Learn to Match with No Regret: Reinforcement Learning in Markov Matching Markets

We study a Markov matching market involving a planner and a set of strategic agents on the two sides of the market. At each step, the agents are presented with a dynamical context, where the contexts determine the utilities. The planner controls the transition of the contexts to maximize the cumulative social welfare, while the agents aim to find a myopic stable matching at each step. Such a setting captures a range of applications including ridesharing platforms. We formalize the problem by proposing a reinforcement learning framework that integrates optimistic value iteration with maximum weight matching. The proposed algorithm addresses the coupled challenges of sequential exploration, matching stability, and function approximation. We prove that the algorithm achieves sublinear regret.

Learning Dynamic Mechanisms in Unknown Environments: A Reinforcement Learning Approach

Dynamic mechanism design studies how mechanism designers should allocate resources among agents in a time-varying environment. We consider the problem where the agents interact with the mechanism designer according to an unknown Markov Decision Process (MDP), where agent rewards and the mechanism designer's state evolve according to an episodic MDP with unknown reward functions and transition kernels. We focus on the online setting with linear function approximation and attempt to recover the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism over multiple rounds of interaction. A key contribution of our work is incorporating reward-free online Reinforcement Learning (RL) to aid exploration over a rich policy space to estimate prices in the dynamic VCG mechanism. We show that the regret of our proposed method is upper bounded by $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ and further devise a lower bound to show that our algorithm is efficient, incurring the same $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2 / 3})$ regret as the lower bound, where $T$ is the total number of rounds. Our work establishes the regret guarantee for online RL in solving dynamic mechanism design problems without prior knowledge of the underlying model.

Pessimistic Bootstrapping for Uncertainty-Driven Offline Reinforcement Learning

Offline Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims to learn policies from previously collected datasets without exploring the environment. Directly applying off-policy algorithms to offline RL usually fails due to the extrapolation error caused by the out-of-distribution (OOD) actions. Previous methods tackle such problem by penalizing the Q-values of OOD actions or constraining the trained policy to be close to the behavior policy. Nevertheless, such methods typically prevent the generalization of value functions beyond the offline data and also lack precise characterization of OOD data. In this paper, we propose Pessimistic Bootstrapping for offline RL (PBRL), a purely uncertainty-driven offline algorithm without explicit policy constraints. Specifically, PBRL conducts uncertainty quantification via the disagreement of bootstrapped Q-functions, and performs pessimistic updates by penalizing the value function based on the estimated uncertainty. To tackle the extrapolating error, we further propose a novel OOD sampling method. We show that such OOD sampling and pessimistic bootstrapping yields provable uncertainty quantifier in linear MDPs, thus providing the theoretical underpinning for PBRL. Extensive experiments on D4RL benchmark show that PBRL has better performance compared to the state-of-the-art algorithms.

Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning

In today's economy, it becomes important for Internet platforms to consider the sequential information design problem to align its long term interest with incentives of the gig service providers. This paper proposes a novel model of sequential information design, namely the Markov persuasion processes (MPPs), where a sender, with informational advantage, seeks to persuade a stream of myopic receivers to take actions that maximizes the sender's cumulative utilities in a finite horizon Markovian environment with varying prior and utility functions. Planning in MPPs thus faces the unique challenge in finding a signaling policy that is simultaneously persuasive to the myopic receivers and inducing the optimal long-term cumulative utilities of the sender. Nevertheless, in the population level where the model is known, it turns out that we can efficiently determine the optimal (resp. $\epsilon$-optimal) policy with finite (resp. infinite) states and outcomes, through a modified formulation of the Bellman equation. Our main technical contribution is to study the MPP under the online reinforcement learning (RL) setting, where the goal is to learn the optimal signaling policy by interacting with with the underlying MPP, without the knowledge of the sender's utility functions, prior distributions, and the Markov transition kernels. We design a provably efficient no-regret learning algorithm, the Optimism-Pessimism Principle for Persuasion Process (OP4), which features a novel combination of both optimism and pessimism principles. Our algorithm enjoys sample efficiency by achieving a sublinear $\sqrt{T}$-regret upper bound. Furthermore, both our algorithm and theory can be applied to MPPs with large space of outcomes and states via function approximation, and we showcase such a success under the linear setting.

Pessimistic Minimax Value Iteration: Provably Efficient Equilibrium Learning from Offline Datasets

We study episodic two-player zero-sum Markov games (MGs) in the offline setting, where the goal is to find an approximate Nash equilibrium (NE) policy pair based on a dataset collected a priori. When the dataset does not have uniform coverage over all policy pairs, finding an approximate NE involves challenges in three aspects: (i) distributional shift between the behavior policy and the optimal policy, (ii) function approximation to handle large state space, and (iii) minimax optimization for equilibrium solving. We propose a pessimism-based algorithm, dubbed as pessimistic minimax value iteration (PMVI), which overcomes the distributional shift by constructing pessimistic estimates of the value functions for both players and outputs a policy pair by solving NEs based on the two value functions. Furthermore, we establish a data-dependent upper bound on the suboptimality which recovers a sublinear rate without the assumption on uniform coverage of the dataset. We also prove an information-theoretical lower bound, which suggests that the data-dependent term in the upper bound is intrinsic. Our theoretical results also highlight a notion of "relative uncertainty", which characterizes the necessary and sufficient condition for achieving sample efficiency in offline MGs. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first nearly minimax optimal result for offline MGs with function approximation.

