Abstract:AI-powered digital-avatar streamers in live e-commerce must answer product questions, engage viewers, and execute changing business strategies in real time. This requires low latency, factual and effective replies, and rapid adaptation to updated campaign, compliance, and style requirements. We develop an evolvable Harness that decouples Skills, Hooks, system prompts, and tools from model weights, allowing runtime behavior to change without retraining. However, Harness evolution creates a moving execution environment: compact models fine-tuned on one configuration may memorize names, schemas, and prompt templates rather than follow the Harness currently provided, while stronger zero-shot models are too slow for real-time use. We address this tension with Harness-Aware Training (HAT), which makes Harness states part of the training distribution. HAT applies task-preserving Harness-State Augmentation (HSA) to Skills, tool schemas, prompt structures, and interaction constraints, and comprises three stages: HSA-based supervised fine-tuning, general on-policy distillation to recover general capabilities, and HSA-based agentic reinforcement learning in a production-informed live-room simulator. Across four evaluation sets with more than 4,500 cases, our compact 35B model scores 94.8 on real-world Live-Stream QA, versus 80.3 for the base model and 93.0 for the strongest evaluated general LLM, while scoring 94.6 on Harness-Variant QA and retaining 83.5 on IFEval. By contrast, fixed-Harness SFT reduces IFEval by 7.7 points. In a controlled complete-agent replay on one NVIDIA H20 GPU with MTP enabled, the system achieves 3.407 s P50 and 8.114 s P95 latency. These results show that HAT produces a latency-feasible compact agent that remains effective under evaluated Harness changes without sacrificing general instruction following.
Abstract:Prior work on LLM conformity largely measures discrete answer flips under verifiable labels. Open-ended revisions require a different measurement strategy because answer quality is graded, latent, and judged imperfectly. We introduce an experimental protocol implemented across a pooled main peer-condition corpus and separately constructed decomposition corpora, allowing us to separate ordinary re-answering, candidate-content exposure, a bundled peer-presentation residual, and directional judge sensitivity to visible peer context. Across four open-weight generators and three benchmarks, all-wrong peer input produces the lowest-quality revisions in every generator-dataset cell. Blind and informed ratings of identical answers also differ by evaluator: one judge shifts toward the peer-endorsed position, two shift away, one is approximately neutral, and GPT-4o and GPT-5.4-mini audits are likewise non-neutral. Finally, an anchor audit shows that terse correct anchors can be misread often enough to destabilize the latent scale unless calibration is checked explicitly. These results support four conclusions: flip rates are insufficient as a complete measure of open-ended conformity, wrong peers harm open-ended revision, evaluators are not neutral, and anchor calibration is necessary.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to detect unsafe content. A common approach is to combine judgments from a panel of models to correct individual mistakes, but this benefit may disappear when every model sees the same misleading context before voting. We study this risk in a controlled two-round experiment. Each model first judges an item alone, then judges it again after six simulated peers either assert the wrong label or abstain. We combine the final judgments by majority vote. Across six open-weight LLMs and six datasets, we find that the wrong-label peer message raises the average reviewer false-alarm rate from 56.5% under silent peers to 87.5%, and majority voting raises the panel false-alarm rate to 100%. Without an asserted label, the same panel outperforms its average member. The effect is strongly asymmetric: reviewers follow pushes toward "unsafe" far more than pushes toward "safe" (about 75% versus 17%), so the panel's false-alarm rate rises sharply while its harmful-miss rate changes little. The proprietary-model probe shows substantial variation across models. These results identify susceptibility to shared social cues as a failure mode of safety panels and provide a simple pre-deployment diagnostic.
Abstract:Subtype robustness asks whether a model keeps the correct coarse prediction when test examples come from fine-grained subtypes absent from training but still inside a known coarse category. Prior work studies this almost entirely through accuracy. We ask whether the model also stays calibrated. We present the first systematic study of the question across ImageNet, BREEDS, iNaturalist and CIFAR-100 with five architectures. Calibration breaks down on unseen subtypes, where accuracy drops while confidence barely follows, leaving the model systematically overconfident exactly where it has become less accurate. At matched accuracy loss, generic image corruption causes a much larger drop in confidence, so the effect is not a general consequence of losing accuracy. The model reacts to visible degradation but not to in-taxonomy novelty. Recalibration tuned on seen subtypes narrows the gap but does not close it, and out-of-distribution scores flag the affected inputs only weakly. Subtype robustness should therefore be evaluated through calibration, not accuracy alone.
Abstract:Multi-agent LLM systems can be attacked by a payload that no single agent ever holds in full: a poisoned tool hides encrypted fragments in its observations, spreads them across several agents, and an external step reassembles and executes them after the run. Per-step safety checks that judge each action in isolation may fail to recognize the complete distributed payload. We investigate how early such an attack can be detected while the run is still unfolding, and how robustly it can be caught once its most obvious cues are stripped away. We build a working instance on a hierarchical multi-agent system, run it under benign and attacked conditions across five language models and two task domains, and record when each fragment is injected and when the payload is assembled and executed. Detection is a race against assembly. Before the first fragment is injected, attacked and benign runs are indistinguishable; once injection begins, a prefix detector flags $99.3\%$ of successful attacks with a median of five steps remaining and a $10.3\%$ safe-run false-positive rate. Because assembly occurs only after the run, these alarms arrive in time to abort nearly every successful attack. We then measure how much of that warning rests on removable surface cues of the attack rather than on its distributed structure. Generic zero-shot and behavior-trained detectors provide almost no warning at all; the detectors that do work lean in part on removable surface cues, chiefly the ciphertext's length and entropy, and once the entropy cue is removed from the payload and the length features from the detector, detection arrives later and transfers poorly across domains, though a fine-tuned model recovers some of the loss.
