Abstract:A 3D CT scan entering a vision-language model produces a long sequence of visual tokens, often thousands to tens of thousands per volume, and this sequence must be compressed before a language model can consume it. Token compression is well studied in general vision, but little of it targets 3D CT specifically. A common baseline is grid average, which pools regular grid cells and can blend distinct anatomy, lesion, and air into one token. We present \textbf{ORCA} (ORgan-Centroid Aggregation), a token compressor for 3D CT. It merges adjacent tokens with organ guidance and adds a sinusoidal encoding of each region's centroid to preserve spatial layout. This preserves the anatomical information a downstream model needs. ORCA is training-free and plug-and-play, producing an adjustable token set without any model change or text query. We evaluate it across two datasets (CT-RATE and Merlin) and five encoders. The evaluation spans two task types: attribute prediction over five families (size, density, location, texture, and disease) and text generation (visual question answering and report generation). At matched token budgets, ORCA improves consistently over existing compression methods. It shrinks the visual context $64\times$ and its KV-cache $50\times$, and is $31\times$ faster to process each volume. Code released at https://github.com/renjie-liang/ORCA-3DCT.
Abstract:Jigsaw puzzle solving requires jointly reasoning about visual content and geometric constraints, yet existing benchmarks use rectangular cuts that create ambiguous ground truth in texture-repeated regions. We introduce \textit{\ours{}}, a benchmark with tab-and-blank interlocking pieces where geometric constraints provide strong local compatibility requirements that, combined with visual content, yield unambiguous ground truth. Across 95K instances at four grid densities (4$\times$4 to 16$\times$16), we find that \textbf{zero-shot VLMs largely lack geometric reasoning}: only one of five frontier models (GPT-5.5) exceeds random baseline on 4$\times$4 puzzles, while all others perform at chance level. While supervised fine-tuning achieves $>$97\% on 4$\times$4, \textbf{all models collapse on larger grids}: GPT-5.5 drops from 70\% to near-random on 8$\times$8, and even fine-tuned models fall below 5\% on 12$\times$12. This ``scaling cliff'' suggests current architectures cannot maintain consistent constraint satisfaction as the number of pieces increases. \ours{} establishes scalable geometric reasoning as an open challenge for vision-language models.
Abstract:Robotic foundation models have recently made substantial progress in multi-task capability, cross-embodiment transfer, and language-conditioned control. Yet robust deployment across diverse real-world settings remains difficult, in part because policies often fail to distinguish causally relevant visual structure from spurious scene-level correlations. We identify this failure mode as shortcut learning: the tendency to exploit predictive but non-causal correlations in the training distribution rather than the task-relevant visual evidence that determines successful action. Although shortcut learning has been extensively studied in computer vision and broader machine learning, its role in robotic foundation models remains comparatively underexplored. We propose Artificial Foveated Perception (AFP), a lightweight, policy-agnostic module that takes the same vision and language inputs as Vision-Language-Action and World Action Model pipelines and predicts task-conditioned masks over relevant objects, the robot, and other action-critical regions. We use these masks primarily as an auxiliary grounding signal during fine-tuning, aligning policy attention with task-relevant regions while leaving the core architecture unchanged. After fine-tuning, the policy executes on the original observation stream without requiring AFP in the control loop. We evaluate AFP across state-of-the-art robotic foundation models and show that foveated perception reduces fine-tuning time, suppresses overfitting, and improves generalization under environmental perturbations. Ablations over mask quality and grounding-loss design further show that these gains arise from directing policy learning toward task-relevant visual evidence. These results suggest that task-conditioned foveated perception is a practical mechanism for making robotic foundation models more robust, data-efficient, and scalable.
