ArtistAuditor: Auditing Artist Style Pirate in Text-to-Image Generation Models

Text-to-image models based on diffusion processes, such as DALL-E, Stable Diffusion, and Midjourney, are capable of transforming texts into detailed images and have widespread applications in art and design. As such, amateur users can easily imitate professional-level paintings by collecting an artist's work and fine-tuning the model, leading to concerns about artworks' copyright infringement. To tackle these issues, previous studies either add visually imperceptible perturbation to the artwork to change its underlying styles (perturbation-based methods) or embed post-training detectable watermarks in the artwork (watermark-based methods). However, when the artwork or the model has been published online, i.e., modification to the original artwork or model retraining is not feasible, these strategies might not be viable. To this end, we propose a novel method for data-use auditing in the text-to-image generation model. The general idea of ArtistAuditor is to identify if a suspicious model has been finetuned using the artworks of specific artists by analyzing the features related to the style. Concretely, ArtistAuditor employs a style extractor to obtain the multi-granularity style representations and treats artworks as samplings of an artist's style. Then, ArtistAuditor queries a trained discriminator to gain the auditing decisions. The experimental results on six combinations of models and datasets show that ArtistAuditor can achieve high AUC values (> 0.937). By studying ArtistAuditor's transferability and core modules, we provide valuable insights into the practical implementation. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of ArtistAuditor in real-world cases by an online platform Scenario. ArtistAuditor is open-sourced at https://github.com/Jozenn/ArtistAuditor.

UNIDOOR: A Universal Framework for Action-Level Backdoor Attacks in Deep Reinforcement Learning

Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) is widely applied to safety-critical decision-making scenarios. However, DRL is vulnerable to backdoor attacks, especially action-level backdoors, which pose significant threats through precise manipulation and flexible activation, risking outcomes like vehicle collisions or drone crashes. The key distinction of action-level backdoors lies in the utilization of the backdoor reward function to associate triggers with target actions. Nevertheless, existing studies typically rely on backdoor reward functions with fixed values or conditional flipping, which lack universality across diverse DRL tasks and backdoor designs, resulting in fluctuations or even failure in practice. This paper proposes the first universal action-level backdoor attack framework, called UNIDOOR, which enables adaptive exploration of backdoor reward functions through performance monitoring, eliminating the reliance on expert knowledge and grid search. We highlight that action tampering serves as a crucial component of action-level backdoor attacks in continuous action scenarios, as it addresses attack failures caused by low-frequency target actions. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that UNIDOOR significantly enhances the attack performance of action-level backdoors, showcasing its universality across diverse attack scenarios, including single/multiple agents, single/multiple backdoors, discrete/continuous action spaces, and sparse/dense reward signals. Furthermore, visualization results encompassing state distribution, neuron activation, and animations demonstrate the stealthiness of UNIDOOR. The source code of UNIDOOR can be found at https://github.com/maoubo/UNIDOOR.

Defending against Adversarial Malware Attacks on ML-based Android Malware Detection Systems

Android malware presents a persistent threat to users' privacy and data integrity. To combat this, researchers have proposed machine learning-based (ML-based) Android malware detection (AMD) systems. However, adversarial Android malware attacks compromise the detection integrity of the ML-based AMD systems, raising significant concerns. Existing defenses against adversarial Android malware provide protections against feature space attacks which generate adversarial feature vectors only, leaving protection against realistic threats from problem space attacks which generate real adversarial malware an open problem. In this paper, we address this gap by proposing ADD, a practical adversarial Android malware defense framework designed as a plug-in to enhance the adversarial robustness of the ML-based AMD systems against problem space attacks. Our extensive evaluation across various ML-based AMD systems demonstrates that ADD is effective against state-of-the-art problem space adversarial Android malware attacks. Additionally, ADD shows the defense effectiveness in enhancing the adversarial robustness of real-world antivirus solutions.

