We introduce Genie, the first generative interactive environment trained in an unsupervised manner from unlabelled Internet videos. The model can be prompted to generate an endless variety of action-controllable virtual worlds described through text, synthetic images, photographs, and even sketches. At 11B parameters, Genie can be considered a foundation world model. It is comprised of a spatiotemporal video tokenizer, an autoregressive dynamics model, and a simple and scalable latent action model. Genie enables users to act in the generated environments on a frame-by-frame basis despite training without any ground-truth action labels or other domain-specific requirements typically found in the world model literature. Further the resulting learned latent action space facilitates training agents to imitate behaviors from unseen videos, opening the path for training generalist agents of the future.
Restless multi-arm bandits (RMABs), a class of resource allocation problems with broad application in areas such as healthcare, online advertising, and anti-poaching, have recently been studied from a multi-agent reinforcement learning perspective. Prior RMAB research suffers from several limitations, e.g., it fails to adequately address continuous states, and requires retraining from scratch when arms opt-in and opt-out over time, a common challenge in many real world applications. We address these limitations by developing a neural network-based pre-trained model (PreFeRMAB) that has general zero-shot ability on a wide range of previously unseen RMABs, and which can be fine-tuned on specific instances in a more sample-efficient way than retraining from scratch. Our model also accommodates general multi-action settings and discrete or continuous state spaces. To enable fast generalization, we learn a novel single policy network model that utilizes feature information and employs a training procedure in which arms opt-in and out over time. We derive a new update rule for a crucial $\lambda$-network with theoretical convergence guarantees and empirically demonstrate the advantages of our approach on several challenging, real-world inspired problems.
In social psychology, Social Value Orientation (SVO) describes an individual's propensity to allocate resources between themself and others. In reinforcement learning, SVO has been instantiated as an intrinsic motivation that remaps an agent's rewards based on particular target distributions of group reward. Prior studies show that groups of agents endowed with heterogeneous SVO learn diverse policies in settings that resemble the incentive structure of Prisoner's dilemma. Our work extends this body of results and demonstrates that (1) heterogeneous SVO leads to meaningfully diverse policies across a range of incentive structures in sequential social dilemmas, as measured by task-specific diversity metrics; and (2) learning a best response to such policy diversity leads to better zero-shot generalization in some situations. We show that these best-response agents learn policies that are conditioned on their co-players, which we posit is the reason for improved zero-shot generalization results.
Foundation models have shown impressive adaptation and scalability in supervised and self-supervised learning problems, but so far these successes have not fully translated to reinforcement learning (RL). In this work, we demonstrate that training an RL agent at scale leads to a general in-context learning algorithm that can adapt to open-ended novel embodied 3D problems as quickly as humans. In a vast space of held-out environment dynamics, our adaptive agent (AdA) displays on-the-fly hypothesis-driven exploration, efficient exploitation of acquired knowledge, and can successfully be prompted with first-person demonstrations. Adaptation emerges from three ingredients: (1) meta-reinforcement learning across a vast, smooth and diverse task distribution, (2) a policy parameterised as a large-scale attention-based memory architecture, and (3) an effective automated curriculum that prioritises tasks at the frontier of an agent's capabilities. We demonstrate characteristic scaling laws with respect to network size, memory length, and richness of the training task distribution. We believe our results lay the foundation for increasingly general and adaptive RL agents that perform well across ever-larger open-ended domains.
The Game Theory & Multi-Agent team at DeepMind studies several aspects of multi-agent learning ranging from computing approximations to fundamental concepts in game theory to simulating social dilemmas in rich spatial environments and training 3-d humanoids in difficult team coordination tasks. A signature aim of our group is to use the resources and expertise made available to us at DeepMind in deep reinforcement learning to explore multi-agent systems in complex environments and use these benchmarks to advance our understanding. Here, we summarise the recent work of our team and present a taxonomy that we feel highlights many important open challenges in multi-agent research.
