The study of adversarial examples and their activation has attracted significant attention for secure and robust learning with deep neural networks (DNNs). Different from existing works, in this paper, we highlight two new characteristics of adversarial examples from the channel-wise activation perspective: 1) the activation magnitudes of adversarial examples are higher than that of natural examples; and 2) the channels are activated more uniformly by adversarial examples than natural examples. We find that the state-of-the-art defense adversarial training has addressed the first issue of high activation magnitudes via training on adversarial examples, while the second issue of uniform activation remains. This motivates us to suppress redundant activation from being activated by adversarial perturbations via a Channel-wise Activation Suppressing (CAS) strategy. We show that CAS can train a model that inherently suppresses adversarial activation, and can be easily applied to existing defense methods to further improve their robustness. Our work provides a simple but generic training strategy for robustifying the intermediate layer activation of DNNs.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to the \emph{backdoor attack}, which intends to embed hidden backdoors in DNNs by poisoning training data. The attacked model behaves normally on benign samples, whereas its prediction will be changed to a particular target label if hidden backdoors are activated. So far, backdoor research has mostly been conducted towards classification tasks. In this paper, we reveal that this threat could also happen in semantic segmentation, which may further endanger many mission-critical applications ($e.g.$, autonomous driving). Except for extending the existing attack paradigm to maliciously manipulate the segmentation models from the image-level, we propose a novel attack paradigm, the \emph{fine-grained attack}, where we treat the target label ($i.e.$, annotation) from the object-level instead of the image-level to achieve more sophisticated manipulation. In the annotation of poisoned samples generated by the fine-grained attack, only pixels of specific objects will be labeled with the attacker-specified target class while others are still with their ground-truth ones. Experiments show that the proposed methods can successfully attack semantic segmentation models by poisoning only a small proportion of training data. Our method not only provides a new perspective for designing novel attacks but also serves as a strong baseline for improving the robustness of semantic segmentation methods.
Designing proper loss functions for vision tasks has been a long-standing research direction to advance the capability of existing models. For object detection, the well-established classification and regression loss functions have been carefully designed by considering diverse learning challenges. Inspired by the recent progress in network architecture search, it is interesting to explore the possibility of discovering new loss function formulations via directly searching the primitive operation combinations. So that the learned losses not only fit for diverse object detection challenges to alleviate huge human efforts, but also have better alignment with evaluation metric and good mathematical convergence property. Beyond the previous auto-loss works on face recognition and image classification, our work makes the first attempt to discover new loss functions for the challenging object detection from primitive operation levels. We propose an effective convergence-simulation driven evolutionary search algorithm, called CSE-Autoloss, for speeding up the search progress by regularizing the mathematical rationality of loss candidates via convergence property verification and model optimization simulation. CSE-Autoloss involves the search space that cover a wide range of the possible variants of existing losses and discovers best-searched loss function combination within a short time (around 1.5 wall-clock days). We conduct extensive evaluations of loss function search on popular detectors and validate the good generalization capability of searched losses across diverse architectures and datasets. Our experiments show that the best-discovered loss function combinations outperform default combinations by 1.1% and 0.8% in terms of mAP for two-stage and one-stage detectors on COCO respectively. Our searched losses are available at https://github.com/PerdonLiu/CSE-Autoloss.
It is extensively studied that Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to Adversarial Examples (AEs). With more and more advanced adversarial attack methods have been developed, a quantity of corresponding defense solutions were designed to enhance the robustness of DNN models. It has become a popularity to leverage data augmentation techniques to preprocess input samples before inference to remove adversarial perturbations. By obfuscating the gradients of DNN models, these approaches can defeat a considerable number of conventional attacks. Unfortunately, advanced gradient-based attack techniques (e.g., BPDA and EOT) were introduced to invalidate these preprocessing effects. In this paper, we present FenceBox, a comprehensive framework to defeat various kinds of adversarial attacks. FenceBox is equipped with 15 data augmentation methods from three different categories. We comprehensively evaluated that these methods can effectively mitigate various adversarial attacks. FenceBox also provides APIs for users to easily deploy the defense over their models in different modes: they can either select an arbitrary preprocessing method, or a combination of functions for a better robustness guarantee, even under advanced adversarial attacks. We open-source FenceBox, and expect it can be used as a standard toolkit to facilitate the research of adversarial attacks and defenses.
