Role of Human-AI Interaction in Selective Prediction

Recent work has shown the potential benefit of selective prediction systems that can learn to defer to a human when the predictions of the AI are unreliable, particularly to improve the reliability of AI systems in high-stakes applications like healthcare or conservation. However, most prior work assumes that human behavior remains unchanged when they solve a prediction task as part of a human-AI team as opposed to by themselves. We show that this is not the case by performing experiments to quantify human-AI interaction in the context of selective prediction. In particular, we study the impact of communicating different types of information to humans about the AI system's decision to defer. Using real-world conservation data and a selective prediction system that improves expected accuracy over that of the human or AI system working individually, we show that this messaging has a significant impact on the accuracy of human judgements. Our results study two components of the messaging strategy: 1) Whether humans are informed about the prediction of the AI system and 2) Whether they are informed about the decision of the selective prediction system to defer. By manipulating these messaging components, we show that it is possible to significantly boost human performance by informing the human of the decision to defer, but not revealing the prediction of the AI. We therefore show that it is vital to consider how the decision to defer is communicated to a human when designing selective prediction systems, and that the composite accuracy of a human-AI team must be carefully evaluated using a human-in-the-loop framework.

Statistical discrimination in learning agents

Undesired bias afflicts both human and algorithmic decision making, and may be especially prevalent when information processing trade-offs incentivize the use of heuristics. One primary example is \textit{statistical discrimination} -- selecting social partners based not on their underlying attributes, but on readily perceptible characteristics that covary with their suitability for the task at hand. We present a theoretical model to examine how information processing influences statistical discrimination and test its predictions using multi-agent reinforcement learning with various agent architectures in a partner choice-based social dilemma. As predicted, statistical discrimination emerges in agent policies as a function of both the bias in the training population and of agent architecture. All agents showed substantial statistical discrimination, defaulting to using the readily available correlates instead of the outcome relevant features. We show that less discrimination emerges with agents that use recurrent neural networks, and when their training environment has less bias. However, all agent algorithms we tried still exhibited substantial bias after learning in biased training populations.

Open Problems in Cooperative AI

Problems of cooperation--in which agents seek ways to jointly improve their welfare--are ubiquitous and important. They can be found at scales ranging from our daily routines--such as driving on highways, scheduling meetings, and working collaboratively--to our global challenges--such as peace, commerce, and pandemic preparedness. Arguably, the success of the human species is rooted in our ability to cooperate. Since machines powered by artificial intelligence are playing an ever greater role in our lives, it will be important to equip them with the capabilities necessary to cooperate and to foster cooperation. We see an opportunity for the field of artificial intelligence to explicitly focus effort on this class of problems, which we term Cooperative AI. The objective of this research would be to study the many aspects of the problems of cooperation and to innovate in AI to contribute to solving these problems. Central goals include building machine agents with the capabilities needed for cooperation, building tools to foster cooperation in populations of (machine and/or human) agents, and otherwise conducting AI research for insight relevant to problems of cooperation. This research integrates ongoing work on multi-agent systems, game theory and social choice, human-machine interaction and alignment, natural-language processing, and the construction of social tools and platforms. However, Cooperative AI is not the union of these existing areas, but rather an independent bet about the productivity of specific kinds of conversations that involve these and other areas. We see opportunity to more explicitly focus on the problem of cooperation, to construct unified theory and vocabulary, and to build bridges with adjacent communities working on cooperation, including in the natural, social, and behavioural sciences.

Negotiating Team Formation Using Deep Reinforcement Learning

When autonomous agents interact in the same environment, they must often cooperate to achieve their goals. One way for agents to cooperate effectively is to form a team, make a binding agreement on a joint plan, and execute it. However, when agents are self-interested, the gains from team formation must be allocated appropriately to incentivize agreement. Various approaches for multi-agent negotiation have been proposed, but typically only work for particular negotiation protocols. More general methods usually require human input or domain-specific data, and so do not scale. To address this, we propose a framework for training agents to negotiate and form teams using deep reinforcement learning. Importantly, our method makes no assumptions about the specific negotiation protocol, and is instead completely experience driven. We evaluate our approach on both non-spatial and spatially extended team-formation negotiation environments, demonstrating that our agents beat hand-crafted bots and reach negotiation outcomes consistent with fair solutions predicted by cooperative game theory. Additionally, we investigate how the physical location of agents influences negotiation outcomes.