Joint Differentiable Optimization and Verification for Certified Reinforcement Learning

In model-based reinforcement learning for safety-critical control systems, it is important to formally certify system properties (e.g., safety, stability) under the learned controller. However, as existing methods typically apply formal verification \emph{after} the controller has been learned, it is sometimes difficult to obtain any certificate, even after many iterations between learning and verification. To address this challenge, we propose a framework that jointly conducts reinforcement learning and formal verification by formulating and solving a novel bilevel optimization problem, which is differentiable by the gradients from the value function and certificates. Experiments on a variety of examples demonstrate the significant advantages of our framework over the model-based stochastic value gradient (SVG) method and the model-free proximal policy optimization (PPO) method in finding feasible controllers with barrier functions and Lyapunov functions that ensure system safety and stability.

Exponential Family Model-Based Reinforcement Learning via Score Matching

We propose an optimistic model-based algorithm, dubbed SMRL, for finite-horizon episodic reinforcement learning (RL) when the transition model is specified by exponential family distributions with $d$ parameters and the reward is bounded and known. SMRL uses score matching, an unnormalized density estimation technique that enables efficient estimation of the model parameter by ridge regression. Under standard regularity assumptions, SMRL achieves $\tilde O(d\sqrt{H^3T})$ online regret, where $H$ is the length of each episode and $T$ is the total number of interactions (ignoring polynomial dependence on structural scale parameters).

Wasserstein Flow Meets Replicator Dynamics: A Mean-Field Analysis of Representation Learning in Actor-Critic

Actor-critic (AC) algorithms, empowered by neural networks, have had significant empirical success in recent years. However, most of the existing theoretical support for AC algorithms focuses on the case of linear function approximations, or linearized neural networks, where the feature representation is fixed throughout training. Such a limitation fails to capture the key aspect of representation learning in neural AC, which is pivotal in practical problems. In this work, we take a mean-field perspective on the evolution and convergence of feature-based neural AC. Specifically, we consider a version of AC where the actor and critic are represented by overparameterized two-layer neural networks and are updated with two-timescale learning rates. The critic is updated by temporal-difference (TD) learning with a larger stepsize while the actor is updated via proximal policy optimization (PPO) with a smaller stepsize. In the continuous-time and infinite-width limiting regime, when the timescales are properly separated, we prove that neural AC finds the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. Additionally, we prove that the feature representation induced by the critic network is allowed to evolve within a neighborhood of the initial one.

Can Reinforcement Learning Find Stackelberg-Nash Equilibria in General-Sum Markov Games with Myopic Followers?

We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to maximize their instantaneous rewards. For such a game, our goal is to find a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE), which is a policy pair $(\pi^*, \nu^*)$ such that (i) $\pi^*$ is the optimal policy for the leader when the followers always play their best response, and (ii) $\nu^*$ is the best response policy of the followers, which is a Nash equilibrium of the followers' game induced by $\pi^*$. We develop sample-efficient reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms for solving for an SNE in both online and offline settings. Our algorithms are optimistic and pessimistic variants of least-squares value iteration, and they are readily able to incorporate function approximation tools in the setting of large state spaces. Furthermore, for the case with linear function approximation, we prove that our algorithms achieve sublinear regret and suboptimality under online and offline setups respectively. To the best of our knowledge, we establish the first provably efficient RL algorithms for solving for SNEs in general-sum Markov games with myopic followers.

FinRL-Meta: A Universe of Near-Real Market Environments for Data-Driven Deep Reinforcement Learning in Quantitative Finance

Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has shown huge potentials in building financial market simulators recently. However, due to the highly complex and dynamic nature of real-world markets, raw historical financial data often involve large noise and may not reflect the future of markets, degrading the fidelity of DRL-based market simulators. Moreover, the accuracy of DRL-based market simulators heavily relies on numerous and diverse DRL agents, which increases demand for a universe of market environments and imposes a challenge on simulation speed. In this paper, we present a FinRL-Meta framework that builds a universe of market environments for data-driven financial reinforcement learning. First, FinRL-Meta separates financial data processing from the design pipeline of DRL-based strategy and provides open-source data engineering tools for financial big data. Second, FinRL-Meta provides hundreds of market environments for various trading tasks. Third, FinRL-Meta enables multiprocessing simulation and training by exploiting thousands of GPU cores. Our codes are available online at https://github.com/AI4Finance-Foundation/FinRL-Meta.