Policy Mirror Ascent for Efficient and Independent Learning in Mean Field Games

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games in literature. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Instead, we show that $N$ agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\varepsilon^{-2})$ samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})$ error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. Next, we prove that conditional TD-learning in $N$-agent games can learn value functions within $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\varepsilon^{-2})$ time steps. These results allow proving sample complexity guarantees in the oracle-free setting by only relying on a sample path from the $N$ agent simulator. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by $N$ agents with finite sample guarantees.

C3PO: Learning to Achieve Arbitrary Goals via Massively Entropic Pretraining

Given a particular embodiment, we propose a novel method (C3PO) that learns policies able to achieve any arbitrary position and pose. Such a policy would allow for easier control, and would be re-useable as a key building block for downstream tasks. The method is two-fold: First, we introduce a novel exploration algorithm that optimizes for uniform coverage, is able to discover a set of achievable states, and investigates its abilities in attaining both high coverage, and hard-to-discover states; Second, we leverage this set of achievable states as training data for a universal goal-achievement policy, a goal-based SAC variant. We demonstrate the trained policy's performance in achieving a large number of novel states. Finally, we showcase the influence of massive unsupervised training of a goal-achievement policy with state-of-the-art pose-based control of the Hopper, Walker, Halfcheetah, Humanoid and Ant embodiments.

Learning Correlated Equilibria in Mean-Field Games

The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game theoretic analysis becomes effectively infeasible beyond a low number of players. Recent approaches have gone around this limitation by instead considering Mean-Field games, an approximation of anonymous $N$-player games, where the number of players is infinite and the population's state distribution, instead of every individual player's state, is the object of interest. The practical computability of Mean-Field Nash equilibria, the most studied Mean-Field equilibrium to date, however, typically depends on beneficial non-generic structural properties such as monotonicity or contraction properties, which are required for known algorithms to converge. In this work, we provide an alternative route for studying Mean-Field games, by developing the concepts of Mean-Field correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria. We show that they can be efficiently learnt in \emph{all games}, without requiring any additional assumption on the structure of the game, using three classical algorithms. Furthermore, we establish correspondences between our notions and those already present in the literature, derive optimality bounds for the Mean-Field - $N$-player transition, and empirically demonstrate the convergence of these algorithms on simple games.

KL-Entropy-Regularized RL with a Generative Model is Minimax Optimal

In this work, we consider and analyze the sample complexity of model-free reinforcement learning with a generative model. Particularly, we analyze mirror descent value iteration (MDVI) by Geist et al. (2019) and Vieillard et al. (2020a), which uses the Kullback-Leibler divergence and entropy regularization in its value and policy updates. Our analysis shows that it is nearly minimax-optimal for finding an $\varepsilon$-optimal policy when $\varepsilon$ is sufficiently small. This is the first theoretical result that demonstrates that a simple model-free algorithm without variance-reduction can be nearly minimax-optimal under the considered setting.

Learning Mean Field Games: A Survey

Non-cooperative and cooperative games with a very large number of players have many applications but remain generally intractable when the number of players increases. Introduced by Lasry and Lions, and Huang, Caines and Malham\'e, Mean Field Games (MFGs) rely on a mean-field approximation to allow the number of players to grow to infinity. Traditional methods for solving these games generally rely on solving partial or stochastic differential equations with a full knowledge of the model. Recently, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has appeared promising to solve complex problems. By combining MFGs and RL, we hope to solve games at a very large scale both in terms of population size and environment complexity. In this survey, we review the quickly growing recent literature on RL methods to learn Nash equilibria in MFGs. We first identify the most common settings (static, stationary, and evolutive). We then present a general framework for classical iterative methods (based on best-response computation or policy evaluation) to solve MFGs in an exact way. Building on these algorithms and the connection with Markov Decision Processes, we explain how RL can be used to learn MFG solutions in a model-free way. Last, we present numerical illustrations on a benchmark problem, and conclude with some perspectives.

Learning Energy Networks with Generalized Fenchel-Young Losses

Energy-based models, a.k.a. energy networks, perform inference by optimizing an energy function, typically parametrized by a neural network. This allows one to capture potentially complex relationships between inputs and outputs. To learn the parameters of the energy function, the solution to that optimization problem is typically fed into a loss function. The key challenge for training energy networks lies in computing loss gradients, as this typically requires argmin/argmax differentiation. In this paper, building upon a generalized notion of conjugate function, which replaces the usual bilinear pairing with a general energy function, we propose generalized Fenchel-Young losses, a natural loss construction for learning energy networks. Our losses enjoy many desirable properties and their gradients can be computed efficiently without argmin/argmax differentiation. We also prove the calibration of their excess risk in the case of linear-concave energies. We demonstrate our losses on multilabel classification and imitation learning tasks.

