Abstract:Spurious patterns refer to a mathematical association between two or more variables in a dataset that are not causally related. However, this notion of spuriousness, which is usually introduced due to sampling biases in the dataset, has classically lacked a formal definition. To address this gap, this work presents the first information-theoretic formalization of spuriousness in a dataset (given a split of spurious and core features) using a mathematical framework called Partial Information Decomposition (PID). Specifically, we disentangle the joint information content that the spurious and core features share about another target variable (e.g., the prediction label) into distinct components, namely unique, redundant, and synergistic information. We propose the use of unique information, with roots in Blackwell Sufficiency, as a novel metric to formally quantify dataset spuriousness and derive its desirable properties. We empirically demonstrate how higher unique information in the spurious features in a dataset could lead a model into choosing the spurious features over the core features for inference, often having low worst-group-accuracy. We also propose a novel autoencoder-based estimator for computing unique information that is able to handle high-dimensional image data. Finally, we also show how this unique information in the spurious feature is reduced across several dataset-based spurious-pattern-mitigation techniques such as data reweighting and varying levels of background mixing, demonstrating a novel tradeoff between unique information (spuriousness) and worst-group-accuracy.
Abstract:In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.
Abstract:A good teacher should not only be knowledgeable; but should be able to communicate in a way that the student understands -- to share the student's representation of the world. In this work, we integrate insights from machine teaching and pragmatic communication with the burgeoning literature on representational alignment to characterize a utility curve defining a relationship between representational alignment and teacher capability for promoting student learning. To explore the characteristics of this utility curve, we design a supervised learning environment that disentangles representational alignment from teacher accuracy. We conduct extensive computational experiments with machines teaching machines, complemented by a series of experiments in which machines teach humans. Drawing on our findings that improved representational alignment with a student improves student learning outcomes (i.e., task accuracy), we design a classroom matching procedure that assigns students to teachers based on the utility curve. If we are to design effective machine teachers, it is not enough to build teachers that are accurate -- we want teachers that can align, representationally, to their students too.
Abstract:Conversational tones -- the manners and attitudes in which speakers communicate -- are essential to effective communication. Amidst the increasing popularization of Large Language Models (LLMs) over recent years, it becomes necessary to characterize the divergences in their conversational tones relative to humans. However, existing investigations of conversational modalities rely on pre-existing taxonomies or text corpora, which suffer from experimenter bias and may not be representative of real-world distributions for the studies' psycholinguistic domains. Inspired by methods from cognitive science, we propose an iterative method for simultaneously eliciting conversational tones and sentences, where participants alternate between two tasks: (1) one participant identifies the tone of a given sentence and (2) a different participant generates a sentence based on that tone. We run 100 iterations of this process with human participants and GPT-4, then obtain a dataset of sentences and frequent conversational tones. In an additional experiment, humans and GPT-4 annotated all sentences with all tones. With data from 1,339 human participants, 33,370 human judgments, and 29,900 GPT-4 queries, we show how our approach can be used to create an interpretable geometric representation of relations between conversational tones in humans and GPT-4. This work demonstrates how combining ideas from machine learning and cognitive science can address challenges in human-computer interactions.
Abstract:Scientific discoveries often hinge on synthesizing decades of research, a task that potentially outstrips human information processing capacities. Large language models (LLMs) offer a solution. LLMs trained on the vast scientific literature could potentially integrate noisy yet interrelated findings to forecast novel results better than human experts. To evaluate this possibility, we created BrainBench, a forward-looking benchmark for predicting neuroscience results. We find that LLMs surpass experts in predicting experimental outcomes. BrainGPT, an LLM we tuned on the neuroscience literature, performed better yet. Like human experts, when LLMs were confident in their predictions, they were more likely to be correct, which presages a future where humans and LLMs team together to make discoveries. Our approach is not neuroscience-specific and is transferable to other knowledge-intensive endeavors.