Advances in artificial intelligence often stem from the development of new environments that abstract real-world situations into a form where research can be done conveniently. This paper contributes such an environment based on ideas inspired by elementary Microeconomics. Agents learn to produce resources in a spatially complex world, trade them with one another, and consume those that they prefer. We show that the emergent production, consumption, and pricing behaviors respond to environmental conditions in the directions predicted by supply and demand shifts in Microeconomics. We also demonstrate settings where the agents' emergent prices for goods vary over space, reflecting the local abundance of goods. After the price disparities emerge, some agents then discover a niche of transporting goods between regions with different prevailing prices -- a profitable strategy because they can buy goods where they are cheap and sell them where they are expensive. Finally, in a series of ablation experiments, we investigate how choices in the environmental rewards, bartering actions, agent architecture, and ability to consume tradable goods can either aid or inhibit the emergence of this economic behavior. This work is part of the environment development branch of a research program that aims to build human-like artificial general intelligence through multi-agent interactions in simulated societies. By exploring which environment features are needed for the basic phenomena of elementary microeconomics to emerge automatically from learning, we arrive at an environment that differs from those studied in prior multi-agent reinforcement learning work along several dimensions. For example, the model incorporates heterogeneous tastes and physical abilities, and agents negotiate with one another as a grounded form of communication.
Cultural transmission is the domain-general social skill that allows agents to acquire and use information from each other in real-time with high fidelity and recall. In humans, it is the inheritance process that powers cumulative cultural evolution, expanding our skills, tools and knowledge across generations. We provide a method for generating zero-shot, high recall cultural transmission in artificially intelligent agents. Our agents succeed at real-time cultural transmission from humans in novel contexts without using any pre-collected human data. We identify a surprisingly simple set of ingredients sufficient for generating cultural transmission and develop an evaluation methodology for rigorously assessing it. This paves the way for cultural evolution as an algorithm for developing artificial general intelligence.
Collaborating with humans requires rapidly adapting to their individual strengths, weaknesses, and preferences. Unfortunately, most standard multi-agent reinforcement learning techniques, such as self-play (SP) or population play (PP), produce agents that overfit to their training partners and do not generalize well to humans. Alternatively, researchers can collect human data, train a human model using behavioral cloning, and then use that model to train "human-aware" agents ("behavioral cloning play", or BCP). While such an approach can improve the generalization of agents to new human co-players, it involves the onerous and expensive step of collecting large amounts of human data first. Here, we study the problem of how to train agents that collaborate well with human partners without using human data. We argue that the crux of the problem is to produce a diverse set of training partners. Drawing inspiration from successful multi-agent approaches in competitive domains, we find that a surprisingly simple approach is highly effective. We train our agent partner as the best response to a population of self-play agents and their past checkpoints taken throughout training, a method we call Fictitious Co-Play (FCP). Our experiments focus on a two-player collaborative cooking simulator that has recently been proposed as a challenge problem for coordination with humans. We find that FCP agents score significantly higher than SP, PP, and BCP when paired with novel agent and human partners. Furthermore, humans also report a strong subjective preference to partnering with FCP agents over all baselines.
Collective action demands that individuals efficiently coordinate how much, where, and when to cooperate. Laboratory experiments have extensively explored the first part of this process, demonstrating that a variety of social-cognitive mechanisms influence how much individuals choose to invest in group efforts. However, experimental research has been unable to shed light on how social cognitive mechanisms contribute to the where and when of collective action. We leverage multi-agent deep reinforcement learning to model how a social-cognitive mechanism--specifically, the intrinsic motivation to achieve a good reputation--steers group behavior toward specific spatial and temporal strategies for collective action in a social dilemma. We also collect behavioral data from groups of human participants challenged with the same dilemma. The model accurately predicts spatial and temporal patterns of group behavior: in this public goods dilemma, the intrinsic motivation for reputation catalyzes the development of a non-territorial, turn-taking strategy to coordinate collective action.
The real world is awash with multi-agent problems that require collective action by self-interested agents, from the routing of packets across a computer network to the management of irrigation systems. Such systems have local incentives for individuals, whose behavior has an impact on the global outcome for the group. Given appropriate mechanisms describing agent interaction, groups may achieve socially beneficial outcomes, even in the face of short-term selfish incentives. In many cases, collective action problems possess an underlying graph structure, whose topology crucially determines the relationship between local decisions and emergent global effects. Such scenarios have received great attention through the lens of network games. However, this abstraction typically collapses important dimensions, such as geometry and time, relevant to the design of mechanisms promoting cooperation. In parallel work, multi-agent deep reinforcement learning has shown great promise in modelling the emergence of self-organized cooperation in complex gridworld domains. Here we apply this paradigm in graph-structured collective action problems. Using multi-agent deep reinforcement learning, we simulate an agent society for a variety of plausible mechanisms, finding clear transitions between different equilibria over time. We define analytic tools inspired by related literatures to measure the social outcomes, and use these to draw conclusions about the efficacy of different environmental interventions. Our methods have implications for mechanism design in both human and artificial agent systems.