SOV-CAD: Stepwise Orthographic Views Guided CAD Modeling Sequence Reconstruction

Reconstructing Computer-Aided Design (CAD) modeling sequences from images is crucial for preserving design intent and supporting parametric editing. However, existing methods typically generate full CAD sequences holistically, overlooking the iterative, feedback-driven nature of human design workflows. We address this limitation by introducing the rich stepwise visual supervision: at each modeling step, the system observes the target's orthographic projections, the projections of the incrementally constructed model, and the active sketch, enabling informed action selection. To effectively leverage this on-the-fly feedback, we propose SOV-CAD, a framework that formulates CAD reconstruction as a sequential decision-making task and employs offline reinforcement learning with a Decision Transformer architecture. This design incorporates continuous visual feedback guided by geometric alignment rewards, resulting in a more accurate and human-like modeling process. Extensive experiments show that SOV-CAD surpasses state-of-the-art methods in CAD sequence reconstruction while exhibiting strong data efficiency. Code of SOV-CAD is available at: https://github.com/LukePhong/SOV-CAD

HijackRAG: Hijacking Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Large Language Models

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge, making them adaptable and cost-effective for various applications. However, the growing reliance on these systems also introduces potential security risks. In this work, we reveal a novel vulnerability, the retrieval prompt hijack attack (HijackRAG), which enables attackers to manipulate the retrieval mechanisms of RAG systems by injecting malicious texts into the knowledge database. When the RAG system encounters target questions, it generates the attacker's pre-determined answers instead of the correct ones, undermining the integrity and trustworthiness of the system. We formalize HijackRAG as an optimization problem and propose both black-box and white-box attack strategies tailored to different levels of the attacker's knowledge. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets show that HijackRAG consistently achieves high attack success rates, outperforming existing baseline attacks. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the attack is transferable across different retriever models, underscoring the widespread risk it poses to RAG systems. Lastly, our exploration of various defense mechanisms reveals that they are insufficient to counter HijackRAG, emphasizing the urgent need for more robust security measures to protect RAG systems in real-world deployments.