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Minhui Xue

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Flow-Attention-based Spatio-Temporal Aggregation Network for 3D Mask Detection

Oct 25, 2023
Yuxin Cao, Yian Li, Yumeng Zhu, Derui Wang, Minhui Xue

Anti-spoofing detection has become a necessity for face recognition systems due to the security threat posed by spoofing attacks. Despite great success in traditional attacks, most deep-learning-based methods perform poorly in 3D masks, which can highly simulate real faces in appearance and structure, suffering generalizability insufficiency while focusing only on the spatial domain with single frame input. This has been mitigated by the recent introduction of a biomedical technology called rPPG (remote photoplethysmography). However, rPPG-based methods are sensitive to noisy interference and require at least one second (> 25 frames) of observation time, which induces high computational overhead. To address these challenges, we propose a novel 3D mask detection framework, called FASTEN (Flow-Attention-based Spatio-Temporal aggrEgation Network). We tailor the network for focusing more on fine-grained details in large movements, which can eliminate redundant spatio-temporal feature interference and quickly capture splicing traces of 3D masks in fewer frames. Our proposed network contains three key modules: 1) a facial optical flow network to obtain non-RGB inter-frame flow information; 2) flow attention to assign different significance to each frame; 3) spatio-temporal aggregation to aggregate high-level spatial features and temporal transition features. Through extensive experiments, FASTEN only requires five frames of input and outperforms eight competitors for both intra-dataset and cross-dataset evaluations in terms of multiple detection metrics. Moreover, FASTEN has been deployed in real-world mobile devices for practical 3D mask detection.

* 13 pages, 5 figures. Accepted to NeurIPS 2023 
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RAI4IoE: Responsible AI for Enabling the Internet of Energy

Sep 20, 2023
Minhui Xue, Surya Nepal, Ling Liu, Subbu Sethuvenkatraman, Xingliang Yuan, Carsten Rudolph, Ruoxi Sun, Greg Eisenhauer

This paper plans to develop an Equitable and Responsible AI framework with enabling techniques and algorithms for the Internet of Energy (IoE), in short, RAI4IoE. The energy sector is going through substantial changes fueled by two key drivers: building a zero-carbon energy sector and the digital transformation of the energy infrastructure. We expect to see the convergence of these two drivers resulting in the IoE, where renewable distributed energy resources (DERs), such as electric cars, storage batteries, wind turbines and photovoltaics (PV), can be connected and integrated for reliable energy distribution by leveraging advanced 5G-6G networks and AI technology. This allows DER owners as prosumers to participate in the energy market and derive economic incentives. DERs are inherently asset-driven and face equitable challenges (i.e., fair, diverse and inclusive). Without equitable access, privileged individuals, groups and organizations can participate and benefit at the cost of disadvantaged groups. The real-time management of DER resources not only brings out the equity problem to the IoE, it also collects highly sensitive location, time, activity dependent data, which requires to be handled responsibly (e.g., privacy, security and safety), for AI-enhanced predictions, optimization and prioritization services, and automated management of flexible resources. The vision of our project is to ensure equitable participation of the community members and responsible use of their data in IoE so that it could reap the benefits of advances in AI to provide safe, reliable and sustainable energy services.

* Accepted to IEEE International Conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Intelligent Systems, and Applications (TPS) 2023 
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Copyright Protection and Accountability of Generative AI:Attack, Watermarking and Attribution

Mar 15, 2023
Haonan Zhong, Jiamin Chang, Ziyue Yang, Tingmin Wu, Pathum Chamikara Mahawaga Arachchige, Chehara Pathmabandu, Minhui Xue

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Generative AI (e.g., Generative Adversarial Networks - GANs) has become increasingly popular in recent years. However, Generative AI introduces significant concerns regarding the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) (resp. model accountability) pertaining to images (resp. toxic images) and models (resp. poisoned models) generated. In this paper, we propose an evaluation framework to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of the copyright protection measures for GANs, evaluate their performance across a diverse range of GAN architectures, and identify the factors that affect their performance and future research directions. Our findings indicate that the current IPR protection methods for input images, model watermarking, and attribution networks are largely satisfactory for a wide range of GANs. We highlight that further attention must be directed towards protecting training sets, as the current approaches fail to provide robust IPR protection and provenance tracing on training sets.