Neural Honeytrace: A Robust Plug-and-Play Watermarking Framework against Model Extraction Attacks

Developing high-performance deep learning models is resource-intensive, leading model owners to utilize Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) platforms instead of publicly releasing their models. However, malicious users may exploit query interfaces to execute model extraction attacks, reconstructing the target model's functionality locally. While prior research has investigated triggerable watermarking techniques for asserting ownership, existing methods face significant challenges: (1) most approaches require additional training, resulting in high overhead and limited flexibility, and (2) they often fail to account for advanced attackers, leaving them vulnerable to adaptive attacks. In this paper, we propose Neural Honeytrace, a robust plug-and-play watermarking framework against model extraction attacks. We first formulate a watermark transmission model from an information-theoretic perspective, providing an interpretable account of the principles and limitations of existing triggerable watermarking. Guided by the model, we further introduce: (1) a similarity-based training-free watermarking method for plug-and-play and flexible watermarking, and (2) a distribution-based multi-step watermark information transmission strategy for robust watermarking. Comprehensive experiments on four datasets demonstrate that Neural Honeytrace outperforms previous methods in efficiency and resisting adaptive attacks. Neural Honeytrace reduces the average number of samples required for a worst-case t-Test-based copyright claim from $12,000$ to $200$ with zero training cost.

Fine-tuning is Not Fine: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in GNNs with Limited Clean Data

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved remarkable performance through their message-passing mechanism. However, recent studies have highlighted the vulnerability of GNNs to backdoor attacks, which can lead the model to misclassify graphs with attached triggers as the target class. The effectiveness of recent promising defense techniques, such as fine-tuning or distillation, is heavily contingent on having comprehensive knowledge of the sufficient training dataset. Empirical studies have shown that fine-tuning methods require a clean dataset of 20% to reduce attack accuracy to below 25%, while distillation methods require a clean dataset of 15%. However, obtaining such a large amount of clean data is commonly impractical. In this paper, we propose a practical backdoor mitigation framework, denoted as GRAPHNAD, which can capture high-quality intermediate-layer representations in GNNs to enhance the distillation process with limited clean data. To achieve this, we address the following key questions: How to identify the appropriate attention representations in graphs for distillation? How to enhance distillation with limited data? By adopting the graph attention transfer method, GRAPHNAD can effectively align the intermediate-layer attention representations of the backdoored model with that of the teacher model, forcing the backdoor neurons to transform into benign ones. Besides, we extract the relation maps from intermediate-layer transformation and enforce the relation maps of the backdoored model to be consistent with that of the teacher model, thereby ensuring model accuracy while further reducing the influence of backdoors. Extensive experimental results show that by fine-tuning a teacher model with only 3% of the clean data, GRAPHNAD can reduce the attack success rate to below 5%.

AEIOU: A Unified Defense Framework against NSFW Prompts in Text-to-Image Models

As text-to-image (T2I) models continue to advance and gain widespread adoption, their associated safety issues are becoming increasingly prominent. Malicious users often exploit these models to generate Not-Safe-for-Work (NSFW) images using harmful or adversarial prompts, highlighting the critical need for robust safeguards to ensure the integrity and compliance of model outputs. Current internal safeguards frequently degrade image quality, while external detection methods often suffer from low accuracy and inefficiency. In this paper, we introduce AEIOU, a defense framework that is Adaptable, Efficient, Interpretable, Optimizable, and Unified against NSFW prompts in T2I models. AEIOU extracts NSFW features from the hidden states of the model's text encoder, utilizing the separable nature of these features to detect NSFW prompts. The detection process is efficient, requiring minimal inference time. AEIOU also offers real-time interpretation of results and supports optimization through data augmentation techniques. The framework is versatile, accommodating various T2I architectures. Our extensive experiments show that AEIOU significantly outperforms both commercial and open-source moderation tools, achieving over 95% accuracy across all datasets and improving efficiency by at least tenfold. It effectively counters adaptive attacks and excels in few-shot and multi-label scenarios.

