Multi-Sender Persuasion -- A Computational Perspective

We consider multiple senders with informational advantage signaling to convince a single self-interested actor towards certain actions. Generalizing the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework, such settings are ubiquitous in computational economics, multi-agent learning, and machine learning with multiple objectives. The core solution concept here is the Nash equilibrium of senders' signaling policies. Theoretically, we prove that finding an equilibrium in general is PPAD-Hard; in fact, even computing a sender's best response is NP-Hard. Given these intrinsic difficulties, we turn to finding local Nash equilibria. We propose a novel differentiable neural network to approximate this game's non-linear and discontinuous utilities. Complementing this with the extra-gradient algorithm, we discover local equilibria that Pareto dominates full-revelation equilibria and those found by existing neural networks. Broadly, our theoretical and empirical contributions are of interest to a large class of economic problems.

Incentivized Truthful Communication for Federated Bandits

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Learning in Online Principal-Agent Interactions: The Power of Menus

We study a ubiquitous learning challenge in online principal-agent problems during which the principal learns the agent's private information from the agent's revealed preferences in historical interactions. This paradigm includes important special cases such as pricing and contract design, which have been widely studied in recent literature. However, existing work considers the case where the principal can only choose a single strategy at every round to interact with the agent and then observe the agent's revealed preference through their actions. In this paper, we extend this line of study to allow the principal to offer a menu of strategies to the agent and learn additionally from observing the agent's selection from the menu. We provide a thorough investigation of several online principal-agent problem settings and characterize their sample complexities, accompanied by the corresponding algorithms we have developed. We instantiate this paradigm to several important design problems $-$ including Stackelberg (security) games, contract design, and information design. Finally, we also explore the connection between our findings and existing results about online learning in Stackelberg games, and we offer a solution that can overcome a key hard instance of Peng et al. (2019).

Learning in Online Principle-Agent Interactions: The Power of Menus

We study a ubiquitous learning challenge in online principal-agent problems during which the principal learns the agent's private information from the agent's revealed preferences in historical interactions. This paradigm includes important special cases such as pricing and contract design, which have been widely studied in recent literature. However, existing work considers the case where the principal can only choose a single strategy at every round to interact with the agent and then observe the agent's revealed preference through their actions. In this paper, we extend this line of study to allow the principal to offer a menu of strategies to the agent and learn additionally from observing the agent's selection from the menu. We provide a thorough investigation of several online principal-agent problem settings and characterize their sample complexities, accompanied by the corresponding algorithms we have developed. We instantiate this paradigm to several important design problems $-$ including Stackelberg (security) games, contract design, and information design. Finally, we also explore the connection between our findings and existing results about online learning in Stackelberg games, and we offer a solution that can overcome a key hard instance of Peng et al. (2019).

Bandits Meet Mechanism Design to Combat Clickbait in Online Recommendation

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a $\tilde{\mathcal{O}} (\sqrt{KT})$ regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Sample Complexity of Opinion Formation on Networks

Consider public health officials aiming to spread awareness about a new vaccine in a community interconnected by a social network. How can they distribute information with minimal resources, ensuring community-wide understanding that aligns with the actual facts? This concern mirrors numerous real-world situations. In this paper, we initialize the study of sample complexity in opinion formation to solve this problem. Our model is built on the recognized opinion formation game, where we regard each agent's opinion as a data-derived model parameter, not just a real number as in prior studies. Such an extension offers a wider understanding of opinion formation and ties closely with federated learning. Through this formulation, we characterize the sample complexity bounds for any network and also show asymptotically tight bounds for specific network structures. Intriguingly, we discover optimal strategies often allocate samples inversely to the degree, hinting at vital policy implications. Our findings are empirically validated on both synthesized and real-world networks.

