Abstract:Proprietary text-to-image diffusion models are increasingly distributed as hosted services and downloadable checkpoints, making their intellectual property (IP) protection an increasingly critical concern when model leakage, copying, or unauthorized fine-tuning is disputed. In this work, we present a non-invasive model fingerprinting framework based on \emph{collapsed generation}, a phenomenon where certain input conditions produce highly consistent images across multiple stochastic seeds. We show that collapsed generation is an intrinsic, model-dependent property of the learned generation process. These collapse-prone conditions therefore expose model-specific behavioral signatures, enabling reliable ownership verification without embedding invasive watermarks. After preparing conditions on the source model, the framework verifies a suspect model under two access settings: (1) white-box pipeline access, where optimized continuous embeddings can be injected into the generation process, and (2) black-box API-only access, where natural language prompts are queried through the service interface. In both cases, ownership evidence is measured by whether the suspect model reproduces the source model's collapse behavior across stochastic samplings. Extensive experiments across UNet- and transformer-based diffusion models show that collapsed generation fingerprints can distinguish different source models with low confusion. These fingerprints remain verifiable in fine-tuned derivatives and under common and adaptive model- or query-level obfuscations, while requiring only a modest verification query budget. Together, these results establish collapsed generation as a reliable intrinsic evidence source for non-invasive diffusion model ownership verification.
Abstract:Pretraining corpus composition shapes LLM capabilities, but it often remains hidden even when model weights are released. Prior work has inferred corpus mixtures or traced specific token groups from released tokenizer vocabularies; in contrast, we estimate corpus ratios for arbitrary target tokens. We first show that BPE tokenizers trained on different corpora share stable token ID--ratio distributions, motivating distribution transfer from known corpora to a target tokenizer trained on hidden corpora. We then propose Quantile-Guided Density Estimation (QGDE), which approximates this distribution with multiple quantile trends and uses local density weighting to produce token-level estimates. In controlled settings and a realistic setting using the released SmolLM tokenizer, QGDE achieves mean relative errors as low as 3.00% for token-level estimation and 3.08% after aggregation into category-level mixtures. These results suggest that released tokenizer vocabularies provide a useful signal for fine-grained corpus estimation beyond coarse composition inference.
Abstract:Chinese web pollution has surfaced in LLMs, motivating audits of upstream Chinese corpora. However, auditing such corpora faces three challenges: (1) their web-scale size makes full scan costly; (2) prior analyses are often too coarse to expose token-level pollution; (3) Chinese web pollution is implicit and rapidly changing. We propose Sampled-BPE, a lightweight token-level auditing pipeline that sample a small subset and train BPE tokenizer to surface polluted tokens. Experiments show that Sampled-BPE preserves usable estimates while substantially reducing runtime and memory: a 148.4 $\times$ speedup and a 35.8 $\times$ memory reduction induce only 4.25% relative error for pollution categories. We apply the pipeline to 11 open Chinese corpora and 6 Chinese Common Crawl snapshots from 2021 to 2026. The audit reveals widespread but uneven pollution across open corpora, as well as highly polluted and temporally shifting Chinese web content. We further release a hierarchical Chinese web token dataset with 660k+ token records, each with web context, category, and explanation fields, organized as trees to support review and tracing of pollution.
Abstract:Self-evolving agents are usually built around prescribed optimization pipelines: the framework decides how to gather evidence, revise a persistent artifact, select candidates, and stop. We ask whether this task-specific procedure remains necessary when a frontier model acts as the optimizer. We introduce Open-Ended Optimization (OEO), which keeps the objective, permitted interactions, resource budget, data boundary, and evaluation fixed while allowing the optimizer to compose the improvement process online. We compare OEO with two complementary prescribed approaches: SkillOpt, a staged pipeline with bounded edits, and GEPA, a reflective evolutionary search. Across 14 head-to-head comparisons over 8 benchmark-target-model settings, GPT-5.5-driven OEO records 12 wins, 1 tie, and 1 narrow loss of 0.21 percentage points. It uses a median 34.3 percent of SkillOpt's configured target-interaction token budget. A one-shot, zero-interaction control shows that the gains are not explained by a single prior-driven rewrite. However, delegation has a capability boundary: SkillOpt outperforms OEO with a medium optimizer, and a weak optimizer cannot operate through the unchanged OEO interface. In the fully instrumented OEO-SkillOpt pair, trajectory analysis further shows that prescription changes how optimization proceeds more consistently than it changes final behavior. Together, these findings recast prescribed pipelines as capability-dependent scaffolding: essential constraints remain external, but a sufficiently capable optimizer can compose the route from measurable feedback to persistent improvement.
