Abstract:Multimodal pretrained models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, yet most existing methods rely on visual or multimodal triggers, which are impractical since visually embedded triggers rarely occur in real-world data. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel Text-Guided Backdoor (TGB) attack on multimodal pretrained models, where commonly occurring words in textual descriptions serve as backdoor triggers, significantly improving stealthiness and practicality. Furthermore, we introduce visual adversarial perturbations on poisoned samples to modulate the model's learning of textual triggers, enabling a controllable and adjustable TGB attack. Extensive experiments on downstream tasks built upon multimodal pretrained models, including Composed Image Retrieval (CIR) and Visual Question Answering (VQA), demonstrate that TGB achieves practicality and stealthiness with adjustable attack success rates across diverse realistic settings, revealing critical security vulnerabilities in multimodal pretrained models.
Abstract:Recent large-scale generative models enable high-quality 3D synthesis. However, the public accessibility of pre-trained weights introduces a critical vulnerability. Adversaries can fine-tune these models to steal specialized knowledge acquired during pre-training, leading to intellectual property infringement. Unlike defenses for 2D images and language models, 3D generators require specialized protection due to their explicit Gaussian representations, which expose fundamental structural parameters directly to gradient-based optimization. We propose GaussLock, the first approach designed to defend 3D generative models against fine-tuning attacks. GaussLock is a lightweight parameter-space immunization framework that integrates authorized distillation with attribute-aware trap losses targeting position, scale, rotation, opacity, and color. Specifically, these traps systematically collapse spatial distributions, distort geometric shapes, align rotational axes, and suppress primitive visibility to fundamentally destroy structural integrity. By jointly optimizing these dual objectives, the distillation process preserves fidelity on authorized tasks while the embedded traps actively disrupt unauthorized reconstructions. Experiments on large-scale Gaussian models demonstrate that GaussLock effectively neutralizes unauthorized fine-tuning attacks. It substantially degrades the quality of unauthorized reconstructions, evidenced by significantly higher LPIPS and lower PSNR, while effectively maintaining performance on authorized fine-tuning.
Abstract:Text-to-Image (T2I) diffusion models have demonstrated significant advancements in generating high-quality images, while raising potential safety concerns regarding harmful content generation. Safety-guidance-based methods have been proposed to mitigate harmful outputs by steering generation away from harmful zones, where the zones are averaged across multiple harmful categories based on predefined keywords. However, these approaches fail to capture the complex interplay among different harm categories, leading to "harmful conflicts" where mitigating one type of harm may inadvertently amplify another, thus increasing overall harmful rate. To address this issue, we propose Conflict-aware Adaptive Safety Guidance (CASG), a training-free framework that dynamically identifies and applies the category-aligned safety direction during generation. CASG is composed of two components: (i) Conflict-aware Category Identification (CaCI), which identifies the harmful category most aligned with the model's evolving generative state, and (ii) Conflict-resolving Guidance Application (CrGA), which applies safety steering solely along the identified category to avoid multi-category interference. CASG can be applied to both latent-space and text-space safeguards. Experiments on T2I safety benchmarks demonstrate CASG's state-of-the-art performance, reducing the harmful rate by up to 15.4% compared to existing methods.
Abstract:Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.
Abstract:For ethical and safe AI, machine unlearning rises as a critical topic aiming to protect sensitive, private, and copyrighted knowledge from misuse. To achieve this goal, it is common to conduct gradient ascent (GA) to reverse the training on undesired data. However, such a reversal is prone to catastrophic collapse, which leads to serious performance degradation in general tasks. As a solution, we propose model extrapolation as an alternative to GA, which reaches the counterpart direction in the hypothesis space from one model given another reference model. Therefore, we leverage the original model as the reference, further train it to memorize undesired data while keeping prediction consistency on the rest retained data, to obtain a memorization model. Counterfactual as it might sound, a forget model can be obtained via extrapolation from the memorization model to the reference model. Hence, we avoid directly acquiring the forget model using GA, but proceed with gradient descent for the memorization model, which successfully stabilizes the machine unlearning process. Our model extrapolation is simple and efficient to implement, and it can also effectively converge throughout training to achieve improved unlearning performance.
Abstract:3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) has become a mainstream representation for real-time 3D scene synthesis, enabling applications in virtual and augmented reality, robotics, and 3D content creation. Its rising commercial value and explicit parametric structure raise emerging intellectual property (IP) protection concerns, prompting a surge of research on 3DGS IP protection. However, current progress remains fragmented, lacking a unified view of the underlying mechanisms, protection paradigms, and robustness challenges. To address this gap, we present the first systematic survey on 3DGS IP protection and introduce a bottom-up framework that examines (i) underlying Gaussian-based perturbation mechanisms, (ii) passive and active protection paradigms, and (iii) robustness threats under emerging generative AI era, revealing gaps in technical foundations and robustness characterization and indicating opportunities for deeper investigation. Finally, we outline six research directions across robustness, efficiency, and protection paradigms, offering a roadmap toward reliable and trustworthy IP protection for 3DGS assets.
