People often give instructions whose meaning is ambiguous without further context, expecting that their actions or goals will disambiguate their intentions. How can we build assistive agents that follow such instructions in a flexible, context-sensitive manner? This paper introduces cooperative language-guided inverse plan search (CLIPS), a Bayesian agent architecture for pragmatic instruction following and goal assistance. Our agent assists a human by modeling them as a cooperative planner who communicates joint plans to the assistant, then performs multimodal Bayesian inference over the human's goal from actions and language, using large language models (LLMs) to evaluate the likelihood of an instruction given a hypothesized plan. Given this posterior, our assistant acts to minimize expected goal achievement cost, enabling it to pragmatically follow ambiguous instructions and provide effective assistance even when uncertain about the goal. We evaluate these capabilities in two cooperative planning domains (Doors, Keys & Gems and VirtualHome), finding that CLIPS significantly outperforms GPT-4V, LLM-based literal instruction following and unimodal inverse planning in both accuracy and helpfulness, while closely matching the inferences and assistive judgments provided by human raters.
A universal feature of human societies is the adoption of systems of rules and norms in the service of cooperative ends. How can we build learning agents that do the same, so that they may flexibly cooperate with the human institutions they are embedded in? We hypothesize that agents can achieve this by assuming there exists a shared set of norms that most others comply with while pursuing their individual desires, even if they do not know the exact content of those norms. By assuming shared norms, a newly introduced agent can infer the norms of an existing population from observations of compliance and violation. Furthermore, groups of agents can converge to a shared set of norms, even if they initially diverge in their beliefs about what the norms are. This in turn enables the stability of the normative system: since agents can bootstrap common knowledge of the norms, this leads the norms to be widely adhered to, enabling new entrants to rapidly learn those norms. We formalize this framework in the context of Markov games and demonstrate its operation in a multi-agent environment via approximately Bayesian rule induction of obligative and prohibitive norms. Using our approach, agents are able to rapidly learn and sustain a variety of cooperative institutions, including resource management norms and compensation for pro-social labor, promoting collective welfare while still allowing agents to act in their own interests.
Despite the fact that beliefs are mental states that cannot be directly observed, humans talk about each others' beliefs on a regular basis, often using rich compositional language to describe what others think and know. What explains this capacity to interpret the hidden epistemic content of other minds? In this paper, we take a step towards an answer by grounding the semantics of belief statements in a Bayesian theory-of-mind: By modeling how humans jointly infer coherent sets of goals, beliefs, and plans that explain an agent's actions, then evaluating statements about the agent's beliefs against these inferences via epistemic logic, our framework provides a conceptual role semantics for belief, explaining the gradedness and compositionality of human belief attributions, as well as their intimate connection with goals and plans. We evaluate this framework by studying how humans attribute goals and beliefs while watching an agent solve a doors-and-keys gridworld puzzle that requires instrumental reasoning about hidden objects. In contrast to pure logical deduction, non-mentalizing baselines, and mentalizing that ignores the role of instrumental plans, our model provides a much better fit to human goal and belief attributions, demonstrating the importance of theory-of-mind for a semantics of belief.
When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.
Human beings are social creatures. We routinely reason about other agents, and a crucial component of this social reasoning is inferring people's goals as we learn about their actions. In many settings, we can perform intuitive but reliable goal inference from language descriptions of agents, actions, and the background environments. In this paper, we study this process of language driving and influencing social reasoning in a probabilistic goal inference domain. We propose a neuro-symbolic model that carries out goal inference from linguistic inputs of agent scenarios. The "neuro" part is a large language model (LLM) that translates language descriptions to code representations, and the "symbolic" part is a Bayesian inverse planning engine. To test our model, we design and run a human experiment on a linguistic goal inference task. Our model closely matches human response patterns and better predicts human judgements than using an LLM alone.
