Have we built machines that think like people?

A chief goal of artificial intelligence is to build machines that think like people. Yet it has been argued that deep neural network architectures fail to accomplish this. Researchers have asserted these models' limitations in the domains of causal reasoning, intuitive physics, and intuitive psychology. Yet recent advancements, namely the rise of large language models, particularly those designed for visual processing, have rekindled interest in the potential to emulate human-like cognitive abilities. This paper evaluates the current state of vision-based large language models in the domains of intuitive physics, causal reasoning, and intuitive psychology. Through a series of controlled experiments, we investigate the extent to which these modern models grasp complex physical interactions, causal relationships, and intuitive understanding of others' preferences. Our findings reveal that, while these models demonstrate a notable proficiency in processing and interpreting visual data, they still fall short of human capabilities in these areas. The models exhibit a rudimentary understanding of physical laws and causal relationships, but their performance is hindered by a lack of deeper insights-a key aspect of human cognition. Furthermore, in tasks requiring an intuitive theory of mind, the models fail altogether. Our results emphasize the need for integrating more robust mechanisms for understanding causality, physical dynamics, and social cognition into modern-day, vision-based language models, and point out the importance of cognitively-inspired benchmarks.

Playing repeated games with Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.