Abstract:Text-to-Image (T2I) diffusion models have demonstrated significant advancements in generating high-quality images, while raising potential safety concerns regarding harmful content generation. Safety-guidance-based methods have been proposed to mitigate harmful outputs by steering generation away from harmful zones, where the zones are averaged across multiple harmful categories based on predefined keywords. However, these approaches fail to capture the complex interplay among different harm categories, leading to "harmful conflicts" where mitigating one type of harm may inadvertently amplify another, thus increasing overall harmful rate. To address this issue, we propose Conflict-aware Adaptive Safety Guidance (CASG), a training-free framework that dynamically identifies and applies the category-aligned safety direction during generation. CASG is composed of two components: (i) Conflict-aware Category Identification (CaCI), which identifies the harmful category most aligned with the model's evolving generative state, and (ii) Conflict-resolving Guidance Application (CrGA), which applies safety steering solely along the identified category to avoid multi-category interference. CASG can be applied to both latent-space and text-space safeguards. Experiments on T2I safety benchmarks demonstrate CASG's state-of-the-art performance, reducing the harmful rate by up to 15.4% compared to existing methods.
Abstract:Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.
Abstract:Non-transferable learning (NTL) has been proposed to protect model intellectual property (IP) by creating a "non-transferable barrier" to restrict generalization from authorized to unauthorized domains. Recently, well-designed attack, which restores the unauthorized-domain performance by fine-tuning NTL models on few authorized samples, highlights the security risks of NTL-based applications. However, such attack requires modifying model weights, thus being invalid in the black-box scenario. This raises a critical question: can we trust the security of NTL models deployed as black-box systems? In this work, we reveal the first loophole of black-box NTL models by proposing a novel attack method (dubbed as JailNTL) to jailbreak the non-transferable barrier through test-time data disguising. The main idea of JailNTL is to disguise unauthorized data so it can be identified as authorized by the NTL model, thereby bypassing the non-transferable barrier without modifying the NTL model weights. Specifically, JailNTL encourages unauthorized-domain disguising in two levels, including: (i) data-intrinsic disguising (DID) for eliminating domain discrepancy and preserving class-related content at the input-level, and (ii) model-guided disguising (MGD) for mitigating output-level statistics difference of the NTL model. Empirically, when attacking state-of-the-art (SOTA) NTL models in the black-box scenario, JailNTL achieves an accuracy increase of up to 55.7% in the unauthorized domain by using only 1% authorized samples, largely exceeding existing SOTA white-box attacks.




Abstract:Over the past decades, researchers have primarily focused on improving the generalization abilities of models, with limited attention given to regulating such generalization. However, the ability of models to generalize to unintended data (e.g., harmful or unauthorized data) can be exploited by malicious adversaries in unforeseen ways, potentially resulting in violations of model ethics. Non-transferable learning (NTL), a task aimed at reshaping the generalization abilities of deep learning models, was proposed to address these challenges. While numerous methods have been proposed in this field, a comprehensive review of existing progress and a thorough analysis of current limitations remain lacking. In this paper, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive survey on NTL and introducing NTLBench, the first benchmark to evaluate NTL performance and robustness within a unified framework. Specifically, we first introduce the task settings, general framework, and criteria of NTL, followed by a summary of NTL approaches. Furthermore, we emphasize the often-overlooked issue of robustness against various attacks that can destroy the non-transferable mechanism established by NTL. Experiments conducted via NTLBench verify the limitations of existing NTL methods in robustness. Finally, we discuss the practical applications of NTL, along with its future directions and associated challenges.