RoboWits: Unexpected Challenges for Robotic Creative Problem Solving

The ability to reason, adapt, and creatively solve problems under unexpected challenges is essential for robots operating in real-world environments. However, current robotic benchmarks primarily emphasize skill-level execution and provide limited insight into such cognitive reasoning capabilities. We introduce RoboWits, a bi-manual robotic benchmark designed to systematically evaluate cognitive reasoning, creative tool use, and robustness to unexpected conditions. To enable scalable construction of high-quality reasoning-centric unexpected scenarios, we propose an automated task generation pipeline formulated as a multi-agent cooperative framework, comprising agents for seed task generation and verification, metric generation, scene generation, and task mutation. Using the pipeline, we curated 30 diverse seed tasks and 208 tasks with mutations and graded difficulty across geometry, material, and assembly-based reasoning. We benchmark popular robot policies, pre-trained VLAs, and oracle-state planners. Our results reveal a significant performance gap: while pre-trained VLAs exhibit preliminary success on seed tasks after single-task fine-tuning, they struggle to perform on mutated tasks, implying their brittleness in manipulation tasks requiring reasoning, strategy adaptation, and robustness to deceptive or constrained environments. Project page is available at https://umass-embodied-agi.github.io/RoboWits.

Investigating Concept Alignment Using Implausible Category Members

Developing AI systems with a human-like understanding of everyday concepts is a key step towards developing safe, reliable systems whose behavior makes sense to humans. When probing concept understanding, asking questions about plausible category members (e.g., "Is a car a vehicle?") is likely to recall patterns in the model's vast training data. We pursue an alternative strategy, characterizing the boundaries of conceptual categories by asking about implausible category members (e.g., "Is an olive a vehicle?") to probe the kind of concept-level knowledge we take for granted in fellow humans. We characterize concept boundaries for a set of fundamental concepts by studying AI systems' assignments of objects to superordinate categories from a classic psychological study by Rosch and Mervis, as well as their assignments of the same objects to mismatched superordinate categories. We compare these assignments to those made by human participants on the full range of within-category and cross-category assignment tasks. Our results reveal a range of concepts for which which models differ in meaningful and surprising ways from humans, including treating "words" as belonging to categories like "vehicles" and "clothing," identifying several "vegetable" category members as "fruit," and assigning exemplars from non-weapon categories to the "weapons" category. We also demonstrate how these instances of concept misalignment translate into problematic downstream behavior with implications for AI safety.

Improving the Efficiency of Language Agent Teams with Adaptive Task Graphs

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in teams, yet existing coordination approaches often occupy two extremes. Highly structured methods rely on fixed roles, pipelines, or task decompositions assigned a priori. In contrast, fully unstructured teams enable adaptability and exploration but suffer from inefficiencies such as error propagation, inter-agent conflicts, and wasted resources (measured in time, tokens, or file operations). We introduce Language Agent Teams for Task Evolution (LATTE), a framework for coordinating LLM teams inspired by distributed systems, where processors must operate under partial observability and communication constraints. In LATTE, a team of agents collaboratively construct and maintain a shared, evolving coordination graph which encodes sub-task dependencies, individual agent assignment, and the current state of sub-task progress. This protocol maintains consistency while empowering agents to dynamically allocate work, adapt coordination, and discover new tasks. Across multiple collaborative tasks and a variety of base models, we demonstrate how LATTE reduces token usage, wall-clock time, communication, and coordination failures (e.g. file conflicts and redundant outputs) while matching or exceeding the accuracy of standard designs including MetaGPT, decentralized teams, top-down Leader-Worker hierarchies, and static decompositions.

Process Matters more than Output for Distinguishing Humans from Machines

Reliable human-machine discrimination is becoming increasingly important as large language models and autonomous agents are deployed in online settings. Existing approaches evaluate whether a system can produce behavior or responses indistinguishable from those of a human, following the emphasis on outputs as a criterion for intelligence proposed by Alan Turing. Cognitive science offers an alternative perspective: evaluating the process by which behavior is produced. To test whether cognitive processes can reliably distinguish humans from machines, we introduce CogCAPTCHA30, a battery of 30 cognitive tasks designed to elicit diagnostic process-level features even when task performance is matched. Across the battery, process-level features provide stronger discriminative signal than performance metrics alone, reliably distinguishing humans from agents even under output matching (mean process-feature classifier AUC = 0.88). To evaluate agentic process differences, we compare off-the-shelf frontier agents (Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro), Centaur (a language model fine-tuned on 10.7M human decisions), and two task-specific fine-tuning approaches applied to Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct: action-level supervised fine-tuning (A-SFT) and process-level fine-tuning (P-SFT), which directly optimizes process features. Broad fine-tuning on human decisions improves human-like task processes relative to off-the-shelf agents, while task-specific process-level supervision further improves behavioral mimicry. However, this advantage diminishes under cross-task transfer when supervised process targets do not naturally generalize across tasks. Explicit process-level supervision can improve human behavioral mimicry, but only if appropriate task-specific process representations are available, highlighting process specification as a bottleneck for achieving human-like cognitive processes in machines.