Scalable Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithms for Mean Field Games

Mean Field Games (MFGs) have been introduced to efficiently approximate games with very large populations of strategic agents. Recently, the question of learning equilibria in MFGs has gained momentum, particularly using model-free reinforcement learning (RL) methods. One limiting factor to further scale up using RL is that existing algorithms to solve MFGs require the mixing of approximated quantities such as strategies or $q$-values. This is non-trivial in the case of non-linear function approximation that enjoy good generalization properties, e.g. neural networks. We propose two methods to address this shortcoming. The first one learns a mixed strategy from distillation of historical data into a neural network and is applied to the Fictitious Play algorithm. The second one is an online mixing method based on regularization that does not require memorizing historical data or previous estimates. It is used to extend Online Mirror Descent. We demonstrate numerically that these methods efficiently enable the use of Deep RL algorithms to solve various MFGs. In addition, we show that these methods outperform SotA baselines from the literature.

Lazy-MDPs: Towards Interpretable Reinforcement Learning by Learning When to Act

Traditionally, Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims at deciding how to act optimally for an artificial agent. We argue that deciding when to act is equally important. As humans, we drift from default, instinctive or memorized behaviors to focused, thought-out behaviors when required by the situation. To enhance RL agents with this aptitude, we propose to augment the standard Markov Decision Process and make a new mode of action available: being lazy, which defers decision-making to a default policy. In addition, we penalize non-lazy actions in order to encourage minimal effort and have agents focus on critical decisions only. We name the resulting formalism lazy-MDPs. We study the theoretical properties of lazy-MDPs, expressing value functions and characterizing optimal solutions. Then we empirically demonstrate that policies learned in lazy-MDPs generally come with a form of interpretability: by construction, they show us the states where the agent takes control over the default policy. We deem those states and corresponding actions important since they explain the difference in performance between the default and the new, lazy policy. With suboptimal policies as default (pretrained or random), we observe that agents are able to get competitive performance in Atari games while only taking control in a limited subset of states.

Continuous Control with Action Quantization from Demonstrations

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), discrete actions, as opposed to continuous actions, result in less complex exploration problems and the immediate computation of the maximum of the action-value function which is central to dynamic programming-based methods. In this paper, we propose a novel method: Action Quantization from Demonstrations (AQuaDem) to learn a discretization of continuous action spaces by leveraging the priors of demonstrations. This dramatically reduces the exploration problem, since the actions faced by the agent not only are in a finite number but also are plausible in light of the demonstrator's behavior. By discretizing the action space we can apply any discrete action deep RL algorithm to the continuous control problem. We evaluate the proposed method on three different setups: RL with demonstrations, RL with play data --demonstrations of a human playing in an environment but not solving any specific task-- and Imitation Learning. For all three setups, we only consider human data, which is more challenging than synthetic data. We found that AQuaDem consistently outperforms state-of-the-art continuous control methods, both in terms of performance and sample efficiency. We provide visualizations and videos in the paper's website: https://google-research.github.io/aquadem.

Twice regularized MDPs and the equivalence between robustness and regularization

Robust Markov decision processes (MDPs) aim to handle changing or partially known system dynamics. To solve them, one typically resorts to robust optimization methods. However, this significantly increases computational complexity and limits scalability in both learning and planning. On the other hand, regularized MDPs show more stability in policy learning without impairing time complexity. Yet, they generally do not encompass uncertainty in the model dynamics. In this work, we aim to learn robust MDPs using regularization. We first show that regularized MDPs are a particular instance of robust MDPs with uncertain reward. We thus establish that policy iteration on reward-robust MDPs can have the same time complexity as on regularized MDPs. We further extend this relationship to MDPs with uncertain transitions: this leads to a regularization term with an additional dependence on the value function. We finally generalize regularized MDPs to twice regularized MDPs (R${}^2$ MDPs), i.e., MDPs with $\textit{both}$ value and policy regularization. The corresponding Bellman operators enable developing policy iteration schemes with convergence and robustness guarantees. It also reduces planning and learning in robust MDPs to regularized MDPs.