WaterPark: A Robustness Assessment of Language Model Watermarking

To mitigate the misuse of large language models (LLMs), such as disinformation, automated phishing, and academic cheating, there is a pressing need for the capability of identifying LLM-generated texts. Watermarking emerges as one promising solution: it plants statistical signals into LLMs' generative processes and subsequently verifies whether LLMs produce given texts. Various watermarking methods (``watermarkers'') have been proposed; yet, due to the lack of unified evaluation platforms, many critical questions remain under-explored: i) What are the strengths/limitations of various watermarkers, especially their attack robustness? ii) How do various design choices impact their robustness? iii) How to optimally operate watermarkers in adversarial environments? To fill this gap, we systematize existing LLM watermarkers and watermark removal attacks, mapping out their design spaces. We then develop WaterPark, a unified platform that integrates 10 state-of-the-art watermarkers and 12 representative attacks. More importantly, leveraging WaterPark, we conduct a comprehensive assessment of existing watermarkers, unveiling the impact of various design choices on their attack robustness. For instance, a watermarker's resilience to increasingly intensive attacks hinges on its context dependency. We further explore the best practices to operate watermarkers in adversarial environments. For instance, using a generic detector alongside a watermark-specific detector improves the security of vulnerable watermarkers. We believe our study sheds light on current LLM watermarking techniques while WaterPark serves as a valuable testbed to facilitate future research.

FLMarket: Enabling Privacy-preserved Pre-training Data Pricing for Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL), as a mainstream privacy-preserving machine learning paradigm, offers promising solutions for privacy-critical domains such as healthcare and finance. Although extensive efforts have been dedicated from both academia and industry to improve the vanilla FL, little work focuses on the data pricing mechanism. In contrast to the straightforward in/post-training pricing techniques, we study a more difficult problem of pre-training pricing without direct information from the learning process. We propose FLMarket that integrates a two-stage, auction-based pricing mechanism with a security protocol to address the utility-privacy conflict. Through comprehensive experiments, we show that the client selection according to FLMarket can achieve more than 10% higher accuracy in subsequent FL training compared to state-of-the-art methods. In addition, it outperforms the in-training baseline with more than 2% accuracy increase and 3x run-time speedup.

Navigating the Risks: A Survey of Security, Privacy, and Ethics Threats in LLM-Based Agents

With the continuous development of large language models (LLMs), transformer-based models have made groundbreaking advances in numerous natural language processing (NLP) tasks, leading to the emergence of a series of agents that use LLMs as their control hub. While LLMs have achieved success in various tasks, they face numerous security and privacy threats, which become even more severe in the agent scenarios. To enhance the reliability of LLM-based applications, a range of research has emerged to assess and mitigate these risks from different perspectives. To help researchers gain a comprehensive understanding of various risks, this survey collects and analyzes the different threats faced by these agents. To address the challenges posed by previous taxonomies in handling cross-module and cross-stage threats, we propose a novel taxonomy framework based on the sources and impacts. Additionally, we identify six key features of LLM-based agents, based on which we summarize the current research progress and analyze their limitations. Subsequently, we select four representative agents as case studies to analyze the risks they may face in practical use. Finally, based on the aforementioned analyses, we propose future research directions from the perspectives of data, methodology, and policy, respectively.

"No Matter What You Do!": Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Graph Neural Networks

Recent studies have exposed that GNNs are vulnerable to several adversarial attacks, among which backdoor attack is one of the toughest. Similar to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), backdoor attacks in GNNs lie in the fact that the attacker modifies a portion of graph data by embedding triggers and enforces the model to learn the trigger feature during the model training process. Despite the massive prior backdoor defense works on DNNs, defending against backdoor attacks in GNNs is largely unexplored, severely hindering the widespread application of GNNs in real-world tasks. To bridge this gap, we present GCleaner, the first backdoor mitigation method on GNNs. GCleaner can mitigate the presence of the backdoor logic within backdoored GNNs by reversing the backdoor learning procedure, aiming to restore the model performance to a level similar to that is directly trained on the original clean dataset. To achieve this objective, we ask: How to recover universal and hard backdoor triggers in GNNs? How to unlearn the backdoor trigger feature while maintaining the model performance? We conduct the graph trigger recovery via the explanation method to identify optimal trigger locations, facilitating the search of universal and hard backdoor triggers in the feature space of the backdoored model through maximal similarity. Subsequently, we introduce the backdoor unlearning mechanism, which combines knowledge distillation and gradient-based explainable knowledge for fine-grained backdoor erasure. Extensive experimental evaluations on four benchmark datasets demonstrate that GCleaner can reduce the backdoor attack success rate to 10% with only 1% of clean data, and has almost negligible degradation in model performance, which far outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) defense methods.