SciAgentGym: Benchmarking Multi-Step Scientific Tool-use in LLM Agents

Scientific reasoning inherently demands integrating sophisticated toolkits to navigate domain-specific knowledge. Yet, current benchmarks largely overlook agents' ability to orchestrate tools for such rigorous workflows. To bridge this gap, we introduce SciAgentGym, a scalable interactive environment featuring 1,780 domain-specific tools across four natural science disciplines, supported by a robust execution infrastructure. Complementing this, we present SciAgentBench, a tiered evaluation suite designed to stress-test agentic capabilities from elementary actions to long-horizon workflows. Our evaluation identifies a critical bottleneck: state-of-the-art models struggle with complex scientific tool-use. Even for a leading model like GPT-5, success rates drop sharply from 60.6% to 30.9% as interaction horizons extend, primarily due to failures in multi-step workflow execution. To address this, we propose SciForge, a data synthesis method that models the tool action space as a dependency graph to generate logic-aware training trajectories. By fine-tuning on these trajectories, our SciAgent-8B outperforms the significantly larger Qwen3-VL-235B-Instruct while exhibiting positive cross-domain transfer of scientific tool-use capabilities. These results underscore the promising potential of next-generation autonomous scientific agents.

Mirror: A Multi-Agent System for AI-Assisted Ethics Review

Ethics review is a foundational mechanism of modern research governance, yet contemporary systems face increasing strain as ethical risks arise as structural consequences of large-scale, interdisciplinary scientific practice. The demand for consistent and defensible decisions under heterogeneous risk profiles exposes limitations in institutional review capacity rather than in the legitimacy of ethics oversight. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) offer new opportunities to support ethics review, but their direct application remains limited by insufficient ethical reasoning capability, weak integration with regulatory structures, and strict privacy constraints on authentic review materials. In this work, we introduce Mirror, an agentic framework for AI-assisted ethical review that integrates ethical reasoning, structured rule interpretation, and multi-agent deliberation within a unified architecture. At its core is EthicsLLM, a foundational model fine-tuned on EthicsQA, a specialized dataset of 41K question-chain-of-thought-answer triples distilled from authoritative ethics and regulatory corpora. EthicsLLM provides detailed normative and regulatory understanding, enabling Mirror to operate in two complementary modes. Mirror-ER (expedited Review) automates expedited review through an executable rule base that supports efficient and transparent compliance checks for minimal-risk studies. Mirror-CR (Committee Review) simulates full-board deliberation through coordinated interactions among expert agents, an ethics secretary agent, and a principal investigator agent, producing structured, committee-level assessments across ten ethical dimensions. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that Mirror significantly improves the quality, consistency, and professionalism of ethics assessments compared with strong generalist LLMs.

Toward Universal and Transferable Jailbreak Attacks on Vision-Language Models

Vision-language models (VLMs) extend large language models (LLMs) with vision encoders, enabling text generation conditioned on both images and text. However, this multimodal integration expands the attack surface by exposing the model to image-based jailbreaks crafted to induce harmful responses. Existing gradient-based jailbreak methods transfer poorly, as adversarial patterns overfit to a single white-box surrogate and fail to generalise to black-box models. In this work, we propose Universal and transferable jailbreak (UltraBreak), a framework that constrains adversarial patterns through transformations and regularisation in the vision space, while relaxing textual targets through semantic-based objectives. By defining its loss in the textual embedding space of the target LLM, UltraBreak discovers universal adversarial patterns that generalise across diverse jailbreak objectives. This combination of vision-level regularisation and semantically guided textual supervision mitigates surrogate overfitting and enables strong transferability across both models and attack targets. Extensive experiments show that UltraBreak consistently outperforms prior jailbreak methods. Further analysis reveals why earlier approaches fail to transfer, highlighting that smoothing the loss landscape via semantic objectives is crucial for enabling universal and transferable jailbreaks. The code is publicly available in our \href{https://github.com/kaiyuanCui/UltraBreak}{GitHub repository}.

