The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have heightened concerns about their potential misalignment with human values. However, evaluating their grasp of these values is complex due to their intricate and adaptable nature. We argue that truly understanding values in LLMs requires considering both "know what" and "know why". To this end, we present the Value Understanding Measurement (VUM) framework that quantitatively assesses both "know what" and "know why" by measuring the discriminator-critique gap related to human values. Using the Schwartz Value Survey, we specify our evaluation values and develop a thousand-level dialogue dataset with GPT-4. Our assessment looks at both the value alignment of LLM's outputs compared to baseline answers and how LLM responses align with reasons for value recognition versus GPT-4's annotations. We evaluate five representative LLMs and provide strong evidence that the scaling law significantly impacts "know what" but not much on "know why", which has consistently maintained a high level. This may further suggest that LLMs might craft plausible explanations based on the provided context without truly understanding their inherent value, indicating potential risks.
Preference-based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) has demonstrated remarkable efficacy in aligning rewards with human intentions. However, a significant challenge lies in the need of substantial human labels, which is costly and time-consuming. Additionally, the expensive preference data obtained from prior tasks is not typically reusable for subsequent task learning, leading to extensive labeling for each new task. In this paper, we propose a novel zero-shot preference-based RL algorithm that leverages labeled preference data from source tasks to infer labels for target tasks, eliminating the requirement for human queries. Our approach utilizes Gromov-Wasserstein distance to align trajectory distributions between source and target tasks. The solved optimal transport matrix serves as a correspondence between trajectories of two tasks, making it possible to identify corresponding trajectory pairs between tasks and transfer the preference labels. However, learning directly from inferred labels that contains a fraction of noisy labels will result in an inaccurate reward function, subsequently affecting policy performance. To this end, we introduce Robust Preference Transformer, which models the rewards as Gaussian distributions and incorporates reward uncertainty in addition to reward mean. The empirical results on robotic manipulation tasks of Meta-World and Robomimic show that our method has strong capabilities of transferring preferences between tasks and learns reward functions from noisy labels robustly. Furthermore, we reveal that our method attains near-oracle performance with a small proportion of scripted labels.