Abstract:Despite the impressive generative capabilities of text-to-image diffusion models, they remain vulnerable to implicit sexual prompts, where subtle cues disguised as benign terms or adversarial tokens unexpectedly generate the inappropriate content due to model biases or latent correlations in training data. Existing safety mechanisms face fundamental limitations: detection methods primarily identify explicit content and fail to capture implicit malicious intent, while mitigation approaches rely on static negative prompts inadequate for diverse implicit scenarios. To address these challenges, we propose UniNDM, a unified noise-driven framework that rethinks safety mechanisms through the lens of noise dynamics in diffusion processes. Our key insight is that early-stage predicted noise exhibits inherent separability between normal and sexually explicit content, which we theoretically demonstrates quadratically increasing semantic concentration with timestep. Leveraging this property, we develop a lightweight noise-based detector achieving superior accuracy with virtually no computational overhead. For mitigation, we introduce noise-enhanced adaptive negative guidance: dynamically generating context-specific negative prompts via large language models to handle diverse implicit content, while optimizing initial noise by suppressing attention concentration on explicit tokens to provide comprehensive protection. Besides the U-Net-based diffusion models, we further extend our framework to emerging Diffusion Transformer architectures through region-constrained semantic guidance tailored for their unified multimodal attention. Comprehensive experiments across U-Net models and DiT models on both natural and adversarial datasets demonstrate substantial improvements over state-of-the-art methods, including SLD, UCE, Safree, etc. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/UniNDM.
Abstract:Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved high visual fidelity and broad adoption, but remain vulnerable to safety violations when adversaries exploit them to synthesize illicit content. Existing alignment paradigms, from input sanitization to structural feature pruning, are largely organized around unsafe concepts explicitly exposed during filtering, editing, or localization. This leaves a blind spot for visual synonym attacks (VSA), a jailbreak where benign-looking prompts elicit prohibited imagery through implicit visual associations. As a result, current defenses face a safety-utility dilemma: they may either under-mitigate VSA threats or over-suppress visually similar benign concepts. The core challenge is that VSA hides the unsafe target at the textual surface while revealing it through generation-time visual-semantic convergence. In this work, we therefore shift from static suppression of pre-specified unsafe concepts to dynamic tracing of how unsafe semantics emerge during generation. Our mechanistic analysis shows that VSA and explicit unsafe prompts converge through sparse semantic-injecting attention heads, which serve as inference-time bottlenecks for prohibited visual semantics. Based on this insight, we propose AEGIS (Adaptive Evasion Guard via Identification and Steering), an inference-time defense that applies similarity-aware repulsion only at the identified vulnerable heads. Evaluated against 16 baselines, AEGIS improves both safety and utility. On SD 1.4, it reduces ASR to $\mathbf{0.00}/\mathbf{0.03}$ for in-domain violence/nudity VSA and achieves ASRs $\le \mathbf{0.09}$ on out-of-domain explicit and adversarial attacks. It preserves benign fidelity, avoids suppressing hard-negative concepts, and transfers to SD 2.1 and FLUX.1 after re-identifying the critical heads for each backbone.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse applications, yet ensuring their simultaneous safety, helpfulness, and trustworthiness remains a persistent challenge. Conventional refusal-oriented alignment strategies mitigate harmful content generation but systematically fail to serve legitimate user needs, often withholding information that could safely and constructively address the underlying intent of sensitive queries. Building upon the constructive safety paradigm pioneered by Oyster-I, which moves beyond blanket refusal toward thoughtful, response-oriented safety alignment, we identify two critical limitations of its Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT)-based scheme: insufficient safety generalization to out-of-distribution scenarios and a phenomenon we term safety chain-of-thought (CoT) over-generalization, wherein safety-oriented reasoning patterns are excessively applied to benign queries, degrading helpfulness and user experience. To address these limitations, we propose Oyster-II, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based constructive safety alignment framework that adopts a Zero-RL paradigm combined with a multi-stage reinforcement learning strategy.Evaluated across extensive benchmarks, Oyster-II comprehensively surpasses both Qwen3-14B and its predecessor Oyster-I on safety dimensions, achieving cross-scale performance comparable to Qwen3-Max and Qwen3.5-397B.
