Recourse for reclamation: Chatting with generative language models

Researchers and developers increasingly rely on toxicity scoring to moderate generative language model outputs, in settings such as customer service, information retrieval, and content generation. However, toxicity scoring may render pertinent information inaccessible, rigidify or "value-lock" cultural norms, and prevent language reclamation processes, particularly for marginalized people. In this work, we extend the concept of algorithmic recourse to generative language models: we provide users a novel mechanism to achieve their desired prediction by dynamically setting thresholds for toxicity filtering. Users thereby exercise increased agency relative to interactions with the baseline system. A pilot study ($n = 30$) supports the potential of our proposed recourse mechanism, indicating improvements in usability compared to fixed-threshold toxicity-filtering of model outputs. Future work should explore the intersection of toxicity scoring, model controllability, user agency, and language reclamation processes -- particularly with regard to the bias that many communities encounter when interacting with generative language models.

How FaR Are Large Language Models From Agents with Theory-of-Mind?

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Heterogeneous Social Value Orientation Leads to Meaningful Diversity in Sequential Social Dilemmas

In social psychology, Social Value Orientation (SVO) describes an individual's propensity to allocate resources between themself and others. In reinforcement learning, SVO has been instantiated as an intrinsic motivation that remaps an agent's rewards based on particular target distributions of group reward. Prior studies show that groups of agents endowed with heterogeneous SVO learn diverse policies in settings that resemble the incentive structure of Prisoner's dilemma. Our work extends this body of results and demonstrates that (1) heterogeneous SVO leads to meaningfully diverse policies across a range of incentive structures in sequential social dilemmas, as measured by task-specific diversity metrics; and (2) learning a best response to such policy diversity leads to better zero-shot generalization in some situations. We show that these best-response agents learn policies that are conditioned on their co-players, which we posit is the reason for improved zero-shot generalization results.

Combining Tree-Search, Generative Models, and Nash Bargaining Concepts in Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning

Multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) has benefited significantly from population-based and game-theoretic training regimes. One approach, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO), employs standard reinforcement learning to compute response policies via approximate best responses and combines them via meta-strategy selection. We augment PSRO by adding a novel search procedure with generative sampling of world states, and introduce two new meta-strategy solvers based on the Nash bargaining solution. We evaluate PSRO's ability to compute approximate Nash equilibrium, and its performance in two negotiation games: Colored Trails, and Deal or No Deal. We conduct behavioral studies where human participants negotiate with our agents ($N = 346$). We find that search with generative modeling finds stronger policies during both training time and test time, enables online Bayesian co-player prediction, and can produce agents that achieve comparable social welfare negotiating with humans as humans trading among themselves.

Developing, Evaluating and Scaling Learning Agents in Multi-Agent Environments

The Game Theory & Multi-Agent team at DeepMind studies several aspects of multi-agent learning ranging from computing approximations to fundamental concepts in game theory to simulating social dilemmas in rich spatial environments and training 3-d humanoids in difficult team coordination tasks. A signature aim of our group is to use the resources and expertise made available to us at DeepMind in deep reinforcement learning to explore multi-agent systems in complex environments and use these benchmarks to advance our understanding. Here, we summarise the recent work of our team and present a taxonomy that we feel highlights many important open challenges in multi-agent research.

Subverting machines, fluctuating identities: Re-learning human categorization

Most machine learning systems that interact with humans construct some notion of a person's "identity," yet the default paradigm in AI research envisions identity with essential attributes that are discrete and static. In stark contrast, strands of thought within critical theory present a conception of identity as malleable and constructed entirely through interaction; a doing rather than a being. In this work, we distill some of these ideas for machine learning practitioners and introduce a theory of identity as autopoiesis, circular processes of formation and function. We argue that the default paradigm of identity used by the field immobilizes existing identity categories and the power differentials that co$\unicode{x2010}$occur, due to the absence of iterative feedback to our models. This includes a critique of emergent AI fairness practices that continue to impose the default paradigm. Finally, we apply our theory to sketch approaches to autopoietic identity through multilevel optimization and relational learning. While these ideas raise many open questions, we imagine the possibilities of machines that are capable of expressing human identity as a relationship perpetually in flux.