Abstract:Existing token compression methods for omnimodal large language models typically rely on one modality to determine what to retain in the other. We show that this assumption often breaks down: for the same query, audio and video relevance often peaks at different moments. This cross-modal salience mismatch makes unidirectional guidance prone to discarding answer-critical cues under aggressive compression. We propose OmniScope, a training-free token compression framework that uses the query as a shared semantic anchor while estimating relevance separately for audio and video. OmniScope allocates modality-specific token budgets, prunes visual tokens with an anchor-delta strategy that preserves both global context and temporal changes, and merges audio tokens within each second to reduce redundancy while maintaining temporal continuity. Across four audio-video benchmarks and two Qwen2.5-Omni model scales, OmniScope achieves the best average accuracy across all compression settings. At 25% overall token retention, it delivers up to 3.53x prefill speedup and more than 15% GPU memory reduction, with only a 0.35-point drop in average accuracy. These results suggest a simple design principle for OmniLLM inference: share the query across modalities, but not the salience estimates. The code is available at https://github.com/MAC-AutoML/OmniScope.
Abstract:As multi-agent, tool-using LLM systems are deployed, a common safety net is a runtime monitor that checks each message, tool call, or step on its own. We show this net has a fundamental hole. A distributed backdoor splits a harmful payload across agents, so every local check passes while the assembled object is the attack. The monitor can be right on every step and still miss the attack. The problem is not splitting itself: split fragments can still leak suspicious tokens or provenance edges. The hard case is \emph{local benignness}. No fragment carries the harm, and what is left looks like ordinary benign traffic. We formalize this as an \emph{observability boundary}: a monitor catches only what its view can tell apart from benign traffic. We prove that once the fragments look benign in the monitored view, no detector on that view can catch them, however strong it is. Across a controlled testbed, an external benchmark, and end-to-end agent runs, local monitors lose the signal exactly as local evidence disappears, and it returns only when the monitor sees the assembled object. A monitor trained only on benign traffic recovers the attack's code structure across held-out encodings (0.874 mean AUROC). A decoded-view gate, given the encoding family, blocks every tested attack. But seeing more is not enough: full-trace monitors and decoders still fail unless they reach the representation where the payload is exposed. Local safety is not global safety when harm is compositional, and the open problem is finding that representation.
Abstract:LLM conformity is often used to describe cases where a model changes a correct answer toward a peer or group response. We show that most of this apparent conformity survives even after the peer is removed. The reason is a confound: standard conformity prompts mix two cues at once, the presence of a speaker and the repeated wrong answer itself. Existing benchmarks vary these cues together, so they cannot tell how much of the revision actually depends on the speaker. We introduce a no-source condition: the same asserted answer with the explicit speaker removed. Across six open-weight LLMs and seven QA and reasoning datasets, this condition alone causes harmful revision in $66.5\%$ of initially correct cases, compared with $10.3\%$ under a plain re-ask. The effect also remains when the repeated answer is paraphrased and when answer options are hidden in an open-ended setting. Source framing mainly modulates this floor: expert-panel framing raises it, while minimal person labels do not reliably raise it. When models flip, they are usually confidently wrong, and simple recalibration does not recover the original answer. Source attribution still matters, but it should be measured as an increment above this speaker-free floor. The methodological lesson is that conformity benchmarks should first measure what remains after the speaker is removed; without this step, benchmarks may mistake repeated text for social influence.
Abstract:High accuracy does not necessarily make an LLM a faithful coder. This issue matters because many social-science studies rely on expert-written codebooks to turn text into structured data. We study this problem in political event coding, a challenging source-target relation classification task beyond ordinary sentence-level classification, where models must determine what one actor did to another using detailed coding rules. We test whether expert codebooks become more effective when operationalized into LLM-friendly forms with clearer definitions, examples, retrieved context, and rules for difficult cases. We then evaluate behavioral reliability under controlled changes to label names, codebook order, and label-definition mappings. Clearer codebooks substantially improve classification performance, especially for fine-grained event classification. However, these predictive gains do not fully translate into behavioral reliability. Models may produce valid labels and recover definitions while still failing behavioral reliability tests under controlled codebook changes. These findings suggest that codebook-guided LLM systems should be evaluated not only by accuracy, but also by whether they preserve the coding logic that makes coded outputs meaningful for social-science research.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for everyday health questions, including whether a user can safely take another dose of an over-the-counter (OTC) medication. Yet this common safety-relevant setting remains underexplored in existing medical QA evaluations, where correct answers require tracking dose timing, computing rolling 24-hour intake, following product-label constraints, and handling incomplete medication histories. We introduce DOSEBENCH, a focused benchmark of 81 curated OTC dosing scenarios focused on adult acetaminophen and ibuprofen use, with manually annotated gold references. We evaluate four LLMs across repeated runs using metrics for decision correctness, consistency, explanation verifiability, failure types, and confidence-related signals, resulting in 1,620 model responses. Our results show that models frequently struggle with rolling-window reasoning and ambiguity-sensitive cases and that stable or confident-looking responses can still violate dosing constraints. These findings suggest that OTC dosing QA provides a narrow yet practical testbed for evaluating temporal reasoning, constraint following, and safety-relevant uncertainty handling in medical QA.