Abstract:Long-form song generation models continue to improve in duration, structural integrity, and acoustic complexity, making reliable aesthetic rewards increasingly important for aligning these models with human preferences. However, reward models for complete songs remain limited, and existing evaluators typically predict scores in a single forward pass without providing readable explanations. We introduce MUSECRITIC, a semi-scalar reward model that generates a natural-language critique covering five aesthetic dimensions and uses it as an intermediate representation to predict continuous reward scores. MUSECRITIC follows a two-stage training pipeline: a teacher model first provides high-quality critiques for supervised fine-tuning, after which the fine-tuned model generates its own critiques for reward learning, mitigating distribution shift between training and inference. On an in-domain test set of 200 SongEval songs, MUSECRITIC reduces macro-averaged mean squared error from 0.2875 to 0.2316 and improves macro-averaged LCC, SRCC, and Kendall's tau to 0.9068, 0.8838, and 0.7178, respectively. On the out-of-domain Music Arena benchmark with 733 preference pairs, it achieves the highest accuracy of 71.35%. Moreover, using MUSECRITIC with GRPO improves Muse-0.6B on all nine aesthetic metrics from SongEval and Audiobox Aesthetics. These results demonstrate that critique-conditioned reward modeling reduces scoring error and provides an effective optimization signal for song generation. The project repository is available at https://github.com/WuqnEl/MuseCritic.
Abstract:The promise of multimodal fusion lies in combining complementary sources of evidence, yet more evidence does not always yield a better prediction. Recent multimodal models have advanced fusion through richer cross-modal interaction and sample-adaptive fusion. However, the influence assigned to a modality during fusion does not reveal whether that source is unreliable, redundant, or poorly matched to a specialized expert. To address this limitation, we introduce TIER-MoE, a risk-guided subspace mixture-of-experts model that defines sample-specific modality reliability as the prediction loss its unimodal predictor is expected to incur. This risk is learned from out-of-fold predictions generated by models that were not trained on the corresponding sample. TIER-MoE combines the estimated risk with expert-specific subspace compatibility for sparse modality-expert routing, while an always-active shared path preserves multimodal complementarity. We evaluate TIER-MoE on four public multimodal biomedical datasets spanning Alzheimer's disease status, skin-lesion malignancy, and retinal classification. Results demonstrate its superiority over state-of-the-art methods in predictive performance and probability calibration, with consistent improvements in Macro-F1 and Brier score and strong zero-shot generalization to an external cohort.
Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) have been widely applied in high-stakes decision-making scenarios such as corporate strategy, and users are increasingly relying on their outputs. However, the deep integration of open-source model sharing ecosystems with LLM-powered critical decision-making applications also introduces critical risks: if an attacker can manipulate the model's cognitive stance, they can indirectly influence the judgments and actions of downstream decision-makers. This paper defines such threats as decision-level hijacking. Existing attacks fail to achieve targeted cognitive manipulation without triggering prohibited content or degrading model functionality. To fill this gap, this paper reveals that Bit-Flip Attacks (BFAs) can serve as an attack vector for inducing decision-level hijacking, requiring no real-time interaction or control over the training process, and only a minimal number of weight bits need to be flipped after deployment to achieve stealthy, low-cost, and persistent cognitive manipulation. Therefore, we propose CogBias, a cognitive bias injection framework for LLMs. CogBias converts subjective preferences into optimization signals via a differentiable sentiment evaluator, uses a multi-objective loss to jointly constrain multiple dimensions, and constructs BitScout to locate critical bits, achieving targeted cognitive intervention under an ultra-sparse flip budget. Experiments on Llama-3.2-3B, Mistral-7B, and Qwen2.5-14B, as well as on the commercial recommendation and controversial factual topic scenarios, demonstrate that flipping only a small number of bits stably induces significant stance shifts on target topics, while the impact on non-target tasks and overall output distribution is limited. This work demonstrates that minute perturbations to low-level weight data suffice to undermine the high-level value alignment of LLMs.
Abstract:Machine-learning services increasingly rely on public data, third-party providers, and outsourced training, creating opportunities for data-poisoning attacks that implant persistent malicious behavior while preserving benign utility. However, existing backdoor studies largely evaluate exact trigger reuse, training-exposed trigger diversity, or variations along predefined transformation axes. They therefore leave a critical blind spot: whether a backdoor learned from one training-time trigger can generalize to an inference-time trigger family absent from victim training. We formulate this problem as backdoor generalization under training--inference trigger shift and introduce Lilith, a black-box anchor-to-family framework. Using only disjoint surrogate resources, Lilith first induces a compact target-side vulnerability with a single training anchor, then constructs a bounded inference-only family that preserves the anchor-induced representation geometry. We characterize this mechanism through anchor clearance and family reach, deriving sufficient conditions for family-wise target preservation under local regularity and bounded surrogate--victim discrepancy. Experiments across datasets, architectures, poisoning rates, and defenses show that Lilith achieves high family-wise attack success with limited utility degradation and a small trigger generalization gap. Additional analyses show that family activation depends on representation alignment rather than the proposal mechanism, exposing a broader threat overlooked by exact-trigger evaluation.