Abstract:Large language models increasingly act as agents: they call tools, move money, delete records, and send messages on a user's behalf. To keep them safe, practitioners imported the chatbot-era recipe (train the model to refuse unsafe inputs) into the agentic setting, and treat the resulting capability loss as a manageable ``alignment tax.'' We argue this is a \emph{category error}. Refusal is a primitive for \emph{content safety}, where the harm is in the model's output and is therefore a learnable function of it. Agentic harm is different in kind: it lies not in any output but in the relation between the authority an action exercises and the authority the user granted, which is absent from the text the model sees. Importing content-safety methods into this regime does not trade capability for safety; it pays capability and buys negative security. We support this with three lines of evidence spanning the autonomy spectrum: defense-trained models learn surface patterns rather than intent; the same training collapses multi-step agents before any threat appears while leaving them exploitable; and even undefended frontier models exceed granted authority under ordinary use. We conclude that action safety cannot be installed in weights. It must be expressed as \emph{least privilege}, enforced \emph{outside} the model at the action boundary, and evaluated as \emph{action alignment} (a relational, deployment-conditioned property) rather than a refusal score.
Abstract:Large language model agents increasingly operate through an intermediate skill layer that mediates between user intent and concrete task execution. This layer is widely treated as an organizational abstraction, but we argue it is also a privilege boundary that current models routinely exceed. We present \textbf{FORTIS}, a benchmark that evaluates over-privilege in agent skills across two stages: whether a model selects the minimally sufficient skill from a large overlapping library, and whether it executes that skill without expanding into broader tools or actions than the skill permits. Across ten frontier models and three domains, we find that over-privileged behavior is the norm rather than the exception. Models consistently reach for higher-privilege skills and tools than the task requires, failing at both stages at rates that remain high even for the strongest available models. Failure is especially severe under the ordinary conditions of real user interaction: incomplete specification, convenience framing, and proximity to skill boundaries. None of these requires adversarial construction. The results indicate that the skill layer, far from containing agent behavior, is itself a primary source of privilege escalation in current systems.
Abstract:Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection identifies test samples that fall outside a model's training distribution, a capability critical for safe deployment in high-stakes applications. Standard OOD detectors are trained on a specific in-distribution (ID) dataset and detect deviations from that single domain. In contrast, we study few-shot cross-domain OOD detection: given a \emph{single} pre-trained model, can we perform OOD detection on \emph{arbitrary} new ID-OOD task pairs using only a handful of ID samples at inference time, with no additional training? We propose \textbf{UFCOD}, a unified framework that achieves this goal through information-geometric analysis of diffusion trajectories. Our key insight is that diffusion noise predictions are score functions (gradients of log-density), and we extract two energy features: \emph{Path Energy} (integrated score magnitude) and \emph{Dynamics Energy} (score smoothness), that form a discrete Sobolev norm capturing how samples interact with the learned diffusion process. The central contribution is a \textbf{train-once, deploy-anywhere} paradigm: a diffusion model trained on a single dataset (e.g., CelebA) serves as a universal feature extractor for OOD detection across semantically unrelated domains (e.g., CIFAR-10, SVHN, Textures). At deployment, each new task requires only $\sim$100 unlabeled ID samples for inference: no retraining, no fine-tuning, no task-specific adaptation. Using 100 ID samples per task, UFCOD achieves 93.7\% average AUROC across 12 cross-domain benchmarks, competitive with methods trained on 50k--163k samples, demonstrating $\sim$500$\times$ improvement in sample efficiency. See our code in https://github.com/lili0415/UFCOD.