Warmth and competence in human-agent cooperation

Interaction and cooperation with humans are overarching aspirations of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Recent studies demonstrate that AI agents trained with deep reinforcement learning are capable of collaborating with humans. These studies primarily evaluate human compatibility through "objective" metrics such as task performance, obscuring potential variation in the levels of trust and subjective preference that different agents garner. To better understand the factors shaping subjective preferences in human-agent cooperation, we train deep reinforcement learning agents in Coins, a two-player social dilemma. We recruit participants for a human-agent cooperation study and measure their impressions of the agents they encounter. Participants' perceptions of warmth and competence predict their stated preferences for different agents, above and beyond objective performance metrics. Drawing inspiration from social science and biology research, we subsequently implement a new "partner choice" framework to elicit revealed preferences: after playing an episode with an agent, participants are asked whether they would like to play the next round with the same agent or to play alone. As with stated preferences, social perception better predicts participants' revealed preferences than does objective performance. Given these results, we recommend human-agent interaction researchers routinely incorporate the measurement of social perception and subjective preferences into their studies.

Hidden Agenda: a Social Deduction Game with Diverse Learned Equilibria

A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden, possibly misaligned motivations and goals. Social deduction games offer an avenue to study how individuals might learn to synthesize potentially unreliable information about others, and elucidate their true motivations. In this work, we present Hidden Agenda, a two-team social deduction game that provides a 2D environment for studying learning agents in scenarios of unknown team alignment. The environment admits a rich set of strategies for both teams. Reinforcement learning agents trained in Hidden Agenda show that agents can learn a variety of behaviors, including partnering and voting without need for communication in natural language.

Statistical discrimination in learning agents

Undesired bias afflicts both human and algorithmic decision making, and may be especially prevalent when information processing trade-offs incentivize the use of heuristics. One primary example is \textit{statistical discrimination} -- selecting social partners based not on their underlying attributes, but on readily perceptible characteristics that covary with their suitability for the task at hand. We present a theoretical model to examine how information processing influences statistical discrimination and test its predictions using multi-agent reinforcement learning with various agent architectures in a partner choice-based social dilemma. As predicted, statistical discrimination emerges in agent policies as a function of both the bias in the training population and of agent architecture. All agents showed substantial statistical discrimination, defaulting to using the readily available correlates instead of the outcome relevant features. We show that less discrimination emerges with agents that use recurrent neural networks, and when their training environment has less bias. However, all agent algorithms we tried still exhibited substantial bias after learning in biased training populations.

Collaborating with Humans without Human Data

Collaborating with humans requires rapidly adapting to their individual strengths, weaknesses, and preferences. Unfortunately, most standard multi-agent reinforcement learning techniques, such as self-play (SP) or population play (PP), produce agents that overfit to their training partners and do not generalize well to humans. Alternatively, researchers can collect human data, train a human model using behavioral cloning, and then use that model to train "human-aware" agents ("behavioral cloning play", or BCP). While such an approach can improve the generalization of agents to new human co-players, it involves the onerous and expensive step of collecting large amounts of human data first. Here, we study the problem of how to train agents that collaborate well with human partners without using human data. We argue that the crux of the problem is to produce a diverse set of training partners. Drawing inspiration from successful multi-agent approaches in competitive domains, we find that a surprisingly simple approach is highly effective. We train our agent partner as the best response to a population of self-play agents and their past checkpoints taken throughout training, a method we call Fictitious Co-Play (FCP). Our experiments focus on a two-player collaborative cooking simulator that has recently been proposed as a challenge problem for coordination with humans. We find that FCP agents score significantly higher than SP, PP, and BCP when paired with novel agent and human partners. Furthermore, humans also report a strong subjective preference to partnering with FCP agents over all baselines.