Abstract:Recent studies have extended diffusion-based instruction-driven 2D image editing pipelines to 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS), enabling faithful manipulation of 3DGS assets and greatly advancing 3DGS content creation. However, it also exposes these assets to serious risks of unauthorized editing and malicious tampering. Although imperceptible adversarial perturbations against diffusion models have proven effective for protecting 2D images, applying them to 3DGS encounters two major challenges: view-generalizable protection and balancing invisibility with protection capability. In this work, we propose the first editing safeguard for 3DGS, termed AdLift, which prevents instruction-driven editing across arbitrary views and dimensions by lifting strictly bounded 2D adversarial perturbations into 3D Gaussian-represented safeguard. To ensure both adversarial perturbations effectiveness and invisibility, these safeguard Gaussians are progressively optimized across training views using a tailored Lifted PGD, which first conducts gradient truncation during back-propagation from the editing model at the rendered image and applies projected gradients to strictly constrain the image-level perturbation. Then, the resulting perturbation is backpropagated to the safeguard Gaussian parameters via an image-to-Gaussian fitting operation. We alternate between gradient truncation and image-to-Gaussian fitting, yielding consistent adversarial-based protection performance across different viewpoints and generalizes to novel views. Empirically, qualitative and quantitative results demonstrate that AdLift effectively protects against state-of-the-art instruction-driven 2D image and 3DGS editing.
Abstract:In Zero-Shot Learning (ZSL), embedding-based methods enable knowledge transfer from seen to unseen classes by learning a visual-semantic mapping from seen-class images to class-level semantic prototypes (e.g., attributes). However, these semantic prototypes are manually defined and may introduce noisy supervision for two main reasons: (i) instance-level mismatch: variations in perspective, occlusion, and annotation bias will cause discrepancies between individual sample and the class-level semantic prototypes; and (ii) class-level imprecision: the manually defined semantic prototypes may not accurately reflect the true semantics of the class. Consequently, the visual-semantic mapping will be misled, reducing the effectiveness of knowledge transfer to unseen classes. In this work, we propose a prototype-guided curriculum learning framework (dubbed as CLZSL), which mitigates instance-level mismatches through a Prototype-Guided Curriculum Learning (PCL) module and addresses class-level imprecision via a Prototype Update (PUP) module. Specifically, the PCL module prioritizes samples with high cosine similarity between their visual mappings and the class-level semantic prototypes, and progressively advances to less-aligned samples, thereby reducing the interference of instance-level mismatches to achieve accurate visual-semantic mapping. Besides, the PUP module dynamically updates the class-level semantic prototypes by leveraging the visual mappings learned from instances, thereby reducing class-level imprecision and further improving the visual-semantic mapping. Experiments were conducted on standard benchmark datasets-AWA2, SUN, and CUB-to verify the effectiveness of our method.
Abstract:Non-transferable learning (NTL) has been proposed to protect model intellectual property (IP) by creating a "non-transferable barrier" to restrict generalization from authorized to unauthorized domains. Recently, well-designed attack, which restores the unauthorized-domain performance by fine-tuning NTL models on few authorized samples, highlights the security risks of NTL-based applications. However, such attack requires modifying model weights, thus being invalid in the black-box scenario. This raises a critical question: can we trust the security of NTL models deployed as black-box systems? In this work, we reveal the first loophole of black-box NTL models by proposing a novel attack method (dubbed as JailNTL) to jailbreak the non-transferable barrier through test-time data disguising. The main idea of JailNTL is to disguise unauthorized data so it can be identified as authorized by the NTL model, thereby bypassing the non-transferable barrier without modifying the NTL model weights. Specifically, JailNTL encourages unauthorized-domain disguising in two levels, including: (i) data-intrinsic disguising (DID) for eliminating domain discrepancy and preserving class-related content at the input-level, and (ii) model-guided disguising (MGD) for mitigating output-level statistics difference of the NTL model. Empirically, when attacking state-of-the-art (SOTA) NTL models in the black-box scenario, JailNTL achieves an accuracy increase of up to 55.7% in the unauthorized domain by using only 1% authorized samples, largely exceeding existing SOTA white-box attacks.




Abstract:Over the past decades, researchers have primarily focused on improving the generalization abilities of models, with limited attention given to regulating such generalization. However, the ability of models to generalize to unintended data (e.g., harmful or unauthorized data) can be exploited by malicious adversaries in unforeseen ways, potentially resulting in violations of model ethics. Non-transferable learning (NTL), a task aimed at reshaping the generalization abilities of deep learning models, was proposed to address these challenges. While numerous methods have been proposed in this field, a comprehensive review of existing progress and a thorough analysis of current limitations remain lacking. In this paper, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive survey on NTL and introducing NTLBench, the first benchmark to evaluate NTL performance and robustness within a unified framework. Specifically, we first introduce the task settings, general framework, and criteria of NTL, followed by a summary of NTL approaches. Furthermore, we emphasize the often-overlooked issue of robustness against various attacks that can destroy the non-transferable mechanism established by NTL. Experiments conducted via NTLBench verify the limitations of existing NTL methods in robustness. Finally, we discuss the practical applications of NTL, along with its future directions and associated challenges.