Parallelograms Strike Back: LLMs Generate Better Analogies than People

Four-term word analogies (A:B::C:D) are classically modeled geometrically as ''parallelograms,'' yet recent work suggests this model poorly captures how humans produce analogies, with simple local-similarity heuristics often providing a better account (Peterson et al., 2020). But does the parallelogram model fail because it is a bad model of analogical relations, or because people are not very good at generating relation-preserving analogies? We compared human and large language model (LLM) analogy completions on the same set of analogy problems from (Peterson et al., 2020). We find that LLM-generated analogies are reliably judged as better than human-generated ones, and are also more closely aligned with the parallelogram structure in a distributional embedding space (GloVe). Crucially, we show that the improvement over human analogies was driven by greater parallelogram alignment and reduced reliance on accessible words rather than enhanced sensitivity to local similarity. Moreover, the LLM advantage is driven not by uniformly superior responses by LLMs, but by humans producing a long tail of weak completions: when only modal (most frequent) responses by both systems are compared, the LLM advantage disappears. However, greater parallelogram alignment and lower word frequency continue to predict which LLM completions are rated higher than those of humans. Overall, these results suggest that the parallelogram model is not a poor account of word analogy. Rather, humans may often fail to produce completions that satisfy this relational constraint, whereas LLMs do so more consistently.

Serendipity by Design: Evaluating the Impact of Cross-domain Mappings on Human and LLM Creativity

Are large language models (LLMs) creative in the same way humans are, and can the same interventions increase creativity in both? We evaluate a promising but largely untested intervention for creativity: forcing creators to draw an analogy from a random, remote source domain (''cross-domain mapping''). Human participants and LLMs generated novel features for ten daily products (e.g., backpack, TV) under two prompts: (i) cross-domain mapping, which required translating a property from a randomly assigned source (e.g., octopus, cactus, GPS), and (ii) user-need, which required proposing innovations targeting unmet user needs. We show that humans reliably benefit from randomly assigned cross-domain mappings, while LLMs, on average, generate more original ideas than humans and do not show a statistically significant effect of cross-domain mappings. However, in both systems, the impact of cross-domain mapping increases when the inspiration source becomes more semantically distant from the target. Our results highlight both the role of remote association in creative ideation and systematic differences in how humans and LLMs respond to the same intervention for creativity.

Cognitive Models and AI Algorithms Provide Templates for Designing Language Agents

While contemporary large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable in isolation, there are still many difficult problems that lie beyond the abilities of a single LLM. For such tasks, there is still uncertainty about how best to take many LLMs as parts and combine them into a greater whole. This position paper argues that potential blueprints for designing such modular language agents can be found in the existing literature on cognitive models and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. To make this point clear, we formalize the idea of an agent template that specifies roles for individual LLMs and how their functionalities should be composed. We then survey a variety of existing language agents in the literature and highlight their underlying templates derived directly from cognitive models or AI algorithms. By highlighting these designs, we aim to call attention to agent templates inspired by cognitive science and AI as a powerful tool for developing effective, interpretable language agents.

AI Gamestore: Scalable, Open-Ended Evaluation of Machine General Intelligence with Human Games

Rigorously evaluating machine intelligence against the broad spectrum of human general intelligence has become increasingly important and challenging in this era of rapid technological advance. Conventional AI benchmarks typically assess only narrow capabilities in a limited range of human activity. Most are also static, quickly saturating as developers explicitly or implicitly optimize for them. We propose that a more promising way to evaluate human-like general intelligence in AI systems is through a particularly strong form of general game playing: studying how and how well they play and learn to play \textbf{all conceivable human games}, in comparison to human players with the same level of experience, time, or other resources. We define a "human game" to be a game designed by humans for humans, and argue for the evaluative suitability of this space of all such games people can imagine and enjoy -- the "Multiverse of Human Games". Taking a first step towards this vision, we introduce the AI GameStore, a scalable and open-ended platform that uses LLMs with humans-in-the-loop to synthesize new representative human games, by automatically sourcing and adapting standardized and containerized variants of game environments from popular human digital gaming platforms. As a proof of concept, we generated 100 such games based on the top charts of Apple App Store and Steam, and evaluated seven frontier vision-language models (VLMs) on short episodes of play. The best models achieved less than 10\% of the human average score on the majority of the games, and especially struggled with games that challenge world-model learning, memory and planning. We conclude with a set of next steps for building out the AI GameStore as a practical way to measure and drive progress toward human-like general intelligence in machines.