Abstract:Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks. Practitioners deploy defense-trained models to protect against prompt injection attacks that manipulate agent behavior through malicious observations or retrieved content. We reveal a fundamental \textbf{capability-alignment paradox}: defense training designed to improve safety systematically destroys agent competence while failing to prevent sophisticated attacks. Evaluating defended models against undefended baselines across 97 agent tasks and 1,000 adversarial prompts, we uncover three systematic biases unique to multi-step agents. \textbf{Agent incompetence bias} manifests as immediate tool execution breakdown, with models refusing or generating invalid actions on benign tasks before observing any external content. \textbf{Cascade amplification bias} causes early failures to propagate through retry loops, pushing defended models to timeout on 99\% of tasks compared to 13\% for baselines. \textbf{Trigger bias} leads to paradoxical security degradation where defended models perform worse than undefended baselines while straightforward attacks bypass defenses at high rates. Root cause analysis reveals these biases stem from shortcut learning: models overfit to surface attack patterns rather than semantic threat understanding, evidenced by extreme variance in defense effectiveness across attack categories. Our findings demonstrate that current defense paradigms optimize for single-turn refusal benchmarks while rendering multi-step agents fundamentally unreliable, necessitating new approaches that preserve tool execution competence under adversarial conditions.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in security-sensitive applications, where they must follow system- or developer-specified instructions that define the intended task behavior, while completing benign user requests. When adversarial instructions appear in user queries or externally retrieved content, models may override intended logic. Recent defenses rely on supervised fine-tuning with benign and malicious labels. Although these methods achieve high attack rejection rates, we find that they rely on narrow correlations in defense data rather than harmful intent, leading to systematic rejection of safe inputs. We analyze three recurring shortcut behaviors induced by defense fine-tuning. \emph{Position bias} arises when benign content placed later in a prompt is rejected at much higher rates; across reasoning benchmarks, suffix-task rejection rises from below \textbf{10\%} to as high as \textbf{90\%}. \emph{Token trigger bias} occurs when strings common in attack data raise rejection probability even in benign contexts; inserting a single trigger token increases false refusals by up to \textbf{50\%}. \emph{Topic generalization bias} reflects poor generalization beyond the defense data distribution, with defended models suffering test-time accuracy drops of up to \textbf{40\%}. These findings suggest that current prompt-injection defenses frequently respond to attack-like surface patterns rather than the underlying intent. We introduce controlled diagnostic datasets and a systematic evaluation across two base models and multiple defense pipelines, highlighting limitations of supervised fine-tuning for reliable LLM security.
Abstract:Early children's developmental trajectories set up a natural goal for sample-efficient pretraining of vision foundation models. We introduce BabyVLM-V2, a developmentally grounded framework for infant-inspired vision-language modeling that extensively improves upon BabyVLM-V1 through a longitudinal, multifaceted pretraining set, a versatile model, and, most importantly, DevCV Toolbox for cognitive evaluation. The pretraining set maximizes coverage while minimizing curation of a longitudinal, infant-centric audiovisual corpus, yielding video-utterance, image-utterance, and multi-turn conversational data that mirror infant experiences. DevCV Toolbox adapts all vision-related measures of the recently released NIH Baby Toolbox into a benchmark suite of ten multimodal tasks, covering spatial reasoning, memory, and vocabulary understanding aligned with early children's capabilities. Experimental results show that a compact model pretrained from scratch can achieve competitive performance on DevCV Toolbox, outperforming GPT-4o on some tasks. We hope the principled, unified BabyVLM-V2 framework will accelerate research in developmentally plausible pretraining of vision foundation models.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) have shown substantial capacity for generating fluent, contextually appropriate responses. However, they can produce hallucinated outputs, especially when a user query includes one or more false premises-claims that contradict established facts. Such premises can mislead LLMs into offering fabricated or misleading details. Existing approaches include pretraining, fine-tuning, and inference-time techniques that often rely on access to logits or address hallucinations after they occur. These methods tend to be computationally expensive, require extensive training data, or lack proactive mechanisms to prevent hallucination before generation, limiting their efficiency in real-time applications. We propose a retrieval-based framework that identifies and addresses false premises before generation. Our method first transforms a user's query into a logical representation, then applies retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to assess the validity of each premise using factual sources. Finally, we incorporate the verification results into the LLM's prompt to maintain factual consistency in the final output. Experiments show that this approach effectively reduces hallucinations, improves factual accuracy, and does not require access to model logits or large-scale fine-tuning.