Bayes in the age of intelligent machines

The success of methods based on artificial neural networks in creating intelligent machines seems like it might pose a challenge to explanations of human cognition in terms of Bayesian inference. We argue that this is not the case, and that in fact these systems offer new opportunities for Bayesian modeling. Specifically, we argue that Bayesian models of cognition and artificial neural networks lie at different levels of analysis and are complementary modeling approaches, together offering a way to understand human cognition that spans these levels. We also argue that the same perspective can be applied to intelligent machines, where a Bayesian approach may be uniquely valuable in understanding the behavior of large, opaque artificial neural networks that are trained on proprietary data.

MacGyver: Are Large Language Models Creative Problem Solvers?

We explore the creative problem-solving capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in a constrained setting. The setting requires circumventing a cognitive bias known in psychology as ''functional fixedness'' to use familiar objects in innovative or unconventional ways. To this end, we create MacGyver, an automatically generated dataset consisting of 1,600 real-world problems that deliberately trigger functional fixedness and require thinking 'out-of-the-box'. We then present our collection of problems to both LLMs and humans to compare and contrast their problem-solving abilities. We show that MacGyver is challenging for both groups, but in unique and complementary ways. For example, humans typically excel in solving problems that they are familiar with but may struggle with tasks requiring domain-specific knowledge, leading to a higher variance. On the other hand, LLMs, being exposed to a variety of highly specialized knowledge, attempt broader problems but are prone to overconfidence and propose actions that are physically infeasible or inefficient. We also provide a detailed error analysis of LLMs, and demonstrate the potential of enhancing their problem-solving ability with novel prompting techniques such as iterative step-wise reflection and divergent-convergent thinking. This work provides insight into the creative problem-solving capabilities of humans and AI and illustrates how psychological paradigms can be extended into large-scale tasks for comparing humans and machines.

Improving Interpersonal Communication by Simulating Audiences with Language Models

How do we communicate with others to achieve our goals? We use our prior experience or advice from others, or construct a candidate utterance by predicting how it will be received. However, our experiences are limited and biased, and reasoning about potential outcomes can be difficult and cognitively challenging. In this paper, we explore how we can leverage Large Language Model (LLM) simulations to help us communicate better. We propose the Explore-Generate-Simulate (EGS) framework, which takes as input any scenario where an individual is communicating to an audience with a goal they want to achieve. EGS (1) explores the solution space by producing a diverse set of advice relevant to the scenario, (2) generates communication candidates conditioned on subsets of the advice, and (3) simulates the reactions from various audiences to determine both the best candidate and advice to use. We evaluate the framework on eight scenarios spanning the ten fundamental processes of interpersonal communication. For each scenario, we collect a dataset of human evaluations across candidates and baselines, and showcase that our framework's chosen candidate is preferred over popular generation mechanisms including Chain-of-Thought. We also find that audience simulations achieve reasonably high agreement with human raters across 5 of the 8 scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by applying it to real-world scenarios described by users on web forums. Through evaluations and demonstrations, we show that EGS enhances the effectiveness and outcomes of goal-oriented communication across a variety of situations, thus opening up new possibilities for the application of large language models in revolutionizing communication and decision-making processes.

Getting aligned on representational alignment

Biological and artificial information processing systems form representations that they can use to categorize, reason, plan, navigate, and make decisions. How can we measure the extent to which the representations formed by these diverse systems agree? Do similarities in representations then translate into similar behavior? How can a system's representations be modified to better match those of another system? These questions pertaining to the study of representational alignment are at the heart of some of the most active research areas in cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. For example, cognitive scientists measure the representational alignment of multiple individuals to identify shared cognitive priors, neuroscientists align fMRI responses from multiple individuals into a shared representational space for group-level analyses, and ML researchers distill knowledge from teacher models into student models by increasing their alignment. Unfortunately, there is limited knowledge transfer between research communities interested in representational alignment, so progress in one field often ends up being rediscovered independently in another. Thus, greater cross-field communication would be advantageous. To improve communication between these fields, we propose a unifying framework that can serve as a common language between researchers studying representational alignment. We survey the literature from all three fields and demonstrate how prior work fits into this framework. Finally, we lay out open problems in representational alignment where progress can benefit all three of these fields. We hope that our work can catalyze cross-disciplinary collaboration and accelerate progress for all communities studying and developing information processing systems. We note that this is a working paper and encourage readers to reach out with their suggestions for future revisions.

Concept Alignment as a Prerequisite for Value Alignment

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

Structurally guided task decomposition in spatial navigation tasks

How are people able to plan so efficiently despite limited cognitive resources? We aimed to answer this question by extending an existing model of human task decomposition that can explain a wide range of simple planning problems by adding structure information to the task to facilitate planning in more complex tasks. The extended model was then applied to a more complex planning domain of spatial navigation. Our results suggest that our framework can correctly predict the navigation strategies of the majority of the participants in an online experiment.

Embers of Autoregression: Understanding Large Language Models Through the Problem They are Trained to Solve

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

Cognitive Architectures for Language Agents

Recent efforts have incorporated large language models (LLMs) with external resources (e.g., the Internet) or internal control flows (e.g., prompt chaining) for tasks requiring grounding or reasoning. However, these efforts have largely been piecemeal, lacking a systematic framework for constructing a fully-fledged language agent. To address this challenge, we draw on the rich history of agent design in symbolic artificial intelligence to develop a blueprint for a new wave of cognitive language agents. We first show that LLMs have many of the same properties as production systems, and recent efforts to improve their grounding or reasoning mirror the development of cognitive architectures built around production systems. We then propose Cognitive Architectures for Language Agents (CoALA), a conceptual framework to systematize diverse methods for LLM-based reasoning, grounding, learning, and decision making as instantiations of language agents in the framework. Finally, we use the CoALA framework to highlight gaps and propose actionable directions toward more capable language agents in the future.

The Universal Law of Generalization Holds for Naturalistic Stimuli

Shepard's universal law of generalization is a remarkable hypothesis about how intelligent organisms should perceive similarity. In its broadest form, the universal law states that the level of perceived similarity between a pair of stimuli should decay as a concave function of their distance when embedded in an appropriate psychological space. While extensively studied, evidence in support of the universal law has relied on low-dimensional stimuli and small stimulus sets that are very different from their real-world counterparts. This is largely because pairwise comparisons -- as required for similarity judgments -- scale quadratically in the number of stimuli. We provide direct evidence for the universal law in a naturalistic high-dimensional regime by analyzing an existing dataset of 214,200 human similarity judgments and a newly collected dataset of 390,819 human generalization judgments (N=2406 US participants) across three sets of natural images.