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The "Beatrix'' Resurrections: Robust Backdoor Detection via Gram Matrices

Sep 26, 2022
Wanlun Ma, Derui Wang, Ruoxi Sun, Minhui Xue, Sheng Wen, Yang Xiang

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks during training. The model corrupted in this way functions normally, but when triggered by certain patterns in the input, produces a predefined target label. Existing defenses usually rely on the assumption of the universal backdoor setting in which poisoned samples share the same uniform trigger. However, recent advanced backdoor attacks show that this assumption is no longer valid in dynamic backdoors where the triggers vary from input to input, thereby defeating the existing defenses. In this work, we propose a novel technique, Beatrix (backdoor detection via Gram matrix). Beatrix utilizes Gram matrix to capture not only the feature correlations but also the appropriately high-order information of the representations. By learning class-conditional statistics from activation patterns of normal samples, Beatrix can identify poisoned samples by capturing the anomalies in activation patterns. To further improve the performance in identifying target labels, Beatrix leverages kernel-based testing without making any prior assumptions on representation distribution. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method through extensive evaluation and comparison with state-of-the-art defensive techniques. The experimental results show that our approach achieves an F1 score of 91.1% in detecting dynamic backdoors, while the state of the art can only reach 36.9%.

* 19 pages, 23 figures. Accepted to NDSS 2023. Code availability: https://github.com/wanlunsec/Beatrix 
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M^4I: Multi-modal Models Membership Inference

Sep 15, 2022
Pingyi Hu, Zihan Wang, Ruoxi Sun, Hu Wang, Minhui Xue

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With the development of machine learning techniques, the attention of research has been moved from single-modal learning to multi-modal learning, as real-world data exist in the form of different modalities. However, multi-modal models often carry more information than single-modal models and they are usually applied in sensitive scenarios, such as medical report generation or disease identification. Compared with the existing membership inference against machine learning classifiers, we focus on the problem that the input and output of the multi-modal models are in different modalities, such as image captioning. This work studies the privacy leakage of multi-modal models through the lens of membership inference attack, a process of determining whether a data record involves in the model training process or not. To achieve this, we propose Multi-modal Models Membership Inference (M^4I) with two attack methods to infer the membership status, named metric-based (MB) M^4I and feature-based (FB) M^4I, respectively. More specifically, MB M^4I adopts similarity metrics while attacking to infer target data membership. FB M^4I uses a pre-trained shadow multi-modal feature extractor to achieve the purpose of data inference attack by comparing the similarities from extracted input and output features. Extensive experimental results show that both attack methods can achieve strong performances. Respectively, 72.5% and 94.83% of attack success rates on average can be obtained under unrestricted scenarios. Moreover, we evaluate multiple defense mechanisms against our attacks. The source code of M^4I attacks is publicly available at https://github.com/MultimodalMI/Multimodal-membership-inference.git.

* Accepted to NeurIPS 2022 
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StyleFool: Fooling Video Classification Systems via Style Transfer

Mar 30, 2022
Yuxin Cao, Xi Xiao, Ruoxi Sun, Derui Wang, Minhui Xue, Sheng Wen

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Video classification systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which can create severe security problems in video verification. Current black-box attacks need a large number of queries to succeed, resulting in high computational overhead in the process of attack. On the other hand, attacks with restricted perturbations are ineffective against defenses such as denoising or adversarial training. In this paper, we focus on unrestricted perturbations and propose StyleFool, a black-box video adversarial attack via style transfer to fool the video classification system. StyleFool first utilizes color theme proximity to select the best style image, which helps avoid unnatural details in the stylized videos. Meanwhile, the target class confidence is additionally considered in targeted attack to influence the output distribution of the classifier by moving the stylized video closer to or even across the decision boundary. A gradient-free method is then employed to further optimize the adversarial perturbation. We carry out extensive experiments to evaluate StyleFool on two standard datasets, UCF-101 and HMDB-51. The experimental results suggest that StyleFool outperforms the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks in terms of both number of queries and robustness against existing defenses. We identify that 50% of the stylized videos in untargeted attack do not need any query since they can already fool the video classification model. Furthermore, we evaluate the indistinguishability through a user study to show that the adversarial samples of StyleFool look imperceptible to human eyes, despite unrestricted perturbations.