Ads in AI Chatbots? An Analysis of How Large Language Models Navigate Conflicts of Interest

Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the companies that created them through advertisements. This creates the potential for LLMs to face conflicts of interest, where the most beneficial response to a user may not be aligned with the company's incentives. For instance, a sponsored product may be more expensive but otherwise equal to another; in this case, what does (and should) the LLM recommend to the user? In this paper, we provide a framework for categorizing the ways in which conflicting incentives might lead LLMs to change the way they interact with users, inspired by literature from linguistics and advertising regulation. We then present a suite of evaluations to examine how current models handle these tradeoffs. We find that a majority of LLMs forsake user welfare for company incentives in a multitude of conflict of interest situations, including recommending a sponsored product almost twice as expensive (Grok 4.1 Fast, 83%), surfacing sponsored options to disrupt the purchasing process (GPT 5.1, 94%), and concealing prices in unfavorable comparisons (Qwen 3 Next, 24%). Behaviors also vary strongly with levels of reasoning and users' inferred socio-economic status. Our results highlight some of the hidden risks to users that can emerge when companies begin to subtly incentivize advertisements in chatbots.

Learning is Forgetting: LLM Training As Lossy Compression

Despite the increasing prevalence of large language models (LLMs), we still have a limited understanding of how their representational spaces are structured. This limits our ability to interpret how and what they learn or relate them to learning in humans. We argue LLMs are best seen as an instance of lossy compression, where over training they learn by retaining only information in their training data relevant to their objective(s). We show pre-training results in models that are optimally compressed for next-sequence prediction, approaching the Information Bottleneck bound on compression. Across an array of open weights models, each compresses differently, likely due to differences in the data and training recipes used. However even across different families of LLMs the optimality of a model's compression, and the information present in it, can predict downstream performance on across a wide array of benchmarks, letting us directly link representational structure to actionable insights about model performance. In the general case the work presented here offers a unified Information-Theoretic framing for how these models learn that is deployable at scale.

Do Large Language Models Mentalize When They Teach?

How do LLMs decide what to teach next: by reasoning about a learner's knowledge, or by using simpler rules of thumb? We test this in a controlled task previously used to study human teaching strategies. On each trial, a teacher LLM sees a hypothetical learner's trajectory through a reward-annotated directed graph and must reveal a single edge so the learner would choose a better path if they replanned. We run a range of LLMs as simulated teachers and fit their trial-by-trial choices with the same cognitive models used for humans: a Bayes-Optimal teacher that infers which transitions the learner is missing (inverse planning), weaker Bayesian variants, heuristic baselines (e.g., reward based), and non-mentalizing utility models. In a baseline experiment matched to the stimuli presented to human subjects, most LLMs perform well, show little change in strategy over trials, and their graph-by-graph performance is similar to that of humans. Model comparison (BIC) shows that Bayes-Optimal teaching best explains most models' choices. When given a scaffolding intervention, models follow auxiliary inference- or reward-focused prompts, but these scaffolds do not reliably improve later teaching on heuristic-incongruent test graphs and can sometimes reduce performance. Overall, cognitive model fits provide insight into LLM tutoring policies and show that prompt compliance does not guarantee better teaching decisions.

Serendipity by Design: Evaluating the Impact of Cross-domain Mappings on Human and LLM Creativity

Are large language models (LLMs) creative in the same way humans are, and can the same interventions increase creativity in both? We evaluate a promising but largely untested intervention for creativity: forcing creators to draw an analogy from a random, remote source domain (''cross-domain mapping''). Human participants and LLMs generated novel features for ten daily products (e.g., backpack, TV) under two prompts: (i) cross-domain mapping, which required translating a property from a randomly assigned source (e.g., octopus, cactus, GPS), and (ii) user-need, which required proposing innovations targeting unmet user needs. We show that humans reliably benefit from randomly assigned cross-domain mappings, while LLMs, on average, generate more original ideas than humans and do not show a statistically significant effect of cross-domain mappings. However, in both systems, the impact of cross-domain mapping increases when the inspiration source becomes more semantically distant from the target. Our results highlight both the role of remote association in creative ideation and systematic differences in how humans and LLMs respond to the same intervention for creativity.

Parallelograms Strike Back: LLMs Generate Better Analogies than People

Four-term word analogies (A:B::C:D) are classically modeled geometrically as ''parallelograms,'' yet recent work suggests this model poorly captures how humans produce analogies, with simple local-similarity heuristics often providing a better account (Peterson et al., 2020). But does the parallelogram model fail because it is a bad model of analogical relations, or because people are not very good at generating relation-preserving analogies? We compared human and large language model (LLM) analogy completions on the same set of analogy problems from (Peterson et al., 2020). We find that LLM-generated analogies are reliably judged as better than human-generated ones, and are also more closely aligned with the parallelogram structure in a distributional embedding space (GloVe). Crucially, we show that the improvement over human analogies was driven by greater parallelogram alignment and reduced reliance on accessible words rather than enhanced sensitivity to local similarity. Moreover, the LLM advantage is driven not by uniformly superior responses by LLMs, but by humans producing a long tail of weak completions: when only modal (most frequent) responses by both systems are compared, the LLM advantage disappears. However, greater parallelogram alignment and lower word frequency continue to predict which LLM completions are rated higher than those of humans. Overall, these results suggest that the parallelogram model is not a poor account of word analogy. Rather, humans may often fail to produce completions that satisfy this relational constraint, whereas LLMs do so more consistently.

Cognitive Models and AI Algorithms Provide Templates for Designing Language Agents

While contemporary large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable in isolation, there are still many difficult problems that lie beyond the abilities of a single LLM. For such tasks, there is still uncertainty about how best to take many LLMs as parts and combine them into a greater whole. This position paper argues that potential blueprints for designing such modular language agents can be found in the existing literature on cognitive models and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. To make this point clear, we formalize the idea of an agent template that specifies roles for individual LLMs and how their functionalities should be composed. We then survey a variety of existing language agents in the literature and highlight their underlying templates derived directly from cognitive models or AI algorithms. By highlighting these designs, we aim to call attention to agent templates inspired by cognitive science and AI as a powerful tool for developing effective, interpretable language agents.