Causal interventions expose implicit situation models for commonsense language understanding

Accounts of human language processing have long appealed to implicit ``situation models'' that enrich comprehension with relevant but unstated world knowledge. Here, we apply causal intervention techniques to recent transformer models to analyze performance on the Winograd Schema Challenge (WSC), where a single context cue shifts interpretation of an ambiguous pronoun. We identify a relatively small circuit of attention heads that are responsible for propagating information from the context word that guides which of the candidate noun phrases the pronoun ultimately attends to. We then compare how this circuit behaves in a closely matched ``syntactic'' control where the situation model is not strictly necessary. These analyses suggest distinct pathways through which implicit situation models are constructed to guide pronoun resolution.

Overinformative Question Answering by Humans and Machines

When faced with a polar question, speakers often provide overinformative answers going beyond a simple "yes" or "no". But what principles guide the selection of additional information? In this paper, we provide experimental evidence from two studies suggesting that overinformativeness in human answering is driven by considerations of relevance to the questioner's goals which they flexibly adjust given the functional context in which the question is uttered. We take these human results as a strong benchmark for investigating question-answering performance in state-of-the-art neural language models, conducting an extensive evaluation on items from human experiments. We find that most models fail to adjust their answering behavior in a human-like way and tend to include irrelevant information. We show that GPT-3 is highly sensitive to the form of the prompt and only achieves human-like answer patterns when guided by an example and cognitively-motivated explanation.

Semantic uncertainty guides the extension of conventions to new referents

A long tradition of studies in psycholinguistics has examined the formation and generalization of ad hoc conventions in reference games, showing how newly acquired conventions for a given target transfer to new referential contexts. However, another axis of generalization remains understudied: how do conventions formed for one target transfer to completely distinct targets, when specific lexical choices are unlikely to repeat? This paper presents two dyadic studies (N = 240) that address this axis of generalization, focusing on the role of nameability -- the a priori likelihood that two individuals will share the same label. We leverage the recently-released KiloGram dataset, a collection of abstract tangram images that is orders of magnitude larger than previously available, exhibiting high diversity of properties like nameability. Our first study asks how nameability shapes convention formation, while the second asks how new conventions generalize to entirely new targets of reference. Our results raise new questions about how ad hoc conventions extend beyond target-specific re-use of specific lexical choices.

Abstract Visual Reasoning with Tangram Shapes

We introduce KiloGram, a resource for studying abstract visual reasoning in humans and machines. Drawing on the history of tangram puzzles as stimuli in cognitive science, we build a richly annotated dataset that, with >1k distinct stimuli, is orders of magnitude larger and more diverse than prior resources. It is both visually and linguistically richer, moving beyond whole shape descriptions to include segmentation maps and part labels. We use this resource to evaluate the abstract visual reasoning capacities of recent multi-modal models. We observe that pre-trained weights demonstrate limited abstract reasoning, which dramatically improves with fine-tuning. We also observe that explicitly describing parts aids abstract reasoning for both humans and models, especially when jointly encoding the linguistic and visual inputs. KiloGram is available at https://lil.nlp.cornell.edu/kilogram .

Using Natural Language and Program Abstractions to Instill Human Inductive Biases in Machines

Strong inductive biases are a key component of human intelligence, allowing people to quickly learn a variety of tasks. Although meta-learning has emerged as an approach for endowing neural networks with useful inductive biases, agents trained by meta-learning may acquire very different strategies from humans. We show that co-training these agents on predicting representations from natural language task descriptions and from programs induced to generate such tasks guides them toward human-like inductive biases. Human-generated language descriptions and program induction with library learning both result in more human-like behavior in downstream meta-reinforcement learning agents than less abstract controls (synthetic language descriptions, program induction without library learning), suggesting that the abstraction supported by these representations is key.

Identifying concept libraries from language about object structure

Our understanding of the visual world goes beyond naming objects, encompassing our ability to parse objects into meaningful parts, attributes, and relations. In this work, we leverage natural language descriptions for a diverse set of 2K procedurally generated objects to identify the parts people use and the principles leading these parts to be favored over others. We formalize our problem as search over a space of program libraries that contain different part concepts, using tools from machine translation to evaluate how well programs expressed in each library align to human language. By combining naturalistic language at scale with structured program representations, we discover a fundamental information-theoretic tradeoff governing the part concepts people name: people favor a lexicon that allows concise descriptions of each object, while also minimizing the size of the lexicon itself.

Linguistic communication as (inverse) reward design

Natural language is an intuitive and expressive way to communicate reward information to autonomous agents. It encompasses everything from concrete instructions to abstract descriptions of the world. Despite this, natural language is often challenging to learn from: it is difficult for machine learning methods to make appropriate inferences from such a wide range of input. This paper proposes a generalization of reward design as a unifying principle to ground linguistic communication: speakers choose utterances to maximize expected rewards from the listener's future behaviors. We first extend reward design to incorporate reasoning about unknown future states in a linear bandit setting. We then define a speaker model which chooses utterances according to this objective. Simulations show that short-horizon speakers (reasoning primarily about a single, known state) tend to use instructions, while long-horizon speakers (reasoning primarily about unknown, future states) tend to describe the reward function. We then define a pragmatic listener which performs inverse reward design by jointly inferring the speaker's latent horizon and rewards. Our findings suggest that this extension of reward design to linguistic communication, including the notion of a latent speaker horizon, is a promising direction for achieving more robust alignment outcomes from natural language supervision.

Probing BERT's priors with serial reproduction chains

Sampling is a promising bottom-up method for exposing what generative models have learned about language, but it remains unclear how to generate representative samples from popular masked language models (MLMs) like BERT. The MLM objective yields a dependency network with no guarantee of consistent conditional distributions, posing a problem for naive approaches. Drawing from theories of iterated learning in cognitive science, we explore the use of serial reproduction chains to sample from BERT's priors. In particular, we observe that a unique and consistent estimator of the ground-truth joint distribution is given by a Generative Stochastic Network (GSN) sampler, which randomly selects which token to mask and reconstruct on each step. We show that the lexical and syntactic statistics of sentences from GSN chains closely match the ground-truth corpus distribution and perform better than other methods in a large corpus of naturalness judgments. Our findings establish a firmer theoretical foundation for bottom-up probing and highlight richer deviations from human priors.

A pragmatic account of the weak evidence effect

Language is not only used to inform. We often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker's "hidden agenda" when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a new pragmatic explanation for why weakly favorable arguments may backfire, a phenomenon known as the weak evidence effect. Critically, our model predicts a relationship between belief updating and speaker expectations: weak evidence should only backfire when speakers are expected to act under persuasive goals, implying the absence of stronger evidence. We introduce a simple experimental paradigm called the Stick Contest to measure the extent to which the weak evidence effect depends on speaker expectations, and show that a pragmatic listener model accounts for the empirical data better than alternative models. Our findings suggest potential avenues for rational models of social reasoning to further illuminate decision-making phenomena.