Learning to Play No-Press Diplomacy with Best Response Policy Iteration

Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and principled application of RL methods. However real-world settings are many-agent, and agent interactions are complex mixtures of common-interest and competitive aspects. We consider Diplomacy, a 7-player board game designed to accentuate dilemmas resulting from many-agent interactions. It also features a large combinatorial action space and simultaneous moves, which are challenging for RL algorithms. We propose a simple yet effective approximate best response operator, designed to handle large combinatorial action spaces and simultaneous moves. We also introduce a family of policy iteration methods that approximate fictitious play. With these methods, we successfully apply RL to Diplomacy: we show that our agents convincingly outperform the previous state-of-the-art, and game theoretic equilibrium analysis shows that the new process yields consistent improvements.

Learning to Resolve Alliance Dilemmas in Many-Player Zero-Sum Games

Zero-sum games have long guided artificial intelligence research, since they possess both a rich strategy space of best-responses and a clear evaluation metric. What's more, competition is a vital mechanism in many real-world multi-agent systems capable of generating intelligent innovations: Darwinian evolution, the market economy and the AlphaZero algorithm, to name a few. In two-player zero-sum games, the challenge is usually viewed as finding Nash equilibrium strategies, safeguarding against exploitation regardless of the opponent. While this captures the intricacies of chess or Go, it avoids the notion of cooperation with co-players, a hallmark of the major transitions leading from unicellular organisms to human civilization. Beyond two players, alliance formation often confers an advantage; however this requires trust, namely the promise of mutual cooperation in the face of incentives to defect. Successful play therefore requires adaptation to co-players rather than the pursuit of non-exploitability. Here we argue that a systematic study of many-player zero-sum games is a crucial element of artificial intelligence research. Using symmetric zero-sum matrix games, we demonstrate formally that alliance formation may be seen as a social dilemma, and empirically that na\"ive multi-agent reinforcement learning therefore fails to form alliances. We introduce a toy model of economic competition, and show how reinforcement learning may be augmented with a peer-to-peer contract mechanism to discover and enforce alliances. Finally, we generalize our agent model to incorporate temporally-extended contracts, presenting opportunities for further work.

Minimax Theorem for Latent Games or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying about Mixed-Nash and Love Neural Nets

Adversarial training, a special case of multi-objective optimization, is an increasingly useful tool in machine learning. For example, two-player zero-sum games are important for generative modeling (GANs) and for mastering games like Go or Poker via self-play. A classic result in Game Theory states that one must mix strategies, as pure equilibria may not exist. Surprisingly, machine learning practitioners typically train a \emph{single} pair of agents -- instead of a pair of mixtures -- going against Nash's principle. Our main contribution is a notion of limited-capacity-equilibrium for which, as capacity grows, optimal agents -- not mixtures -- can learn increasingly expressive and realistic behaviors. We define \emph{latent games}, a new class of game where agents are mappings that transform latent distributions. Examples include generators in GANs, which transform Gaussian noise into distributions on images, and StarCraft II agents, which transform sampled build orders into policies. We show that minimax equilibria in latent games can be approximated by a \emph{single} pair of dense neural networks. Finally, we apply our latent game approach to solve differentiable Blotto, a game with an infinite strategy space.

Biases for Emergent Communication in Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning

We study the problem of emergent communication, in which language arises because speakers and listeners must communicate information in order to solve tasks. In temporally extended reinforcement learning domains, it has proved hard to learn such communication without centralized training of agents, due in part to a difficult joint exploration problem. We introduce inductive biases for positive signalling and positive listening, which ease this problem. In a simple one-step environment, we demonstrate how these biases ease the learning problem. We also apply our methods to a more extended environment, showing that agents with these inductive biases achieve better performance, and analyse the resulting communication protocols.

A Neural Architecture for Designing Truthful and Efficient Auctions

Auctions are protocols to allocate goods to buyers who have preferences over them, and collect payments in return. Economists have invested significant effort in designing auction rules that result in allocations of the goods that are desirable for the group as a whole. However, for settings where participants' valuations of the items on sale are their private information, the rules of the auction must deter buyers from misreporting their preferences, so as to maximize their own utility, since misreported preferences hinder the ability for the auctioneer to allocate goods to those who want them most. Manual auction design has yielded excellent mechanisms for specific settings, but requires significant effort when tackling new domains. We propose a deep learning based approach to automatically design auctions in a wide variety of domains, shifting the design work from human to machine. We assume that participants' valuations for the items for sale are independently sampled from an unknown but fixed distribution. Our system receives a data-set consisting of such valuation samples, and outputs an auction rule encoding the desired incentive structure. We focus on producing truthful and efficient auctions that minimize the economic burden on participants. We evaluate the auctions designed by our framework on well-studied domains, such as multi-unit and combinatorial auctions, showing that they outperform known auction designs in terms of the economic burden placed on participants.