Just Ask: Curious Code Agents Reveal System Prompts in Frontier LLMs

Autonomous code agents built on large language models are reshaping software and AI development through tool use, long-horizon reasoning, and self-directed interaction. However, this autonomy introduces a previously unrecognized security risk: agentic interaction fundamentally expands the LLM attack surface, enabling systematic probing and recovery of hidden system prompts that guide model behavior. We identify system prompt extraction as an emergent vulnerability intrinsic to code agents and present \textbf{\textsc{JustAsk}}, a self-evolving framework that autonomously discovers effective extraction strategies through interaction alone. Unlike prior prompt-engineering or dataset-based attacks, \textsc{JustAsk} requires no handcrafted prompts, labeled supervision, or privileged access beyond standard user interaction. It formulates extraction as an online exploration problem, using Upper Confidence Bound-based strategy selection and a hierarchical skill space spanning atomic probes and high-level orchestration. These skills exploit imperfect system-instruction generalization and inherent tensions between helpfulness and safety. Evaluated on \textbf{41} black-box commercial models across multiple providers, \textsc{JustAsk} consistently achieves full or near-complete system prompt recovery, revealing recurring design- and architecture-level vulnerabilities. Our results expose system prompts as a critical yet largely unprotected attack surface in modern agent systems.

FRoM-W1: Towards General Humanoid Whole-Body Control with Language Instructions

Humanoid robots are capable of performing various actions such as greeting, dancing and even backflipping. However, these motions are often hard-coded or specifically trained, which limits their versatility. In this work, we present FRoM-W1, an open-source framework designed to achieve general humanoid whole-body motion control using natural language. To universally understand natural language and generate corresponding motions, as well as enable various humanoid robots to stably execute these motions in the physical world under gravity, FRoM-W1 operates in two stages: (a) H-GPT: utilizing massive human data, a large-scale language-driven human whole-body motion generation model is trained to generate diverse natural behaviors. We further leverage the Chain-of-Thought technique to improve the model's generalization in instruction understanding. (b) H-ACT: After retargeting generated human whole-body motions into robot-specific actions, a motion controller that is pretrained and further fine-tuned through reinforcement learning in physical simulation enables humanoid robots to accurately and stably perform corresponding actions. It is then deployed on real robots via a modular simulation-to-reality module. We extensively evaluate FRoM-W1 on Unitree H1 and G1 robots. Results demonstrate superior performance on the HumanML3D-X benchmark for human whole-body motion generation, and our introduced reinforcement learning fine-tuning consistently improves both motion tracking accuracy and task success rates of these humanoid robots. We open-source the entire FRoM-W1 framework and hope it will advance the development of humanoid intelligence.

A Safety Report on GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has driven major gains in reasoning, perception, and generation across language and vision, yet whether these advances translate into comparable improvements in safety remains unclear, partly due to fragmented evaluations that focus on isolated modalities or threat models. In this report, we present an integrated safety evaluation of six frontier models--GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5--assessing each across language, vision-language, and image generation using a unified protocol that combines benchmark, adversarial, multilingual, and compliance evaluations. By aggregating results into safety leaderboards and model profiles, we reveal a highly uneven safety landscape: while GPT-5.2 demonstrates consistently strong and balanced performance, other models exhibit clear trade-offs across benchmark safety, adversarial robustness, multilingual generalization, and regulatory compliance. Despite strong results under standard benchmarks, all models remain highly vulnerable under adversarial testing, with worst-case safety rates dropping below 6%. Text-to-image models show slightly stronger alignment in regulated visual risk categories, yet remain fragile when faced with adversarial or semantically ambiguous prompts. Overall, these findings highlight that safety in frontier models is inherently multidimensional--shaped by modality, language, and evaluation design--underscoring the need for standardized, holistic safety assessments to better reflect real-world risk and guide responsible deployment.

BackdoorAgent: A Unified Framework for Backdoor Attacks on LLM-based Agents

Large language model (LLM) agents execute tasks through multi-step workflows that combine planning, memory, and tool use. While this design enables autonomy, it also expands the attack surface for backdoor threats. Backdoor triggers injected into specific stages of an agent workflow can persist through multiple intermediate states and adversely influence downstream outputs. However, existing studies remain fragmented and typically analyze individual attack vectors in isolation, leaving the cross-stage interaction and propagation of backdoor triggers poorly understood from an agent-centric perspective. To fill this gap, we propose \textbf{BackdoorAgent}, a modular and stage-aware framework that provides a unified, agent-centric view of backdoor threats in LLM agents. BackdoorAgent structures the attack surface into three functional stages of agentic workflows, including \textbf{planning attacks}, \textbf{memory attacks}, and \textbf{tool-use attacks}, and instruments agent execution to enable systematic analysis of trigger activation and propagation across different stages. Building on this framework, we construct a standardized benchmark spanning four representative agent applications: \textbf{Agent QA}, \textbf{Agent Code}, \textbf{Agent Web}, and \textbf{Agent Drive}, covering both language-only and multimodal settings. Our empirical analysis shows that \textit{triggers implanted at a single stage can persist across multiple steps and propagate through intermediate states.} For instance, when using a GPT-based backbone, we observe trigger persistence in 43.58\% of planning attacks, 77.97\% of memory attacks, and 60.28\% of tool-stage attacks, highlighting the vulnerabilities of the agentic workflow itself to backdoor threats. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and benchmark are publicly available at GitHub.

