Forecasting future events is important for policy and decision making. In this work, we study whether language models (LMs) can forecast at the level of competitive human forecasters. Towards this goal, we develop a retrieval-augmented LM system designed to automatically search for relevant information, generate forecasts, and aggregate predictions. To facilitate our study, we collect a large dataset of questions from competitive forecasting platforms. Under a test set published after the knowledge cut-offs of our LMs, we evaluate the end-to-end performance of our system against the aggregates of human forecasts. On average, the system nears the crowd aggregate of competitive forecasters, and in some settings surpasses it. Our work suggests that using LMs to forecast the future could provide accurate predictions at scale and help to inform institutional decision making.
Language models influence the external world: they query APIs that read and write to web pages, generate content that shapes human behavior, and run system commands as autonomous agents. These interactions form feedback loops: LLM outputs affect the world, which in turn affect subsequent LLM outputs. In this work, we show that feedback loops can cause in-context reward hacking (ICRH), where the LLM at test-time optimizes a (potentially implicit) objective but creates negative side effects in the process. For example, consider an LLM agent deployed to increase Twitter engagement; the LLM may retrieve its previous tweets into the context window and make them more controversial, increasing engagement but also toxicity. We identify and study two processes that lead to ICRH: output-refinement and policy-refinement. For these processes, evaluations on static datasets are insufficient -- they miss the feedback effects and thus cannot capture the most harmful behavior. In response, we provide three recommendations for evaluation to capture more instances of ICRH. As AI development accelerates, the effects of feedback loops will proliferate, increasing the need to understand their role in shaping LLM behavior.
How do two sets of images differ? Discerning set-level differences is crucial for understanding model behaviors and analyzing datasets, yet manually sifting through thousands of images is impractical. To aid in this discovery process, we explore the task of automatically describing the differences between two $\textbf{sets}$ of images, which we term Set Difference Captioning. This task takes in image sets $D_A$ and $D_B$, and outputs a description that is more often true on $D_A$ than $D_B$. We outline a two-stage approach that first proposes candidate difference descriptions from image sets and then re-ranks the candidates by checking how well they can differentiate the two sets. We introduce VisDiff, which first captions the images and prompts a language model to propose candidate descriptions, then re-ranks these descriptions using CLIP. To evaluate VisDiff, we collect VisDiffBench, a dataset with 187 paired image sets with ground truth difference descriptions. We apply VisDiff to various domains, such as comparing datasets (e.g., ImageNet vs. ImageNetV2), comparing classification models (e.g., zero-shot CLIP vs. supervised ResNet), summarizing model failure modes (supervised ResNet), characterizing differences between generative models (e.g., StableDiffusionV1 and V2), and discovering what makes images memorable. Using VisDiff, we are able to find interesting and previously unknown differences in datasets and models, demonstrating its utility in revealing nuanced insights.
To correctly use in-context information, language models (LMs) must bind entities to their attributes. For example, given a context describing a "green square" and a "blue circle", LMs must bind the shapes to their respective colors. We analyze LM representations and identify the binding ID mechanism: a general mechanism for solving the binding problem, which we observe in every sufficiently large model from the Pythia and LLaMA families. Using causal interventions, we show that LMs' internal activations represent binding information by attaching binding ID vectors to corresponding entities and attributes. We further show that binding ID vectors form a continuous subspace, in which distances between binding ID vectors reflect their discernability. Overall, our results uncover interpretable strategies in LMs for representing symbolic knowledge in-context, providing a step towards understanding general in-context reasoning in large-scale LMs.
We investigate the CLIP image encoder by analyzing how individual model components affect the final representation. We decompose the image representation as a sum across individual image patches, model layers, and attention heads, and use CLIP's text representation to interpret the summands. Interpreting the attention heads, we characterize each head's role by automatically finding text representations that span its output space, which reveals property-specific roles for many heads (e.g. location or shape). Next, interpreting the image patches, we uncover an emergent spatial localization within CLIP. Finally, we use this understanding to remove spurious features from CLIP and to create a strong zero-shot image segmenter. Our results indicate that a scalable understanding of transformer models is attainable and can be used to repair and improve models.
Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: overthinking and false induction heads. The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.
Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate $\textbf{counterfactual simulatability}$ of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.
Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.
Recent work has observed an intriguing ''Neural Collapse'' phenomenon in well-trained neural networks, where the last-layer representations of training samples with the same label collapse into each other. This appears to suggest that the last-layer representations are completely determined by the labels, and do not depend on the intrinsic structure of input distribution. We provide evidence that this is not a complete description, and that the apparent collapse hides important fine-grained structure in the representations. Specifically, even when representations apparently collapse, the small amount of remaining variation can still faithfully and accurately captures the intrinsic structure of input distribution. As an example, if we train on CIFAR-10 using only 5 coarse-grained labels (by combining two classes into one super-class) until convergence, we can reconstruct the original 10-class labels from the learned representations via unsupervised clustering. The reconstructed labels achieve $93\%$ accuracy on the CIFAR-10 test set, nearly matching the normal CIFAR-10 accuracy for the same architecture. We also provide an initial theoretical result showing the fine-grained representation structure in a simplified synthetic setting. Our results show concretely how the structure of input data can play a significant role in determining the fine-grained structure of neural representations, going beyond what Neural Collapse predicts.
As the scale of machine learning models increases, trends such as scaling laws anticipate consistent downstream improvements in predictive accuracy. However, these trends take the perspective of a single model-provider in isolation, while in reality providers often compete with each other for users. In this work, we demonstrate that competition can fundamentally alter the behavior of these scaling trends, even causing overall predictive accuracy across users to be non-monotonic or decreasing with scale. We define a model of competition for classification tasks, and use data representations as a lens for studying the impact of increases in scale. We find many settings where improving data representation quality (as measured by Bayes risk) decreases the overall predictive accuracy across users (i.e., social welfare) for a marketplace of competing model-providers. Our examples range from closed-form formulas in simple settings to simulations with pretrained representations on CIFAR-10. At a conceptual level, our work suggests that favorable scaling trends for individual model-providers need not translate to downstream improvements in social welfare in marketplaces with multiple model providers.