Evolution has produced a multi-scale mosaic of interacting adaptive units. Innovations arise when perturbations push parts of the system away from stable equilibria into new regimes where previously well-adapted solutions no longer work. Here we explore the hypothesis that multi-agent systems sometimes display intrinsic dynamics arising from competition and cooperation that provide a naturally emergent curriculum, which we term an autocurriculum. The solution of one social task often begets new social tasks, continually generating novel challenges, and thereby promoting innovation. Under certain conditions these challenges may become increasingly complex over time, demanding that agents accumulate ever more innovations.
From the early days of computing, games have been important testbeds for studying how well machines can do sophisticated decision making. In recent years, machine learning has made dramatic advances with artificial agents reaching superhuman performance in challenge domains like Go, Atari, and some variants of poker. As with their predecessors of chess, checkers, and backgammon, these game domains have driven research by providing sophisticated yet well-defined challenges for artificial intelligence practitioners. We continue this tradition by proposing the game of Hanabi as a new challenge domain with novel problems that arise from its combination of purely cooperative gameplay and imperfect information in a two to five player setting. In particular, we argue that Hanabi elevates reasoning about the beliefs and intentions of other agents to the foreground. We believe developing novel techniques capable of imbuing artificial agents with such theory of mind will not only be crucial for their success in Hanabi, but also in broader collaborative efforts, and especially those with human partners. To facilitate future research, we introduce the open-source Hanabi Learning Environment, propose an experimental framework for the research community to evaluate algorithmic advances, and assess the performance of current state-of-the-art techniques.
Discovering and exploiting the causal structure in the environment is a crucial challenge for intelligent agents. Here we explore whether causal reasoning can emerge via meta-reinforcement learning. We train a recurrent network with model-free reinforcement learning to solve a range of problems that each contain causal structure. We find that the trained agent can perform causal reasoning in novel situations in order to obtain rewards. The agent can select informative interventions, draw causal inferences from observational data, and make counterfactual predictions. Although established formal causal reasoning algorithms also exist, in this paper we show that such reasoning can arise from model-free reinforcement learning, and suggest that causal reasoning in complex settings may benefit from the more end-to-end learning-based approaches presented here. This work also offers new strategies for structured exploration in reinforcement learning, by providing agents with the ability to perform -- and interpret -- experiments.
Here we explore a new algorithmic framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning, called Malthusian reinforcement learning, which extends self-play to include fitness-linked population size dynamics that drive ongoing innovation. In Malthusian RL, increases in a subpopulation's average return drive subsequent increases in its size, just as Thomas Malthus argued in 1798 was the relationship between preindustrial income levels and population growth. Malthusian reinforcement learning harnesses the competitive pressures arising from growing and shrinking population size to drive agents to explore regions of state and policy spaces that they could not otherwise reach. Furthermore, in environments where there are potential gains from specialization and division of labor, we show that Malthusian reinforcement learning is better positioned to take advantage of such synergies than algorithms based on self-play.
When observing the actions of others, humans carry out inferences about why the others acted as they did, and what this implies about their view of the world. Humans also use the fact that their actions will be interpreted in this manner when observed by others, allowing them to act informatively and thereby communicate efficiently with others. Although learning algorithms have recently achieved superhuman performance in a number of two-player, zero-sum games, scalable multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms that can discover effective strategies and conventions in complex, partially observable settings have proven elusive. We present the Bayesian action decoder (BAD), a new multi-agent learning method that uses an approximate Bayesian update to obtain a public belief that conditions on the actions taken by all agents in the environment. Together with the public belief, this Bayesian update effectively defines a new Markov decision process, the public belief MDP, in which the action space consists of deterministic partial policies, parameterised by deep neural networks, that can be sampled for a given public state. It exploits the fact that an agent acting only on this public belief state can still learn to use its private information if the action space is augmented to be over partial policies mapping private information into environment actions. The Bayesian update is also closely related to the theory of mind reasoning that humans carry out when observing others' actions. We first validate BAD on a proof-of-principle two-step matrix game, where it outperforms traditional policy gradient methods. We then evaluate BAD on the challenging, cooperative partial-information card game Hanabi, where in the two-player setting the method surpasses all previously published learning and hand-coded approaches.
We derive a new intrinsic social motivation for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), in which agents are rewarded for having causal influence over another agent's actions. Causal influence is assessed using counterfactual reasoning. The reward does not depend on observing another agent's reward function, and is thus a more realistic approach to MARL than taken in previous work. We show that the causal influence reward is related to maximizing the mutual information between agents' actions. We test the approach in challenging social dilemma environments, where it consistently leads to enhanced cooperation between agents and higher collective reward. Moreover, we find that rewarding influence can lead agents to develop emergent communication protocols. We therefore employ influence to train agents to use an explicit communication channel, and find that it leads to more effective communication and higher collective reward. Finally, we show that influence can be computed by equipping each agent with an internal model that predicts the actions of other agents. This allows the social influence reward to be computed without the use of a centralised controller, and as such represents a significantly more general and scalable inductive bias for MARL with independent agents.
Recent work has shown that deep reinforcement-learning agents can learn to follow language-like instructions from infrequent environment rewards. However, this places on environment designers the onus of designing language-conditional reward functions which may not be easily or tractably implemented as the complexity of the environment and the language scales. To overcome this limitation, we present a framework within which instruction-conditional RL agents are trained using rewards obtained not from the environment, but from reward models which are jointly trained from expert examples. As reward models improve, they learn to accurately reward agents for completing tasks for environment configurations---and for instructions---not present amongst the expert data. This framework effectively separates the representation of what instructions require from how they can be executed. In a simple grid world, it enables an agent to learn a range of commands requiring interaction with blocks and understanding of spatial relations and underspecified abstract arrangements. We further show the method allows our agent to adapt to changes in the environment without requiring new expert examples.
Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.