OpenRT: An Open-Source Red Teaming Framework for Multimodal LLMs

The rapid integration of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) into critical applications is increasingly hindered by persistent safety vulnerabilities. However, existing red-teaming benchmarks are often fragmented, limited to single-turn text interactions, and lack the scalability required for systematic evaluation. To address this, we introduce OpenRT, a unified, modular, and high-throughput red-teaming framework designed for comprehensive MLLM safety evaluation. At its core, OpenRT architects a paradigm shift in automated red-teaming by introducing an adversarial kernel that enables modular separation across five critical dimensions: model integration, dataset management, attack strategies, judging methods, and evaluation metrics. By standardizing attack interfaces, it decouples adversarial logic from a high-throughput asynchronous runtime, enabling systematic scaling across diverse models. Our framework integrates 37 diverse attack methodologies, spanning white-box gradients, multi-modal perturbations, and sophisticated multi-agent evolutionary strategies. Through an extensive empirical study on 20 advanced models (including GPT-5.2, Claude 4.5, and Gemini 3 Pro), we expose critical safety gaps: even frontier models fail to generalize across attack paradigms, with leading models exhibiting average Attack Success Rates as high as 49.14%. Notably, our findings reveal that reasoning models do not inherently possess superior robustness against complex, multi-turn jailbreaks. By open-sourcing OpenRT, we provide a sustainable, extensible, and continuously maintained infrastructure that accelerates the development and standardization of AI safety.

Coarse-to-Fine Open-Set Graph Node Classification with Large Language Models

Developing open-set classification methods capable of classifying in-distribution (ID) data while detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) samples is essential for deploying graph neural networks (GNNs) in open-world scenarios. Existing methods typically treat all OOD samples as a single class, despite real-world applications, especially high-stake settings such as fraud detection and medical diagnosis, demanding deeper insights into OOD samples, including their probable labels. This raises a critical question: can OOD detection be extended to OOD classification without true label information? To address this question, we propose a Coarse-to-Fine open-set Classification (CFC) framework that leverages large language models (LLMs) for graph datasets. CFC consists of three key components: a coarse classifier that uses LLM prompts for OOD detection and outlier label generation, a GNN-based fine classifier trained with OOD samples identified by the coarse classifier for enhanced OOD detection and ID classification, and refined OOD classification achieved through LLM prompts and post-processed OOD labels. Unlike methods that rely on synthetic or auxiliary OOD samples, CFC employs semantic OOD instances that are genuinely out-of-distribution based on their inherent meaning, improving interpretability and practical utility. Experimental results show that CFC improves OOD detection by ten percent over state-of-the-art methods on graph and text domains and achieves up to seventy percent accuracy in OOD classification on graph datasets.

Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs

Automated red teaming frameworks for Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, yet they share a fundamental limitation: their jailbreak logic is confined to selecting, combining, or refining pre-existing attack strategies. This binds their creativity and leaves them unable to autonomously invent entirely new attack mechanisms. To overcome this gap, we introduce \textbf{EvoSynth}, an autonomous framework that shifts the paradigm from attack planning to the evolutionary synthesis of jailbreak methods. Instead of refining prompts, EvoSynth employs a multi-agent system to autonomously engineer, evolve, and execute novel, code-based attack algorithms. Crucially, it features a code-level self-correction loop, allowing it to iteratively rewrite its own attack logic in response to failure. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that EvoSynth not only establishes a new state-of-the-art by achieving an 85.5\% Attack Success Rate (ASR) against highly robust models like Claude-Sonnet-4.5, but also generates attacks that are significantly more diverse than those from existing methods. We release our framework to facilitate future research in this new direction of evolutionary synthesis of jailbreak methods. Code is available at: https://github.com/dongdongunique/EvoSynth.