The neural linear-chain CRF model is one of the most widely-used approach to sequence labeling. In this paper, we investigate a series of increasingly expressive potential functions for neural CRF models, which not only integrate the emission and transition functions, but also explicitly take the representations of the contextual words as input. Our extensive experiments show that the decomposed quadrilinear potential function based on the vector representations of two neighboring labels and two neighboring words consistently achieves the best performance.
Sequence labeling is a fundamental problem in machine learning, natural language processing and many other fields. A classic approach to sequence labeling is linear chain conditional random fields (CRFs). When combined with neural network encoders, they achieve very good performance in many sequence labeling tasks. One limitation of linear chain CRFs is their inability to model long-range dependencies between labels. High order CRFs extend linear chain CRFs by modeling dependencies no longer than their order, but the computational complexity grows exponentially in the order. In this paper, we propose the Neural Latent Dependency Model (NLDM) that models dependencies of arbitrary length between labels with a latent tree structure. We develop an end-to-end training algorithm and a polynomial-time inference algorithm of our model. We evaluate our model on both synthetic and real datasets and show that our model outperforms strong baselines.
For further progress in video object segmentation (VOS), larger, more diverse, and more challenging datasets will be necessary. However, densely labeling every frame with pixel masks does not scale to large datasets. We use a deep convolutional network to automatically create pseudo-labels on a pixel level from much cheaper bounding box annotations and investigate how far such pseudo-labels can carry us for training state-of-the-art VOS approaches. A very encouraging result of our study is that adding a manually annotated mask in only a single video frame for each object is sufficient to generate pseudo-labels which can be used to train a VOS method to reach almost the same performance level as when training with fully segmented videos. We use this workflow to create pixel pseudo-labels for the training set of the challenging tracking dataset TAO, and we manually annotate a subset of the validation set. Together, we obtain the new TAO-VOS benchmark, which we make publicly available at www.vision.rwth-aachen.de/page/taovos. While the performance of state-of-the-art methods on existing datasets starts to saturate, TAO-VOS remains very challenging for current algorithms and reveals their shortcomings.
Most of the unsupervised dependency parsers are based on first-order probabilistic generative models that only consider local parent-child information. Inspired by second-order supervised dependency parsing, we proposed a second-order extension of unsupervised neural dependency models that incorporate grandparent-child or sibling information. We also propose a novel design of the neural parameterization and optimization methods of the dependency models. In second-order models, the number of grammar rules grows cubically with the increase of vocabulary size, making it difficult to train lexicalized models that may contain thousands of words. To circumvent this problem while still benefiting from both second-order parsing and lexicalization, we use the agreement-based learning framework to jointly train a second-order unlexicalized model and a first-order lexicalized model. Experiments on multiple datasets show the effectiveness of our second-order models compared with recent state-of-the-art methods. Our joint model achieves a 10% improvement over the previous state-of-the-art parser on the full WSJ test set
Speaker verification has been widely and successfully adopted in many mission-critical areas for user identification. The training of speaker verification requires a large amount of data, therefore users usually need to adopt third-party data ($e.g.$, data from the Internet or third-party data company). This raises the question of whether adopting untrusted third-party data can pose a security threat. In this paper, we demonstrate that it is possible to inject the hidden backdoor for infecting speaker verification models by poisoning the training data. Specifically, we design a clustering-based attack scheme where poisoned samples from different clusters will contain different triggers ($i.e.$, pre-defined utterances), based on our understanding of verification tasks. The infected models behave normally on benign samples, while attacker-specified unenrolled triggers will successfully pass the verification even if the attacker has no information about the enrolled speaker. We also demonstrate that existing backdoor attacks can not be directly adopted in attacking speaker verification. Our attack not only provides a new perspective for designing novel attacks, but also serves as a strong baseline for improving the robustness of verification methods.