* 18 pages, 7 figures 
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Fingerprinting Deep Neural Networks Globally via Universal Adversarial Perturbations

Feb 22, 2022
Zirui Peng, Shaofeng Li, Guoxing Chen, Cheng Zhang, Haojin Zhu, Minhui Xue

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In this paper, we propose a novel and practical mechanism which enables the service provider to verify whether a suspect model is stolen from the victim model via model extraction attacks. Our key insight is that the profile of a DNN model's decision boundary can be uniquely characterized by its \textit{Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs)}. UAPs belong to a low-dimensional subspace and piracy models' subspaces are more consistent with victim model's subspace compared with non-piracy model. Based on this, we propose a UAP fingerprinting method for DNN models and train an encoder via \textit{contrastive learning} that takes fingerprint as inputs, outputs a similarity score. Extensive studies show that our framework can detect model IP breaches with confidence $> 99.99 \%$ within only $20$ fingerprints of the suspect model. It has good generalizability across different model architectures and is robust against post-modifications on stolen models.

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PPA: Preference Profiling Attack Against Federated Learning

Feb 10, 2022
Chunyi Zhou, Yansong Gao, Anmin Fu, Kai Chen, Zhiyang Dai, Zhi Zhang, Minhui Xue, Yuqing Zhang

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Federated learning (FL) trains a global model across a number of decentralized participants, each with a local dataset. Compared to traditional centralized learning, FL does not require direct local datasets access and thus mitigates data security and privacy concerns. However, data privacy concerns for FL still exist due to inference attacks, including known membership inference, property inference, and data inversion. In this work, we reveal a new type of privacy inference attack, coined Preference Profiling Attack (PPA), that accurately profiles private preferences of a local user. In general, the PPA can profile top-k, especially for top-1, preferences contingent on the local user's characteristics. Our key insight is that the gradient variation of a local user's model has a distinguishable sensitivity to the sample proportion of a given class, especially the majority/minority class. By observing a user model's gradient sensitivity to a class, the PPA can profile the sample proportion of the class in the user's local dataset and thus the user's preference of the class is exposed. The inherent statistical heterogeneity of FL further facilitates the PPA. We have extensively evaluated the PPA's effectiveness using four datasets from the image domains of MNIST, CIFAR10, Products-10K and RAF-DB. Our results show that the PPA achieves 90% and 98% top-1 attack accuracy to the MNIST and CIFAR10, respectively. More importantly, in the real-world commercial scenarios of shopping (i.e., Products-10K) and the social network (i.e., RAF-DB), the PPA gains a top-1 attack accuracy of 78% in the former case to infer the most ordered items, and 88% in the latter case to infer a victim user's emotions. Although existing countermeasures such as dropout and differential privacy protection can lower the PPA's accuracy to some extent, they unavoidably incur notable global model deterioration.

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Exposing Weaknesses of Malware Detectors with Explainability-Guided Evasion Attacks

Nov 19, 2021
Wei Wang, Ruoxi Sun, Tian Dong, Shaofeng Li, Minhui Xue, Gareth Tyson, Haojin Zhu

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Numerous open-source and commercial malware detectors are available. However, the efficacy of these tools has been threatened by new adversarial attacks, whereby malware attempts to evade detection using, for example, machine learning techniques. In this work, we design an adversarial evasion attack that relies on both feature-space and problem-space manipulation. It uses explainability-guided feature selection to maximize evasion by identifying the most critical features that impact detection. We then use this attack as a benchmark to evaluate several state-of-the-art malware detectors. We find that (i) state-of-the-art malware detectors are vulnerable to even simple evasion strategies, and they can easily be tricked using off-the-shelf techniques; (ii) feature-space manipulation and problem-space obfuscation can be combined to enable evasion without needing white-box understanding of the detector; (iii) we can use explainability approaches (e.g., SHAP) to guide the feature manipulation and explain how attacks can transfer across multiple detectors. Our findings shed light on the weaknesses of current malware detectors, as well as how they can be improved.

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