Quantifying the Sensitivity of Inverse Reinforcement Learning to Misspecification

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function $R$) from their behaviour (represented as a policy $\pi$). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how $\pi$ relates to $R$. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

On the Limitations of Markovian Rewards to Express Multi-Objective, Risk-Sensitive, and Modal Tasks

In this paper, we study the expressivity of scalar, Markovian reward functions in Reinforcement Learning (RL), and identify several limitations to what they can express. Specifically, we look at three classes of RL tasks; multi-objective RL, risk-sensitive RL, and modal RL. For each class, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions that describe when a problem in this class can be expressed using a scalar, Markovian reward. Moreover, we find that scalar, Markovian rewards are unable to express most of the instances in each of these three classes. We thereby contribute to a more complete understanding of what standard reward functions can and cannot express. In addition to this, we also call attention to modal problems as a new class of problems, since they have so far not been given any systematic treatment in the RL literature. We also briefly outline some approaches for solving some of the problems we discuss, by means of bespoke RL algorithms.

On The Expressivity of Objective-Specification Formalisms in Reinforcement Learning

To solve a task with reinforcement learning (RL), it is necessary to formally specify the goal of that task. Although most RL algorithms require that the goal is formalised as a Markovian reward function, alternatives have been developed (such as Linear Temporal Logic and Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning). Moreover, it is well known that some of these formalisms are able to express certain tasks that other formalisms cannot express. However, there has not yet been any thorough analysis of how these formalisms relate to each other in terms of expressivity. In this work, we fill this gap in the existing literature by providing a comprehensive comparison of the expressivities of 17 objective-specification formalisms in RL. We place these formalisms in a preorder based on their expressive power, and present this preorder as a Hasse diagram. We find a variety of limitations for the different formalisms, and that no formalism is both dominantly expressive and straightforward to optimise with current techniques. For example, we prove that each of Regularised RL, Outer Nonlinear Markov Rewards, Reward Machines, Linear Temporal Logic, and Limit Average Rewards can express an objective that the others cannot. Our findings have implications for both policy optimisation and reward learning. Firstly, we identify expressivity limitations which are important to consider when specifying objectives in practice. Secondly, our results highlight the need for future research which adapts reward learning to work with a variety of formalisms, since many existing reward learning methods implicitly assume that desired objectives can be expressed with Markovian rewards. Our work contributes towards a more cohesive understanding of the costs and benefits of different RL objective-specification formalisms.

Goodhart's Law in Reinforcement Learning

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

STARC: A General Framework For Quantifying Differences Between Reward Functions

In order to solve a task using reinforcement learning, it is necessary to first formalise the goal of that task as a reward function. However, for many real-world tasks, it is very difficult to manually specify a reward function that never incentivises undesirable behaviour. As a result, it is increasingly popular to use reward learning algorithms, which attempt to learn a reward function from data. However, the theoretical foundations of reward learning are not yet well-developed. In particular, it is typically not known when a given reward learning algorithm with high probability will learn a reward function that is safe to optimise. This means that reward learning algorithms generally must be evaluated empirically, which is expensive, and that their failure modes are difficult to predict in advance. One of the roadblocks to deriving better theoretical guarantees is the lack of good methods for quantifying the difference between reward functions. In this paper we provide a solution to this problem, in the form of a class of pseudometrics on the space of all reward functions that we call STARC (STAndardised Reward Comparison) metrics. We show that STARC metrics induce both an upper and a lower bound on worst-case regret, which implies that our metrics are tight, and that any metric with the same properties must be bilipschitz equivalent to ours. Moreover, we also identify a number of issues with reward metrics proposed by earlier works. Finally, we evaluate our metrics empirically, to demonstrate their practical efficacy. STARC metrics can be used to make both theoretical and empirical analysis of reward learning algorithms both easier and more principled.

Lexicographic Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning

In this work we introduce reinforcement learning techniques for solving lexicographic multi-objective problems. These are problems that involve multiple reward signals, and where the goal is to learn a policy that maximises the first reward signal, and subject to this constraint also maximises the second reward signal, and so on. We present a family of both action-value and policy gradient algorithms that can be used to solve such problems, and prove that they converge to policies that are lexicographically optimal. We evaluate the scalability and performance of these algorithms empirically, demonstrating their practical applicability. As a more specific application, we show how our algorithms can be used to impose safety constraints on the behaviour of an agent, and compare their performance in this context with that of other constrained reinforcement learning algorithms.

Misspecification in Inverse Reinforcement Learning

The aim of Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) is to infer a reward function $R$ from a policy $\pi$. To do this, we need a model of how $\pi$ relates to $R$. In the current literature, the most common models are optimality, Boltzmann rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. One of the primary motivations behind IRL is to infer human preferences from human behaviour. However, the true relationship between human preferences and human behaviour is much more complex than any of the models currently used in IRL. This means that they are misspecified, which raises the worry that they might lead to unsound inferences if applied to real-world data. In this paper, we provide a mathematical analysis of how robust different IRL models are to misspecification, and answer precisely how the demonstrator policy may differ from each of the standard models before that model leads to faulty inferences about the reward function $R$. We also introduce a framework for reasoning about misspecification in IRL, together with formal tools that can be used to easily derive the misspecification robustness of new IRL models.

Defining and Characterizing Reward Hacking

We provide the first formal definition of reward hacking, a phenomenon where optimizing an imperfect proxy reward function, $\mathcal{\tilde{R}}$, leads to poor performance according to the true reward function, $\mathcal{R}$. We say that a proxy is unhackable if increasing the expected proxy return can never decrease the expected true return. Intuitively, it might be possible to create an unhackable proxy by leaving some terms out of the reward function (making it "narrower") or overlooking fine-grained distinctions between roughly equivalent outcomes, but we show this is usually not the case. A key insight is that the linearity of reward (in state-action visit counts) makes unhackability a very strong condition. In particular, for the set of all stochastic policies, two reward functions can only be unhackable if one of them is constant. We thus turn our attention to deterministic policies and finite sets of stochastic policies, where non-trivial unhackable pairs always exist, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of simplifications, an important special case of unhackability. Our results reveal a tension between using reward functions to specify narrow tasks and aligning AI systems with human values.

Invariance in Policy Optimisation and Partial Identifiability in Reward Learning

It's challenging to design reward functions for complex, real-world tasks. Reward learning lets one instead infer reward functions from data. However, multiple reward functions often fit the data equally well, even in the infinite-data limit. Prior work often considers reward functions to be uniquely recoverable, by imposing additional assumptions on data sources. By contrast, we formally characterise the partial identifiability of popular data sources, including demonstrations and trajectory preferences, under multiple common sets of assumptions. We analyse the impact of this partial identifiability on downstream tasks such as policy optimisation, including under changes in environment dynamics. We unify our results in a framework for comparing data sources and downstream tasks by their invariances, with implications for the design and selection of data sources for reward learning.

A General Counterexample to Any Decision Theory and Some Responses

In this paper I present an argument and a general schema which can be used to construct a problem case for any decision theory, in a way that could be taken to show that one cannot formulate a decision theory that is never outperformed by any other decision theory. I also present and discuss a number of possible responses to this argument. One of these responses raises the question of what it means for two decision problems to be "equivalent" in the relevant sense, and gives an answer to this question which would invalidate the first argument. However, this position would have further consequences for how we compare different decision theories in decision problems already discussed in the literature (including e.g. Newcomb's problem).