Image deep steganography (IDS) is a technique that utilizes deep learning to embed a secret image invisibly into a cover image to generate a container image. However, the container images generated by convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are vulnerable to attacks that distort their high-frequency components. To address this problem, we propose a novel method called Low-frequency Image Deep Steganography (LIDS) that allows frequency distribution manipulation in the embedding process. LIDS extracts a feature map from the secret image and adds it to the cover image to yield the container image. The container image is not directly output by the CNNs, and thus, it does not contain high-frequency artifacts. The extracted feature map is regulated by a frequency loss to ensure that its frequency distribution mainly concentrates on the low-frequency domain. To further enhance robustness, an attack layer is inserted to damage the container image. The retrieval network then retrieves a recovered secret image from a damaged container image. Our experiments demonstrate that LIDS outperforms state-of-the-art methods in terms of robustness, while maintaining high fidelity and specificity. By avoiding high-frequency artifacts and manipulating the frequency distribution of the embedded feature map, LIDS achieves improved robustness against attacks that distort the high-frequency components of container images.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is one of the most important branches of AI. Due to its capacity for self-adaption and decision-making in dynamic environments, reinforcement learning has been widely applied in multiple areas, such as healthcare, data markets, autonomous driving, and robotics. However, some of these applications and systems have been shown to be vulnerable to security or privacy attacks, resulting in unreliable or unstable services. A large number of studies have focused on these security and privacy problems in reinforcement learning. However, few surveys have provided a systematic review and comparison of existing problems and state-of-the-art solutions to keep up with the pace of emerging threats. Accordingly, we herein present such a comprehensive review to explain and summarize the challenges associated with security and privacy in reinforcement learning from a new perspective, namely that of the Markov Decision Process (MDP). In this survey, we first introduce the key concepts related to this area. Next, we cover the security and privacy issues linked to the state, action, environment, and reward function of the MDP process, respectively. We further highlight the special characteristics of security and privacy methodologies related to reinforcement learning. Finally, we discuss the possible future research directions within this area.
Nowadays, the development of information technology is growing rapidly. In the big data era, the privacy of personal information has been more pronounced. The major challenge is to find a way to guarantee that sensitive personal information is not disclosed while data is published and analyzed. Centralized differential privacy is established on the assumption of a trusted third-party data curator. However, this assumption is not always true in reality. As a new privacy preservation model, local differential privacy has relatively strong privacy guarantees. Although federated learning has relatively been a privacy-preserving approach for distributed learning, it still introduces various privacy concerns. To avoid privacy threats and reduce communication costs, in this article, we propose integrating federated learning and local differential privacy with momentum gradient descent to improve the performance of machine learning models.
Cryptocurrencies are no longer just the preferred option for cybercriminal activities on darknets, due to the increasing adoption in mainstream applications. This is partly due to the transparency associated with the underpinning ledgers, where any individual can access the record of a transaction record on the public ledger. In this paper, we build a dataset comprising Bitcoin transactions between 12 July 2019 and 26 May 2021. This dataset (hereafter referred to as BABD-13) contains 13 types of Bitcoin addresses, 5 categories of indicators with 148 features, and 544,462 labeled data. We then use our proposed dataset on common machine learning models, namely: k-nearest neighbors algorithm, decision tree, random forest, multilayer perceptron, and XGBoost. The results show that the accuracy rates of these machine learning models on our proposed dataset are between 93.24% and 96.71%. We also analyze the proposed features and their relationships from the experiments, and propose a k-hop subgraph generation algorithm to extract a k-hop subgraph from the entire Bitcoin transaction graph constructed by the directed heterogeneous multigraph starting from a specific Bitcoin address node (e.g., a known transaction associated with a criminal investigation).
DeepFakes are raising significant social concerns. Although various DeepFake detectors have been developed as forensic countermeasures, these detectors are still vulnerable to attacks. Recently, a few attacks, principally adversarial attacks, have succeeded in cloaking DeepFake images to evade detection. However, these attacks have typical detector-specific designs, which require prior knowledge about the detector, leading to poor transferability. Moreover, these attacks only consider simple security scenarios. Less is known about how effective they are in high-level scenarios where either the detectors or the attacker's knowledge varies. In this paper, we solve the above challenges with presenting a novel detector-agnostic trace removal attack for DeepFake anti-forensics. Instead of investigating the detector side, our attack looks into the original DeepFake creation pipeline, attempting to remove all detectable natural DeepFake traces to render the fake images more "authentic". To implement this attack, first, we perform a DeepFake trace discovery, identifying three discernible traces. Then a trace removal network (TR-Net) is proposed based on an adversarial learning framework involving one generator and multiple discriminators. Each discriminator is responsible for one individual trace representation to avoid cross-trace interference. These discriminators are arranged in parallel, which prompts the generator to remove various traces simultaneously. To evaluate the attack efficacy, we crafted heterogeneous security scenarios where the detectors were embedded with different levels of defense and the attackers' background knowledge of data varies. The experimental results show that the proposed attack can significantly compromise the detection accuracy of six state-of-the-art DeepFake detectors while causing only a negligible loss in visual quality to the original DeepFake samples.