Abstract:We describe a framework for using natural language to design state abstractions for imitation learning. Generalizable policy learning in high-dimensional observation spaces is facilitated by well-designed state representations, which can surface important features of an environment and hide irrelevant ones. These state representations are typically manually specified, or derived from other labor-intensive labeling procedures. Our method, LGA (language-guided abstraction), uses a combination of natural language supervision and background knowledge from language models (LMs) to automatically build state representations tailored to unseen tasks. In LGA, a user first provides a (possibly incomplete) description of a target task in natural language; next, a pre-trained LM translates this task description into a state abstraction function that masks out irrelevant features; finally, an imitation policy is trained using a small number of demonstrations and LGA-generated abstract states. Experiments on simulated robotic tasks show that LGA yields state abstractions similar to those designed by humans, but in a fraction of the time, and that these abstractions improve generalization and robustness in the presence of spurious correlations and ambiguous specifications. We illustrate the utility of the learned abstractions on mobile manipulation tasks with a Spot robot.
Abstract:The speech-to-song illusion is a robust psychological phenomenon whereby a spoken sentence sounds increasingly more musical as it is repeated. Despite decades of research, a complete formal account of this transformation is still lacking, and some of its nuanced characteristics, namely, that certain phrases appear to transform while others do not, is not well understood. Here we provide a formal account of this phenomenon, by recasting it as a statistical inference whereby a rational agent attempts to decide whether a sequence of utterances is more likely to have been produced in a song or speech. Using this approach and analyzing song and speech corpora, we further introduce a novel prose-to-lyrics illusion that is purely text-based. In this illusion, simply duplicating written sentences makes them appear more like song lyrics. We provide robust evidence for this new illusion in both human participants and large language models.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) can pass explicit bias tests but still harbor implicit biases, similar to humans who endorse egalitarian beliefs yet exhibit subtle biases. Measuring such implicit biases can be a challenge: as LLMs become increasingly proprietary, it may not be possible to access their embeddings and apply existing bias measures; furthermore, implicit biases are primarily a concern if they affect the actual decisions that these systems make. We address both of these challenges by introducing two measures of bias inspired by psychology: LLM Implicit Association Test (IAT) Bias, which is a prompt-based method for revealing implicit bias; and LLM Decision Bias for detecting subtle discrimination in decision-making tasks. Using these measures, we found pervasive human-like stereotype biases in 6 LLMs across 4 social domains (race, gender, religion, health) and 21 categories (weapons, guilt, science, career among others). Our prompt-based measure of implicit bias correlates with embedding-based methods but better predicts downstream behaviors measured by LLM Decision Bias. This measure is based on asking the LLM to decide between individuals, motivated by psychological results indicating that relative not absolute evaluations are more related to implicit biases. Using prompt-based measures informed by psychology allows us to effectively expose nuanced biases and subtle discrimination in proprietary LLMs that do not show explicit bias on standard benchmarks.
Abstract:Learning from demonstrations is a common way for users to teach robots, but it is prone to spurious feature correlations. Recent work constructs state abstractions, i.e. visual representations containing task-relevant features, from language as a way to perform more generalizable learning. However, these abstractions also depend on a user's preference for what matters in a task, which may be hard to describe or infeasible to exhaustively specify using language alone. How do we construct abstractions to capture these latent preferences? We observe that how humans behave reveals how they see the world. Our key insight is that changes in human behavior inform us that there are differences in preferences for how humans see the world, i.e. their state abstractions. In this work, we propose using language models (LMs) to query for those preferences directly given knowledge that a change in behavior has occurred. In our framework, we use the LM in two ways: first, given a text description of the task and knowledge of behavioral change between states, we query the LM for possible hidden preferences; second, given the most likely preference, we query the LM to construct the state abstraction. In this framework, the LM is also able to ask the human directly when uncertain about its own estimate. We demonstrate our framework's ability to construct effective preference-conditioned abstractions in simulated experiments, a user study, as well as on a real Spot robot performing mobile manipulation tasks.
Abstract:Discussion of AI alignment (alignment between humans and AI systems) has focused on value alignment, broadly referring to creating AI systems that share human values. We argue that before we can even attempt to align values, it is imperative that AI systems and humans align the concepts they use to understand the world. We integrate ideas from philosophy, cognitive science, and deep learning to explain the need for concept alignment, not just value alignment, between humans and machines. We summarize existing accounts of how humans and machines currently learn concepts, and we outline opportunities and challenges in the path towards shared concepts. Finally, we explain how we can leverage the tools already being developed in cognitive science and AI research to accelerate progress towards concept alignment.