problems, categorized as single-agent, e.g., Atari, cooperative multi-agent, e.g., Hanabi, competitive multi-agent, e.g., Hold'em poker, and mixed cooperative and competitive, e.g., football, are ubiquitous in the real world. Various methods are proposed to address the specific decision-making problems. Despite the successes in specific categories, these methods typically evolve independently and cannot generalize to other categories. Therefore, a fundamental question for decision-making is: \emph{Can we develop \textbf{a single algorithm} to tackle \textbf{ALL} categories of decision-making problems?} There are several main challenges to address this question: i) different decision-making categories involve different numbers of agents and different relationships between agents, ii) different categories have different solution concepts and evaluation measures, and iii) there lacks a comprehensive benchmark covering all the categories. This work presents a preliminary attempt to address the question with three main contributions. i) We propose the generalized mirror descent (GMD), a generalization of MD variants, which considers multiple historical policies and works with a broader class of Bregman divergences. ii) We propose the configurable mirror descent (CMD) where a meta-controller is introduced to dynamically adjust the hyper-parameters in GMD conditional on the evaluation measures. iii) We construct the \textsc{GameBench} with 15 academic-friendly games across different decision-making categories. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CMD achieves empirically competitive or better outcomes compared to baselines while providing the capability of exploring diverse dimensions of decision making.

Provably Efficient Information-Directed Sampling Algorithms for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

This work designs and analyzes a novel set of algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) based on the principle of information-directed sampling (IDS). These algorithms draw inspiration from foundational concepts in information theory, and are proven to be sample efficient in MARL settings such as two-player zero-sum Markov games (MGs) and multi-player general-sum MGs. For episodic two-player zero-sum MGs, we present three sample-efficient algorithms for learning Nash equilibrium. The basic algorithm, referred to as MAIDS, employs an asymmetric learning structure where the max-player first solves a minimax optimization problem based on the joint information ratio of the joint policy, and the min-player then minimizes the marginal information ratio with the max-player's policy fixed. Theoretical analyses show that it achieves a Bayesian regret of tilde{O}(sqrt{K}) for K episodes. To reduce the computational load of MAIDS, we develop an improved algorithm called Reg-MAIDS, which has the same Bayesian regret bound while enjoying less computational complexity. Moreover, by leveraging the flexibility of IDS principle in choosing the learning target, we propose two methods for constructing compressed environments based on rate-distortion theory, upon which we develop an algorithm Compressed-MAIDS wherein the learning target is a compressed environment. Finally, we extend Reg-MAIDS to multi-player general-sum MGs and prove that it can learn either the Nash equilibrium or coarse correlated equilibrium in a sample efficient manner.

Emergence of Social Norms in Large Language Model-based Agent Societies

The emergence of social norms has attracted much interest in a wide array of disciplines, ranging from social science and cognitive science to artificial intelligence. In this paper, we propose the first generative agent architecture that empowers the emergence of social norms within a population of large language model-based agents. Our architecture, named CRSEC, consists of four modules: Creation & Representation, Spreading, Evaluation, and Compliance. Our architecture addresses several important aspects of the emergent processes all in one: (i) where social norms come from, (ii) how they are formally represented, (iii) how they spread through agents' communications and observations, (iv) how they are examined with a sanity check and synthesized in the long term, and (v) how they are incorporated into agents' planning and actions. Our experiments deployed in the Smallville sandbox game environment demonstrate the capability of our architecture to establish social norms and reduce social conflicts within large language model-based multi-agent systems. The positive outcomes of our human evaluation, conducted with 30 evaluators, further affirm the effectiveness of our approach.

Multi-Agent, Human-Agent and Beyond: A Survey on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

The study of cooperation within social dilemmas has long been a fundamental topic across various disciplines, including computer science and social science. Recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have significantly reshaped this field, offering fresh insights into understanding and enhancing cooperation. This survey examines three key areas at the intersection of AI and cooperation in social dilemmas. First, focusing on multi-agent cooperation, we review the intrinsic and external motivations that support cooperation among rational agents, and the methods employed to develop effective strategies against diverse opponents. Second, looking into human-agent cooperation, we discuss the current AI algorithms for cooperating with humans and the human biases towards AI agents. Third, we review the emergent field of leveraging AI agents to enhance cooperation among humans. We conclude by discussing future research avenues, such as using large language models, establishing unified theoretical frameworks, revisiting existing theories of human cooperation, and exploring multiple real-world applications.

Individual-Level Inverse Reinforcement Learning for Mean Field Games

The recent mean field game (MFG) formalism has enabled the application of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) methods in large-scale multi-agent systems, with the goal of inferring reward signals that can explain demonstrated behaviours of large populations. The existing IRL methods for MFGs are built upon reducing an MFG to a Markov decision process (MDP) defined on the collective behaviours and average rewards of the population. However, this paper reveals that the reduction from MFG to MDP holds only for the fully cooperative setting. This limitation invalidates existing IRL methods on MFGs with non-cooperative environments. To measure more general behaviours in large populations, we study the use of individual behaviours to infer ground-truth reward functions for MFGs. We propose Mean Field IRL (MFIRL), the first dedicated IRL framework for MFGs that can handle both cooperative and non-cooperative environments. Based on this theoretically justified framework, we develop a practical algorithm effective for MFGs with unknown dynamics. We evaluate MFIRL on both cooperative and mixed cooperative-competitive scenarios with many agents. Results demonstrate that MFIRL excels in reward recovery, sample efficiency and robustness in the face of changing dynamics.

The Evolutionary Dynamics of Independent Learning Agents in Population Games

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic interactions of a large population comprising small and anonymous agents. This paper presents a formal relation between stochastic processes and the dynamics of independent learning agents who reason based on the reward signals. Using a master equation approach, we provide a novel unified framework for characterising population dynamics via a single partial differential equation (Theorem 1). Through a case study involving Cross learning agents, we illustrate that Theorem 1 allows us to identify qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics, to analyse steady states, and to gain insights into the expected behaviour of a population. In addition, we present extensive experimental results validating that Theorem 1 holds for a variety of learning methods and population games.