Abstract:In this report, we present Hy-Embodied-0.5-VLA, abbreviated as HyVLA-0.5, an end-to-end system that spans the full robot learning stack: data collection, model design, continued pre-training and supervised fine-tuning, RL post-training, and real-world deployment. Each component serves a distinct role in this stack.
Abstract:Recent advancements in generative AI have led to image editing models capable of producing realistic forgeries that evade traditional image forgery localization methods, as these approaches depend on physical noise absent in synthetic data. To address this challenge, we theoretically demonstrate that the diffusion process inherently suppresses local high-frequency variance, creating a statistical energy gap that is distinguishable from the natural entropy of optical imaging. Guided by this insight, we propose FLAME, a unified framework that utilizes a LAD map to capture these intrinsic anomalies, coupled with a parameter-efficient adapter for SAM to achieve precise, pixel-level forgery localization. Furthermore, to bridge the lag between forensic benchmarks and evolving generative models, we introduce EditStream, an automated pipeline for continuous, instruction-based training data synthesis. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FLAME establishes a new state-of-the-art, significantly outperforming previous methods on AI-generated forgery datasets while effectively generalizing to unseen generative architectures. Our code is available at https://github.com/phoenixnir/FLAME.
Abstract:We address the challenging task of 3D object segmentation in complex scene point clouds without relying on any scene-level human annotations during training. Existing methods are typically constrained to identifying simple objects, primarily due to insufficient object priors in the learning process. In this paper, we present FoundObj, a novel framework featuring a superpoint-based object discovery agent that incrementally merges suitable neighboring superpoints, guided by our innovative semantic and geometric reward modules. These modules synergistically leverage semantic and geometric priors from self-supervised 2D/3D foundation models, providing complementary feedback to the object discovery agent and enabling robust identification of multi-class objects through reinforcement learning. Extensive experiments on diverse benchmarks demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms existing baselines. Notably, our method exhibits strong generalization in zero-shot and long-tail scenarios, underscoring its potential for scalable, label-free 3D object segmentation.
Abstract:Extensive research has highlighted the severe threats posed by backdoor attacks to deep reinforcement learning (DRL). However, prior studies primarily focus on vanilla scenarios, while plasticity interventions have emerged as indispensable built-in components of modern DRL agents. Despite their effectiveness in mitigating plasticity loss, the impact of these interventions on DRL backdoor vulnerabilities remains underexplored, and this lack of systematic investigation poses risks in practical DRL deployments. To bridge this gap, we empirically study 14,664 cases integrating representative interventions and attack scenarios. We find that only one intervention (i.e., SAM) exacerbates backdoor threats, while other interventions mitigate them. Pathological analysis identifies that the exacerbation is attributed to backdoor gradient amplification, while the mitigation stems from activation pathway disruption and representation space compression. From these findings, we derive two novel insights: (1) a conceptual framework SCC for robust backdoor injection that deconstructs the mechanistic interplay between interventions and backdoors in DRL, and (2) abnormal loss landscape sharpness as a key indicator for DRL backdoor detection.
Abstract:We introduce EvObj for unsupervised 3D instance segmentation that bridges the geometric domain gap between synthetic pretraining data and real-world point clouds. Current methods suffer from structural discrepancies when transferring object priors from synthetic datasets (e.g., ShapeNet) to real scans (e.g., ScanNet), particularly due to morphological variations and occlusion artifacts. To address this, EvObj integrates two innovative modules: (1) An object discerning module that dynamically refines object candidates, enabling continuous adaptation of object priors to target domains; and (2) An object completion module that reconstructs partial geometries after discovering objects. We conduct extensive experiments on both real-world and synthetic datasets, demonstrating superior 3D object segmentation performance over all baselines while achieving state-of-the-art results.
Abstract:Web agents have emerged as an effective paradigm for automating interactions with complex web environments, yet remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that embed malicious instructions into webpage content to induce unintended actions. This threat is further amplified for screenshot-based web agents, which operate on rendered visual webpages rather than structured textual representations, making predominant text-centric defenses ineffective. Although multimodal detection methods have been explored, they often rely on large vision-language models (VLMs), incurring significant computational overhead. The bottleneck lies in the complexity of modern webpages: VLMs must comprehend the global semantics of an entire page, resulting in substantial inference time and GPU memory usage. This raises a critical question: can we detect prompt injection attacks from screenshots in a lightweight manner? In this paper, we observe that injected webpages exhibit distinct characteristics compared to benign ones from both visual and textual perspectives. Building on this insight, we propose SnapGuard, a lightweight yet accurate method that reformulates prompt injection detection as multimodal representation analysis over webpage screenshots. SnapGuard leverages two complementary signals: a visual stability indicator that identifies abnormally smooth gradient distributions induced by malicious content, and action-oriented textual signals recovered via contrast-polarity reversal. Extensive evaluations across eight attacks and two benign settings demonstrate that SnapGuard achieves an F1 score of 0.75, outperforming GPT-4o-prompt while being 8x faster (1.81s vs. 14.50s) and introducing no additional memory overhead.