Even after fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, large language models (LLMs) can be difficult, if not impossible, to control reliably with prompts alone. We propose a new inference-time approach to enforcing syntactic and semantic constraints on the outputs of LLMs, called sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) steering. The key idea is to specify language generation tasks as posterior inference problems in a class of discrete probabilistic sequence models, and replace standard decoding with sequential Monte Carlo inference. For a computational cost similar to that of beam search, SMC can steer LLMs to solve diverse tasks, including infilling, generation under syntactic constraints, and prompt intersection. To facilitate experimentation with SMC steering, we present a probabilistic programming library, LLaMPPL (https://github.com/probcomp/LLaMPPL), for concisely specifying new generation tasks as language model probabilistic programs, and automating steering of LLaMA-family Transformers.
Domain-general model-based planners often derive their generality by constructing search heuristics through the relaxation or abstraction of symbolic world models. We illustrate how abstract interpretation can serve as a unifying framework for these abstraction-based heuristics, extending the reach of heuristic search to richer world models that make use of more complex datatypes and functions (e.g. sets, geometry), and even models with uncertainty and probabilistic effects. These heuristics can also be integrated with learning, allowing agents to jumpstart planning in novel world models via abstraction-derived information that is later refined by experience. This suggests that abstract interpretation can play a key role in building universal reasoning systems.
To facilitate the development of new models to bridge the gap between machine and human social intelligence, the recently proposed Baby Intuitions Benchmark (arXiv:2102.11938) provides a suite of tasks designed to evaluate commonsense reasoning about agents' goals and actions that even young infants exhibit. Here we present a principled Bayesian solution to this benchmark, based on a hierarchically Bayesian Theory of Mind (HBToM). By including hierarchical priors on agent goals and dispositions, inference over our HBToM model enables few-shot learning of the efficiency and preferences of an agent, which can then be used in commonsense plausibility judgements about subsequent agent behavior. This approach achieves near-perfect accuracy on most benchmark tasks, outperforming deep learning and imitation learning baselines while producing interpretable human-like inferences, demonstrating the advantages of structured Bayesian models of human social cognition.
When inferring the goals that others are trying to achieve, people intuitively understand that others might make mistakes along the way. This is crucial for activities such as teaching, offering assistance, and deciding between blame or forgiveness. However, Bayesian models of theory of mind have generally not accounted for these mistakes, instead modeling agents as mostly optimal in achieving their goals. As a result, they are unable to explain phenomena like locking oneself out of one's house, or losing a game of chess. Here, we extend the Bayesian Theory of Mind framework to model boundedly rational agents who may have mistaken goals, plans, and actions. We formalize this by modeling agents as probabilistic programs, where goals may be confused with semantically similar states, plans may be misguided due to resource-bounded planning, and actions may be unintended due to execution errors. We present experiments eliciting human goal inferences in two domains: (i) a gridworld puzzle with gems locked behind doors, and (ii) a block-stacking domain. Our model better explains human inferences than alternatives, while generalizing across domains. These findings indicate the importance of modeling others as bounded agents, in order to account for the full richness of human intuitive psychology.
People routinely infer the goals of others by observing their actions over time. Remarkably, we can do so even when those actions lead to failure, enabling us to assist others when we detect that they might not achieve their goals. How might we endow machines with similar capabilities? Here we present an architecture capable of inferring an agent's goals online from both optimal and non-optimal sequences of actions. Our architecture models agents as boundedly-rational planners that interleave search with execution by replanning, thereby accounting for sub-optimal behavior. These models are specified as probabilistic programs, allowing us to represent and perform efficient Bayesian inference over an agent's goals and internal planning processes. To perform such inference, we develop Sequential Inverse Plan Search (SIPS), a sequential Monte Carlo algorithm that exploits the online replanning assumption of these models, limiting computation by incrementally extending inferred plans as new actions are observed. We present experiments showing that this modeling and inference architecture outperforms Bayesian inverse reinforcement learning baselines, accurately inferring goals from both optimal and non-optimal trajectories involving failure and back-tracking, while generalizing across domains with compositional structure and sparse rewards.