Machine learning models are vulnerable to data inference attacks, such as membership inference and model inversion attacks. In these types of breaches, an adversary attempts to infer a data record's membership in a dataset or even reconstruct this data record using a confidence score vector predicted by the target model. However, most existing defense methods only protect against membership inference attacks. Methods that can combat both types of attacks require a new model to be trained, which may not be time-efficient. In this paper, we propose a differentially private defense method that handles both types of attacks in a time-efficient manner by tuning only one parameter, the privacy budget. The central idea is to modify and normalize the confidence score vectors with a differential privacy mechanism which preserves privacy and obscures membership and reconstructed data. Moreover, this method can guarantee the order of scores in the vector to avoid any loss in classification accuracy. The experimental results show the method to be an effective and timely defense against both membership inference and model inversion attacks with no reduction in accuracy.
Transfer learning is an important approach that produces pre-trained teacher models which can be used to quickly build specialized student models. However, recent research on transfer learning has found that it is vulnerable to various attacks, e.g., misclassification and backdoor attacks. However, it is still not clear whether transfer learning is vulnerable to model inversion attacks. Launching a model inversion attack against transfer learning scheme is challenging. Not only does the student model hide its structural parameters, but it is also inaccessible to the adversary. Hence, when targeting a student model, both the white-box and black-box versions of existing model inversion attacks fail. White-box attacks fail as they need the target model's parameters. Black-box attacks fail as they depend on making repeated queries of the target model. However, they may not mean that transfer learning models are impervious to model inversion attacks. Hence, with this paper, we initiate research into model inversion attacks against transfer learning schemes with two novel attack methods. Both are black-box attacks, suiting different situations, that do not rely on queries to the target student model. In the first method, the adversary has the data samples that share the same distribution as the training set of the teacher model. In the second method, the adversary does not have any such samples. Experiments show that highly recognizable data records can be recovered with both of these methods. This means that even if a model is an inaccessible black-box, it can still be inverted.
In a model inversion attack, an adversary attempts to reconstruct the data records, used to train a target model, using only the model's output. In launching a contemporary model inversion attack, the strategies discussed are generally based on either predicted confidence score vectors, i.e., black-box attacks, or the parameters of a target model, i.e., white-box attacks. However, in the real world, model owners usually only give out the predicted labels; the confidence score vectors and model parameters are hidden as a defense mechanism to prevent such attacks. Unfortunately, we have found a model inversion method that can reconstruct the input data records based only on the output labels. We believe this is the attack that requires the least information to succeed and, therefore, has the best applicability. The key idea is to exploit the error rate of the target model to compute the median distance from a set of data records to the decision boundary of the target model. The distance, then, is used to generate confidence score vectors which are adopted to train an attack model to reconstruct the data records. The experimental results show that highly recognizable data records can be reconstructed with far less information than existing methods.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial images, while their robustness in text classification is rarely studied. Several lines of text attack methods have been proposed in the literature, including character-level, word-level, and sentence-level attacks. However, it is still a challenge to minimize the number of word changes necessary to induce misclassification, while simultaneously ensuring lexical correctness, syntactic soundness, and semantic similarity. In this paper, we propose a Bigram and Unigram based adaptive Semantic Preservation Optimization (BU-SPO) method to examine the vulnerability of deep models. Our method has four major merits. Firstly, we propose to attack text documents not only at the unigram word level but also at the bigram level which better keeps semantics and avoids producing meaningless outputs. Secondly, we propose a hybrid method to replace the input words with options among both their synonyms candidates and sememe candidates, which greatly enriches the potential substitutions compared to only using synonyms. Thirdly, we design an optimization algorithm, i.e., Semantic Preservation Optimization (SPO), to determine the priority of word replacements, aiming to reduce the modification cost. Finally, we further improve the SPO with a semantic Filter (named SPOF) to find the adversarial example with the highest semantic similarity. We evaluate the effectiveness of our BU-SPO and BU-SPOF on IMDB, AG's News, and Yahoo! Answers text datasets by attacking four popular DNNs models. Results show that our methods achieve the highest attack success rates and semantics rates by changing the smallest number of words compared with existing methods.