A Data-Centric Online Market for Machine Learning: From Discovery to Pricing

Data fuels machine learning (ML) - rich and high-quality training data is essential to the success of ML. However, to transform ML from the race among a few large corporations to an accessible technology that serves numerous normal users' data analysis requests, there still exist important challenges. One gap we observed is that many ML users can benefit from new data that other data owners possess, whereas these data owners sit on piles of data without knowing who can benefit from it. This gap creates the opportunity for building an online market that can automatically connect supply with demand. While online matching markets are prevalent (e.g., ride-hailing systems), designing a data-centric market for ML exhibits many unprecedented challenges. This paper develops new techniques to tackle two core challenges in designing such a market: (a) to efficiently match demand with supply, we design an algorithm to automatically discover useful data for any ML task from a pool of thousands of datasets, achieving high-quality matching between ML models and data; (b) to encourage market participation of ML users without much ML expertise, we design a new pricing mechanism for selling data-augmented ML models. Furthermore, our market is designed to be API-compatible with existing online ML markets like Vertex AI and Sagemaker, making it easy to use while providing better results due to joint data and model search. We envision that the synergy of our data and model discovery algorithm and pricing mechanism will be an important step towards building a new data-centric online market that serves ML users effectively.

Follow-ups Also Matter: Improving Contextual Bandits via Post-serving Contexts

Standard contextual bandit problem assumes that all the relevant contexts are observed before the algorithm chooses an arm. This modeling paradigm, while useful, often falls short when dealing with problems in which valuable additional context can be observed after arm selection. For example, content recommendation platforms like Youtube, Instagram, Tiktok also observe valuable follow-up information pertinent to the user's reward after recommendation (e.g., how long the user stayed, what is the user's watch speed, etc.). To improve online learning efficiency in these applications, we study a novel contextual bandit problem with post-serving contexts and design a new algorithm, poLinUCB, that achieves tight regret under standard assumptions. Core to our technical proof is a robustified and generalized version of the well-known Elliptical Potential Lemma (EPL), which can accommodate noise in data. Such robustification is necessary for tackling our problem, and we believe it could also be of general interest. Extensive empirical tests on both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the significant benefit of utilizing post-serving contexts as well as the superior performance of our algorithm over the state-of-the-art approaches.

Incentivized Communication for Federated Bandits

Most existing works on federated bandits take it for granted that all clients are altruistic about sharing their data with the server for the collective good whenever needed. Despite their compelling theoretical guarantee on performance and communication efficiency, this assumption is overly idealistic and oftentimes violated in practice, especially when the algorithm is operated over self-interested clients, who are reluctant to share data without explicit benefits. Negligence of such self-interested behaviors can significantly affect the learning efficiency and even the practical operability of federated bandit learning. In light of this, we aim to spark new insights into this under-explored research area by formally introducing an incentivized communication problem for federated bandits, where the server shall motivate clients to share data by providing incentives. Without loss of generality, we instantiate this bandit problem with the contextual linear setting and propose the first incentivized communication protocol, namely, Inc-FedUCB, that achieves near-optimal regret with provable communication and incentive cost guarantees. Extensive empirical experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets further validate the effectiveness of the proposed method across various environments.

How Bad is Top-$K$ Recommendation under Competing Content Creators?

Content creators compete for exposure on recommendation platforms, and such strategic behavior leads to a dynamic shift over the content distribution. However, how the creators' competition impacts user welfare and how the relevance-driven recommendation influences the dynamics in the long run are still largely unknown. This work provides theoretical insights into these research questions. We model the creators' competition under the assumptions that: 1) the platform employs an innocuous top-$K$ recommendation policy; 2) user decisions follow the Random Utility model; 3) content creators compete for user engagement and, without knowing their utility function in hindsight, apply arbitrary no-regret learning algorithms to update their strategies. We study the user welfare guarantee through the lens of Price of Anarchy and show that the fraction of user welfare loss due to creator competition is always upper bounded by a small constant depending on $K$ and randomness in user decisions; we also prove the tightness of this bound. Our result discloses an intrinsic merit of the myopic approach to the recommendation, i.e., relevance-driven matching performs reasonably well in the long run, as long as users' decisions involve randomness and the platform provides reasonably many alternatives to its users.