Grounding Language about Belief in a Bayesian Theory-of-Mind

Despite the fact that beliefs are mental states that cannot be directly observed, humans talk about each others' beliefs on a regular basis, often using rich compositional language to describe what others think and know. What explains this capacity to interpret the hidden epistemic content of other minds? In this paper, we take a step towards an answer by grounding the semantics of belief statements in a Bayesian theory-of-mind: By modeling how humans jointly infer coherent sets of goals, beliefs, and plans that explain an agent's actions, then evaluating statements about the agent's beliefs against these inferences via epistemic logic, our framework provides a conceptual role semantics for belief, explaining the gradedness and compositionality of human belief attributions, as well as their intimate connection with goals and plans. We evaluate this framework by studying how humans attribute goals and beliefs while watching an agent solve a doors-and-keys gridworld puzzle that requires instrumental reasoning about hidden objects. In contrast to pure logical deduction, non-mentalizing baselines, and mentalizing that ignores the role of instrumental plans, our model provides a much better fit to human goal and belief attributions, demonstrating the importance of theory-of-mind for a semantics of belief.

Learning adaptive planning representations with natural language guidance

Effective planning in the real world requires not only world knowledge, but the ability to leverage that knowledge to build the right representation of the task at hand. Decades of hierarchical planning techniques have used domain-specific temporal action abstractions to support efficient and accurate planning, almost always relying on human priors and domain knowledge to decompose hard tasks into smaller subproblems appropriate for a goal or set of goals. This paper describes Ada (Action Domain Acquisition), a framework for automatically constructing task-specific planning representations using task-general background knowledge from language models (LMs). Starting with a general-purpose hierarchical planner and a low-level goal-conditioned policy, Ada interactively learns a library of planner-compatible high-level action abstractions and low-level controllers adapted to a particular domain of planning tasks. On two language-guided interactive planning benchmarks (Mini Minecraft and ALFRED Household Tasks), Ada strongly outperforms other approaches that use LMs for sequential decision-making, offering more accurate plans and better generalization to complex tasks.

LILO: Learning Interpretable Libraries by Compressing and Documenting Code

While large language models (LLMs) now excel at code generation, a key aspect of software development is the art of refactoring: consolidating code into libraries of reusable and readable programs. In this paper, we introduce LILO, a neurosymbolic framework that iteratively synthesizes, compresses, and documents code to build libraries tailored to particular problem domains. LILO combines LLM-guided program synthesis with recent algorithmic advances in automated refactoring from Stitch: a symbolic compression system that efficiently identifies optimal lambda abstractions across large code corpora. To make these abstractions interpretable, we introduce an auto-documentation (AutoDoc) procedure that infers natural language names and docstrings based on contextual examples of usage. In addition to improving human readability, we find that AutoDoc boosts performance by helping LILO's synthesizer to interpret and deploy learned abstractions. We evaluate LILO on three inductive program synthesis benchmarks for string editing, scene reasoning, and graphics composition. Compared to existing neural and symbolic methods - including the state-of-the-art library learning algorithm DreamCoder - LILO solves more complex tasks and learns richer libraries that are grounded in linguistic knowledge.

The Neuro-Symbolic Inverse Planning Engine (NIPE): Modeling Probabilistic Social Inferences from Linguistic Inputs

Human beings are social creatures. We routinely reason about other agents, and a crucial component of this social reasoning is inferring people's goals as we learn about their actions. In many settings, we can perform intuitive but reliable goal inference from language descriptions of agents, actions, and the background environments. In this paper, we study this process of language driving and influencing social reasoning in a probabilistic goal inference domain. We propose a neuro-symbolic model that carries out goal inference from linguistic inputs of agent scenarios. The "neuro" part is a large language model (LLM) that translates language descriptions to code representations, and the "symbolic" part is a Bayesian inverse planning engine. To test our model, we design and run a human experiment on a linguistic goal inference task. Our model closely matches human response patterns and better predicts human judgements than using an LLM alone.

From Word Models to World Models: Translating from Natural Language to the Probabilistic Language of Thought

How does language inform our downstream thinking? In particular, how do humans make meaning from language--and how can we leverage a theory of linguistic meaning to build machines that think in more human-like ways? In this paper, we propose rational meaning construction, a computational framework for language-informed thinking that combines neural language models with probabilistic models for rational inference. We frame linguistic meaning as a context-sensitive mapping from natural language into a probabilistic language of thought (PLoT)--a general-purpose symbolic substrate for generative world modeling. Our architecture integrates two computational tools that have not previously come together: we model thinking with probabilistic programs, an expressive representation for commonsense reasoning; and we model meaning construction with large language models (LLMs), which support broad-coverage translation from natural language utterances to code expressions in a probabilistic programming language. We illustrate our framework through examples covering four core domains from cognitive science: probabilistic reasoning, logical and relational reasoning, visual and physical reasoning, and social reasoning. In each, we show that LLMs can generate context-sensitive translations that capture pragmatically-appropriate linguistic meanings, while Bayesian inference with the generated programs supports coherent and robust commonsense reasoning. We extend our framework to integrate cognitively-motivated symbolic modules (physics simulators, graphics engines, and planning algorithms) to provide a unified commonsense thinking interface from language. Finally, we explore how language can drive the construction of world models themselves. We hope this work will provide a roadmap towards cognitive models and AI systems that synthesize the insights of both modern and classical computational perspectives.

Evaluating Language Models for Mathematics through Interactions

The standard methodology of evaluating large language models (LLMs) based on static pairs of inputs and outputs is insufficient for developing assistants: this kind of assessments fails to take into account the essential interactive element in their deployment, and therefore limits how we understand language model capabilities. We introduce CheckMate, an adaptable prototype platform for humans to interact with and evaluate LLMs. We conduct a study with CheckMate to evaluate three language models~(InstructGPT, ChatGPT, and GPT-4) as assistants in proving undergraduate-level mathematics, with a mixed cohort of participants from undergraduate students to professors of mathematics. We release the resulting interaction and rating dataset, MathConverse. By analysing MathConverse, we derive a preliminary taxonomy of human behaviours and uncover that despite a generally positive correlation, there are notable instances of divergence between correctness and perceived helpfulness in LLM generations, amongst other findings. Further, we identify useful scenarios and existing issues of GPT-4 in mathematical reasoning through a series of case studies contributed by expert mathematicians. We conclude with actionable takeaways for ML practitioners and mathematicians: models which communicate uncertainty, respond well to user corrections, are more interpretable and concise may constitute better assistants; interactive evaluation is a promising way to continually navigate the capability of these models; humans should be aware of language models' algebraic fallibility, and for that reason discern where they should be used.

Evaluating statistical language models as pragmatic reasoners

The relationship between communicated language and intended meaning is often probabilistic and sensitive to context. Numerous strategies attempt to estimate such a mapping, often leveraging recursive Bayesian models of communication. In parallel, large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly applied to semantic parsing applications, tasked with inferring logical representations from natural language. While existing LLM explorations have been largely restricted to literal language use, in this work, we evaluate the capacity of LLMs to infer the meanings of pragmatic utterances. Specifically, we explore the case of threshold estimation on the gradable adjective ``strong'', contextually conditioned on a strength prior, then extended to composition with qualification, negation, polarity inversion, and class comparison. We find that LLMs can derive context-grounded, human-like distributions over the interpretations of several complex pragmatic utterances, yet struggle composing with negation. These results inform the inferential capacity of statistical language models, and their use in pragmatic and semantic parsing applications. All corresponding code is made publicly available (https://github.com/benlipkin/probsem/tree/CogSci2023).