Abstract:Fine-grained visual reasoning remains challenging for vision-language models, especially when small but critical visual cues are buried in high-resolution images. Existing approaches rely on repeated cropping or test-time visual search to introduce local evidence, but they typically do not explicitly distinguish perception from reasoning. In this paper, we propose Perceive-to-Reason (P2R), a unified framework that formulates fine-grained visual reasoning as a two-stage process: the model first localizes question-relevant evidence as a Perceiver, and then answers the question as a Reasoner based on the annotated image and cropped regions. To better align training with this decoupled formulation, we further introduce Perception-Reasoning Alternating GRPO (PRA-GRPO), a role-aware reinforcement learning strategy that alternates between perception-focused and reasoning-focused updates using only final-answer supervision. Built on top of Qwen3-VL-Instruct-2B/4B/8B, P2R consistently improves performance across model scales. In particular, P2R-4B achieves 93.2% on V-Star, 81.9% on HR-Bench-4K, and 80.5% on HR-Bench-8K, substantially outperforming its corresponding backbone. Further experiments show that the benefits of P2R extend beyond high-resolution benchmarks to broader multimodal reasoning tasks. These results suggest that explicitly decoupling perception from reasoning provides an effective framework for fine-grained visual reasoning.
Abstract:As large language models are increasingly deployed in real-world systems, safety failures can still lead to harmful outputs and dangerous misuse. We argue that the essence of safety is adversarial: many failures arise not from natural inputs alone, but from strategic attempts to evade model policies and safeguards. However, existing general-purpose model development largely overlook this adversarial nature, and often remain insufficient for realistic safety scenarios involving planning, tool use, and multi-step reasoning, causing measured safety performance to overestimate real deployment robustness. To address this gap, we present Yuvion LLM, a large language model built for adversarially robust content safety and broader AI safety. Yuvion LLM treats adversarial robustness and agentic capability as first-class objectives. Its pipeline combines adversarially aware data construction, knowledge-enhanced continued pretraining, and policy-grounded multi-task safety post-training, including risk-aware supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning-based policy optimization, together with safety-aware agentic reinforcement learning for tool use and multi-step reasoning in complex safety scenarios. We further introduce the Yuvion LLM RiskEval (YLRE), a collection of 93 benchmarks across four evaluation categories, covering diverse open and internal evaluations with a focus on safety, adversarial robustness, and real-world capability requirements. Across these evaluations, Yuvion LLM demonstrates clear advantages on safety-focused benchmarks and particularly strong robustness under adversarial conditions, while maintaining solid overall capability. Notably, Yuvion-8B outperforms most state-of-the-art baselines, including substantially larger models such as GPT-5.4 and Qwen3-MAX, on several safety tasks.
Abstract:General-purpose models often struggle to reliably identify and understand real-world multimodal risks, largely due to the inherent multimodal adversarial nature of content and AI safety. We present Yuvion VL, a family of multimodal large language models purpose-built for content and AI safety, with both instruction-tuned and reasoning-oriented variants. Yuvion VL addresses this gap by treating safety as an inherently adversarial and multimodal problem and designing the entire pipeline around adversarial robustness. For data construction, we develop an automated pipeline integrating adversarial-aware data synthesis with multi-stage quality control, producing large-scale, high-quality multimodal samples augmented with domain knowledge and reasoning annotations. For training, we adopt a three-stage pipeline that includes continued pretraining for risk-concept cross-modal alignment, instruct post-training for production-grade safety tasks, and reasoning post-training for enhanced interpretability and performance in complex tasks. We further introduce Confuse-then-Contrast Fine-Tuning, a contrastive framework that mines model-specific confusions and constructs multi-image contrastive groups to enforce explicit discrimination of fine-grained visual-semantic elements, enabling the model to distinguish between visually similar cases with different safety implications in adversarial safety tasks. To support rigorous evaluation, we further introduce Yuvion VL RiskEval (YVRE), a collection of benchmarks covering diverse open and internal evaluations, with a focus on content and AI safety, adversarial robustness, and real-world capability requirements. Experiments show that Yuvion VL-32B achieves industry-leading safety performance, surpassing comparably sized open-source models and best closed-source commercial models, while maintaining comparable general capabilities.