This paper introduces v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark, which has been created by the MLCommons AI Safety Working Group. The AI Safety Benchmark has been designed to assess the safety risks of AI systems that use chat-tuned language models. We introduce a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which for v0.5 covers only a single use case (an adult chatting to a general-purpose assistant in English), and a limited set of personas (i.e., typical users, malicious users, and vulnerable users). We created a new taxonomy of 13 hazard categories, of which 7 have tests in the v0.5 benchmark. We plan to release version 1.0 of the AI Safety Benchmark by the end of 2024. The v1.0 benchmark will provide meaningful insights into the safety of AI systems. However, the v0.5 benchmark should not be used to assess the safety of AI systems. We have sought to fully document the limitations, flaws, and challenges of v0.5. This release of v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark includes (1) a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which comprises use cases, types of systems under test (SUTs), language and context, personas, tests, and test items; (2) a taxonomy of 13 hazard categories with definitions and subcategories; (3) tests for seven of the hazard categories, each comprising a unique set of test items, i.e., prompts. There are 43,090 test items in total, which we created with templates; (4) a grading system for AI systems against the benchmark; (5) an openly available platform, and downloadable tool, called ModelBench that can be used to evaluate the safety of AI systems on the benchmark; (6) an example evaluation report which benchmarks the performance of over a dozen openly available chat-tuned language models; (7) a test specification for the benchmark.
As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent and integrated into autonomous systems, ensuring their safety is imperative. Despite significant strides toward safety alignment, recent work GCG~\citep{zou2023universal} proposes a discrete token optimization algorithm and selects the single suffix with the lowest loss to successfully jailbreak aligned LLMs. In this work, we first discuss the drawbacks of solely picking the suffix with the lowest loss during GCG optimization for jailbreaking and uncover the missed successful suffixes during the intermediate steps. Moreover, we utilize those successful suffixes as training data to learn a generative model, named AmpleGCG, which captures the distribution of adversarial suffixes given a harmful query and enables the rapid generation of hundreds of suffixes for any harmful queries in seconds. AmpleGCG achieves near 100\% attack success rate (ASR) on two aligned LLMs (Llama-2-7B-chat and Vicuna-7B), surpassing two strongest attack baselines. More interestingly, AmpleGCG also transfers seamlessly to attack different models, including closed-source LLMs, achieving a 99\% ASR on the latest GPT-3.5. To summarize, our work amplifies the impact of GCG by training a generative model of adversarial suffixes that is universal to any harmful queries and transferable from attacking open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs. In addition, it can generate 200 adversarial suffixes for one harmful query in only 4 seconds, rendering it more challenging to defend.
Modern generative search engines enhance the reliability of large language model (LLM) responses by providing cited evidence. However, evaluating the answer's attribution, i.e., whether every claim within the generated responses is fully supported by its cited evidence, remains an open problem. This verification, traditionally dependent on costly human evaluation, underscores the urgent need for automatic attribution evaluation methods. To bridge the gap in the absence of standardized benchmarks for these methods, we present AttributionBench, a comprehensive benchmark compiled from various existing attribution datasets. Our extensive experiments on AttributionBench reveal the challenges of automatic attribution evaluation, even for state-of-the-art LLMs. Specifically, our findings show that even a fine-tuned GPT-3.5 only achieves around 80% macro-F1 under a binary classification formulation. A detailed analysis of more than 300 error cases indicates that a majority of failures stem from the model's inability to process nuanced information, and the discrepancy between the information the model has access to and that human annotators do.
Language agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have seen exploding development. Their capability of using language as a vehicle for thought and communication lends an incredible level of flexibility and versatility. People have quickly capitalized on this capability to connect LLMs to a wide range of external components and environments: databases, tools, the Internet, robotic embodiment, etc. Many believe an unprecedentedly powerful automation technology is emerging. However, new automation technologies come with new safety risks, especially for intricate systems like language agents. There is a surprisingly large gap between the speed and scale of their development and deployment and our understanding of their safety risks. Are we building a house of cards? In this position paper, we present the first systematic effort in mapping adversarial attacks against language agents. We first present a unified conceptual framework for agents with three major components: Perception, Brain, and Action. Under this framework, we present a comprehensive discussion and propose 12 potential attack scenarios against different components of an agent, covering different attack strategies (e.g., input manipulation, adversarial demonstrations, jailbreaking, backdoors). We also draw connections to successful attack strategies previously applied to LLMs. We emphasize the urgency to gain a thorough understanding of language agent risks before their widespread deployment.
Since large language models have approached human-level performance on many tasks, it has become increasingly harder for researchers to find tasks that are still challenging to the models. Failure cases usually come from the long-tail distribution - data that an oracle language model could assign a probability on the lower end of its distribution. Current methodology such as prompt engineering or crowdsourcing are insufficient for creating long-tail examples because humans are constrained by cognitive bias. We propose a Logic-Induced-Knowledge-Search (LINK) framework for systematically generating long-tail knowledge statements. Grounded by a symbolic rule, we search for long-tail values for each variable of the rule by first prompting a LLM, then verifying the correctness of the values with a critic, and lastly pushing for the long-tail distribution with a reranker. With this framework we construct a dataset, Logic-Induced-Long-Tail (LINT), consisting of 200 symbolic rules and 50K knowledge statements spanning across four domains. Human annotations find that 84% of the statements in LINT are factually correct. In contrast, ChatGPT and GPT4 struggle with directly generating long-tail statements under the guidance of logic rules, each only getting 56% and 78% of their statements correct. Moreover, their "long-tail" generations in fact fall into the higher likelihood range, and thus are not really long-tail. Our findings suggest that LINK is effective for generating data in the long-tail distribution while enforcing quality. LINT can be useful for systematically evaluating LLMs' capabilities in the long-tail distribution. We challenge the models with a simple entailment classification task using samples from LINT. We find that ChatGPT and GPT4's capability in identifying incorrect knowledge drop by ~3% in the long-tail distribution compared to head distribution.
This paper presents ChatCounselor, a large language model (LLM) solution designed to provide mental health support. Unlike generic chatbots, ChatCounselor is distinguished by its foundation in real conversations between consulting clients and professional psychologists, enabling it to possess specialized knowledge and counseling skills in the field of psychology. The training dataset, Psych8k, was constructed from 260 in-depth interviews, each spanning an hour. To assess the quality of counseling responses, the counseling Bench was devised. Leveraging GPT-4 and meticulously crafted prompts based on seven metrics of psychological counseling assessment, the model underwent evaluation using a set of real-world counseling questions. Impressively, ChatCounselor surpasses existing open-source models in the counseling Bench and approaches the performance level of ChatGPT, showcasing the remarkable enhancement in model capability attained through high-quality domain-specific data.
Transformers have been shown to be able to perform deductive reasoning on a logical rulebase containing rules and statements written in English natural language. While the progress is promising, it is currently unclear if these models indeed perform logical reasoning by understanding the underlying logical semantics in the language. To this end, we propose RobustLR, a suite of evaluation datasets that evaluate the robustness of these models to minimal logical edits in rulebases and some standard logical equivalence conditions. In our experiments with RoBERTa and T5, we find that the models trained in prior works do not perform consistently on the different perturbations in RobustLR, thus showing that the models are not robust to the proposed logical perturbations. Further, we find that the models find it especially hard to learn logical negation and disjunction operators. Overall, using our evaluation sets, we demonstrate some shortcomings of the deductive reasoning-based language models, which can eventually help towards designing better models for logical reasoning over natural language.