A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

Why Human Guidance Matters in Collaborative Vibe Coding

Writing code has been one of the most transformative ways for human societies to translate abstract ideas into tangible technologies. Modern AI is transforming this process by enabling experts and non-experts alike to generate code without actually writing code, but instead, through natural language instructions, or "vibe coding". While increasingly popular, the cumulative impact of vibe coding on productivity and collaboration, as well as the role of humans in this process, remains unclear. Here, we introduce a controlled experimental framework for studying collaborative vibe coding and use it to compare human-led, AI-led, and hybrid groups. Across 16 experiments involving 604 human participants, we show that people provide uniquely effective high-level instructions for vibe coding across iterations, whereas AI-provided instructions often result in performance collapse. We further demonstrate that hybrid systems perform best when humans retain directional control (providing the instructions), while evaluation is delegated to AI.

Large Language Models Develop Novel Social Biases Through Adaptive Exploration

As large language models (LLMs) are adopted into frameworks that grant them the capacity to make real decisions, it is increasingly important to ensure that they are unbiased. In this paper, we argue that the predominant approach of simply removing existing biases from models is not enough. Using a paradigm from the psychology literature, we demonstrate that LLMs can spontaneously develop novel social biases about artificial demographic groups even when no inherent differences exist. These biases result in highly stratified task allocations, which are less fair than assignments by human participants and are exacerbated by newer and larger models. In social science, emergent biases like these have been shown to result from exploration-exploitation trade-offs, where the decision-maker explores too little, allowing early observations to strongly influence impressions about entire demographic groups. To alleviate this effect, we examine a series of interventions targeting model inputs, problem structure, and explicit steering. We find that explicitly incentivizing exploration most robustly reduces stratification, highlighting the need for better multifaceted objectives to mitigate bias. These results reveal that LLMs are not merely passive mirrors of human social biases, but can actively create new ones from experience, raising urgent questions about how these systems will shape societies over time.

Demystifying the Mechanisms Behind Emergent Exploration in Goal-conditioned RL

In this work, we take a first step toward elucidating the mechanisms behind emergent exploration in unsupervised reinforcement learning. We study Single-Goal Contrastive Reinforcement Learning (SGCRL), a self-supervised algorithm capable of solving challenging long-horizon goal-reaching tasks without external rewards or curricula. We combine theoretical analysis of the algorithm's objective function with controlled experiments to understand what drives its exploration. We show that SGCRL maximizes implicit rewards shaped by its learned representations. These representations automatically modify the reward landscape to promote exploration before reaching the goal and exploitation thereafter. Our experiments also demonstrate that these exploration dynamics arise from learning low-rank representations of the state space rather than from neural network function approximation. Our improved understanding enables us to adapt SGCRL to perform safety-aware exploration.

Amortized Bayesian Meta-Learning for Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Models

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) with low-rank adaptaion (LoRA) is a cost-effective way to incorporate information from a specific dataset. However, it is often unclear how well the fine-tuned LLM will generalize, i.e., how well it will perform on unseen datasets. Methods have been proposed to improve generalization by optimizing with in-context prompts, or by using meta-learning to fine-tune LLMs. However, these methods are expensive in memory and computation, requiring either long-context prompts or saving copies of parameters and using second-order gradient updates. To address these challenges, we propose Amortized Bayesian Meta-Learning for LoRA (ABMLL). This method builds on amortized Bayesian meta-learning for smaller models, adapting this approach to LLMs while maintaining its computational efficiency. We reframe task-specific and global parameters in the context of LoRA and use a set of new hyperparameters to balance reconstruction accuracy and the fidelity of task-specific parameters to the global ones. ABMLL provides effective generalization and scales to large models such as Llama3-8B. Furthermore, as a result of using a Bayesian framework, ABMLL provides improved uncertainty quantification. We test ABMLL on Unified-QA and CrossFit datasets and find that it outperforms existing methods on these benchmarks in terms of both accuracy and expected calibration error.

Machine Bullshit: Characterizing the Emergent Disregard for Truth in Large Language Models

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.