Proprietary large language models (LLMs) have been widely applied in various scenarios. Additionally, deploying LLMs on edge devices is trending for efficiency and privacy reasons. However, edge deployment of proprietary LLMs introduces new security challenges: edge-deployed models are exposed as white-box accessible to users, enabling adversaries to conduct effective model stealing (MS) attacks. Unfortunately, existing defense mechanisms fail to provide effective protection. Specifically, we identify four critical protection properties that existing methods fail to simultaneously satisfy: (1) maintaining protection after a model is physically copied; (2) authorizing model access at request level; (3) safeguarding runtime reverse engineering; (4) achieving high security with negligible runtime overhead. To address the above issues, we propose TransLinkGuard, a plug-and-play model protection approach against model stealing on edge devices. The core part of TransLinkGuard is a lightweight authorization module residing in a secure environment, e.g., TEE. The authorization module can freshly authorize each request based on its input. Extensive experiments show that TransLinkGuard achieves the same security protection as the black-box security guarantees with negligible overhead.
Large language models (LLMs) have achieved commendable accomplishments in various natural language processing tasks. However, LLMs still encounter significant challenges when dealing with complex scenarios involving multiple entities. These challenges arise from the presence of implicit relationships that demand multi-step reasoning. In this paper, we propose a novel approach ERA-CoT, which aids LLMs in understanding context by capturing relationships between entities and supports the reasoning of diverse tasks through Chain-of-Thoughts (CoT). Experimental results show that ERA-CoT demonstrates the superior performance of our proposed method compared to current CoT prompting methods, achieving a significant improvement of an average of 5.1\% on GPT3.5 compared to previous SOTA baselines. Our analysis indicates that ERA-CoT increases the LLM's understanding of entity relationships, significantly improves the accuracy of question answering, and enhances the reasoning ability of LLMs.
Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate exceptional performance in numerous tasks but still heavily rely on knowledge stored in their parameters. Moreover, updating this knowledge incurs high training costs. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) methods address this issue by integrating external knowledge. The model can answer questions it couldn't previously by retrieving knowledge relevant to the query. This approach improves performance in certain scenarios for specific tasks. However, if irrelevant texts are retrieved, it may impair model performance. In this paper, we propose Retrieval Augmented Iterative Self-Feedback (RA-ISF), a framework that iteratively decomposes tasks and processes them in three submodules to enhance the model's problem-solving capabilities. Experiments show that our method outperforms existing benchmarks, performing well on models like GPT3.5, Llama2, significantly enhancing factual reasoning capabilities and reducing hallucinations.
Vision-Language (VL) pre-trained models have shown their superiority on many multimodal tasks. However, the adversarial robustness of such models has not been fully explored. Existing approaches mainly focus on exploring the adversarial robustness under the white-box setting, which is unrealistic. In this paper, we aim to investigate a new yet practical task to craft image and text perturbations using pre-trained VL models to attack black-box fine-tuned models on different downstream tasks. Towards this end, we propose VLAttack to generate adversarial samples by fusing perturbations of images and texts from both single-modal and multimodal levels. At the single-modal level, we propose a new block-wise similarity attack (BSA) strategy to learn image perturbations for disrupting universal representations. Besides, we adopt an existing text attack strategy to generate text perturbations independent of the image-modal attack. At the multimodal level, we design a novel iterative cross-search attack (ICSA) method to update adversarial image-text pairs periodically, starting with the outputs from the single-modal level. We conduct extensive experiments to attack three widely-used VL pretrained models for six tasks on eight datasets. Experimental results show that the proposed VLAttack framework achieves the highest attack success rates on all tasks compared with state-of-the-art baselines, which reveals a significant blind spot in the deployment of pre-trained VL models. Codes will be released soon.
We present ReMasker, a new method of imputing missing values in tabular data by extending the masked autoencoding framework. Compared with prior work, ReMasker is both simple -- besides the missing values (i.e., naturally masked), we randomly ``re-mask'' another set of values, optimize the autoencoder by reconstructing this re-masked set, and apply the trained model to predict the missing values; and effective -- with extensive evaluation on benchmark datasets, we show that ReMasker performs on par with or outperforms state-of-the-art methods in terms of both imputation fidelity and utility under various missingness settings, while its performance advantage often increases with the ratio of missing data. We further explore theoretical justification for its effectiveness, showing that ReMasker tends to learn missingness-invariant representations of tabular data. Our findings indicate that masked modeling represents a promising direction for further research on tabular data imputation. The code is publicly available.
Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance as few-shot learners. However, their security risks under such settings are largely unexplored. In this work, we conduct a pilot study showing that PLMs as few-shot learners are highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks while existing defenses are inadequate due to the unique challenges of few-shot scenarios. To address such challenges, we advocate MDP, a novel lightweight, pluggable, and effective defense for PLMs as few-shot learners. Specifically, MDP leverages the gap between the masking-sensitivity of poisoned and clean samples: with reference to the limited few-shot data as distributional anchors, it compares the representations of given samples under varying masking and identifies poisoned samples as ones with significant variations. We show analytically that MDP creates an interesting dilemma for the attacker to choose between attack effectiveness and detection evasiveness. The empirical evaluation using benchmark datasets and representative attacks validates the efficacy of MDP.
Knowledge graph reasoning (KGR) -- answering complex logical queries over large knowledge graphs -- represents an important artificial intelligence task, entailing a range of applications (e.g., cyber threat hunting). However, despite its surging popularity, the potential security risks of KGR are largely unexplored, which is concerning, given the increasing use of such capability in security-critical domains. This work represents a solid initial step towards bridging the striking gap. We systematize the security threats to KGR according to the adversary's objectives, knowledge, and attack vectors. Further, we present ROAR, a new class of attacks that instantiate a variety of such threats. Through empirical evaluation in representative use cases (e.g., medical decision support, cyber threat hunting, and commonsense reasoning), we demonstrate that ROAR is highly effective to mislead KGR to suggest pre-defined answers for target queries, yet with negligible impact on non-target ones. Finally, we explore potential countermeasures against ROAR, including filtering of potentially poisoning knowledge and training with adversarially augmented queries, which leads to several promising research directions.
It is well-known that recurrent neural networks (RNNs), although widely used, are vulnerable to adversarial attacks including one-frame attacks and multi-frame attacks. Though a few certified defenses exist to provide guaranteed robustness against one-frame attacks, we prove that defending against multi-frame attacks remains a challenging problem due to their enormous perturbation space. In this paper, we propose the first certified defense against multi-frame attacks for RNNs called RNN-Guard. To address the above challenge, we adopt the perturb-all-frame strategy to construct perturbation spaces consistent with those in multi-frame attacks. However, the perturb-all-frame strategy causes a precision issue in linear relaxations. To address this issue, we introduce a novel abstract domain called InterZono and design tighter relaxations. We prove that InterZono is more precise than Zonotope yet carries the same time complexity. Experimental evaluations across various datasets and model structures show that the certified robust accuracy calculated by RNN-Guard with InterZono is up to 2.18 times higher than that with Zonotope. In addition, we extend RNN-Guard as the first certified training method against multi-frame attacks to directly enhance RNNs' robustness. The results show that the certified robust accuracy of models trained with RNN-Guard against multi-frame attacks is 15.47 to 67.65 percentage points higher than those with other training methods.
The $\texttt{torch-choice}$ is an open-source library for flexible, fast choice modeling with Python and PyTorch. $\texttt{torch-choice}$ provides a $\texttt{ChoiceDataset}$ data structure to manage databases flexibly and memory-efficiently. The paper demonstrates constructing a $\texttt{ChoiceDataset}$ from databases of various formats and functionalities of $\texttt{ChoiceDataset}$. The package implements two widely used models, namely the multinomial logit and nested logit models, and supports regularization during model estimation. The package incorporates the option to take advantage of GPUs for estimation, allowing it to scale to massive datasets while being computationally efficient. Models can be initialized using either R-style formula strings or Python dictionaries. We conclude with a comparison of the computational efficiencies of $\texttt{torch-choice}$ and $\texttt{mlogit}$ in R as (1) the number of observations increases, (2) the number of covariates increases, and (3) the expansion of item sets. Finally, we demonstrate the scalability of $\texttt{torch-choice}$ on large-scale datasets.
As an emerging machine learning paradigm, self-supervised learning (SSL) is able to learn high-quality representations for complex data without data labels. Prior work shows that, besides obviating the reliance on labeling, SSL also benefits adversarial robustness by making it more challenging for the adversary to manipulate model prediction. However, whether this robustness benefit generalizes to other types of attacks remains an open question. We explore this question in the context of trojan attacks by showing that SSL is comparably vulnerable as supervised learning to trojan attacks. Specifically, we design and evaluate CTRL, an extremely simple self-supervised trojan attack. By polluting a tiny fraction of training data (less than 1%) with indistinguishable poisoning samples, CTRL causes any trigger-embedded input to be misclassified to the adversary's desired class with a high probability (over 99%) at inference. More importantly, through the lens of CTRL, we study the mechanisms underlying self-supervised trojan attacks. With both empirical and analytical evidence, we reveal that the representation invariance property of SSL, which benefits adversarial robustness, may also be the very reason making SSL highly vulnerable to trojan attacks. We further discuss the fundamental challenges to defending against self-supervised trojan attacks, pointing to promising directions for future research.