Why So Toxic? Measuring and Triggering Toxic Behavior in Open-Domain Chatbots

Chatbots are used in many applications, e.g., automated agents, smart home assistants, interactive characters in online games, etc. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure they do not behave in undesired manners, providing offensive or toxic responses to users. This is not a trivial task as state-of-the-art chatbot models are trained on large, public datasets openly collected from the Internet. This paper presents a first-of-its-kind, large-scale measurement of toxicity in chatbots. We show that publicly available chatbots are prone to providing toxic responses when fed toxic queries. Even more worryingly, some non-toxic queries can trigger toxic responses too. We then set out to design and experiment with an attack, ToxicBuddy, which relies on fine-tuning GPT-2 to generate non-toxic queries that make chatbots respond in a toxic manner. Our extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that our attack is effective against public chatbot models and outperforms manually-crafted malicious queries proposed by previous work. We also evaluate three defense mechanisms against ToxicBuddy, showing that they either reduce the attack performance at the cost of affecting the chatbot's utility or are only effective at mitigating a portion of the attack. This highlights the need for more research from the computer security and online safety communities to ensure that chatbot models do not hurt their users. Overall, we are confident that ToxicBuddy can be used as an auditing tool and that our work will pave the way toward designing more effective defenses for chatbot safety.

On the Privacy Risks of Cell-Based NAS Architectures

Existing studies on neural architecture search (NAS) mainly focus on efficiently and effectively searching for network architectures with better performance. Little progress has been made to systematically understand if the NAS-searched architectures are robust to privacy attacks while abundant work has already shown that human-designed architectures are prone to privacy attacks. In this paper, we fill this gap and systematically measure the privacy risks of NAS architectures. Leveraging the insights from our measurement study, we further explore the cell patterns of cell-based NAS architectures and evaluate how the cell patterns affect the privacy risks of NAS-searched architectures. Through extensive experiments, we shed light on how to design robust NAS architectures against privacy attacks, and also offer a general methodology to understand the hidden correlation between the NAS-searched architectures and other privacy risks.

Membership Inference Attacks by Exploiting Loss Trajectory

Machine learning models are vulnerable to membership inference attacks in which an adversary aims to predict whether or not a particular sample was contained in the target model's training dataset. Existing attack methods have commonly exploited the output information (mostly, losses) solely from the given target model. As a result, in practical scenarios where both the member and non-member samples yield similarly small losses, these methods are naturally unable to differentiate between them. To address this limitation, in this paper, we propose a new attack method, called \system, which can exploit the membership information from the whole training process of the target model for improving the attack performance. To mount the attack in the common black-box setting, we leverage knowledge distillation, and represent the membership information by the losses evaluated on a sequence of intermediate models at different distillation epochs, namely \emph{distilled loss trajectory}, together with the loss from the given target model. Experimental results over different datasets and model architectures demonstrate the great advantage of our attack in terms of different metrics. For example, on CINIC-10, our attack achieves at least 6$\times$ higher true-positive rate at a low false-positive rate of 0.1\% than existing methods. Further analysis demonstrates the general effectiveness of our attack in more strict scenarios.

Auditing Membership Leakages of Multi-Exit Networks

Relying on the fact that not all inputs require the same amount of computation to yield a confident prediction, multi-exit networks are gaining attention as a prominent approach for pushing the limits of efficient deployment. Multi-exit networks endow a backbone model with early exits, allowing to obtain predictions at intermediate layers of the model and thus save computation time and/or energy. However, current various designs of multi-exit networks are only considered to achieve the best trade-off between resource usage efficiency and prediction accuracy, the privacy risks stemming from them have never been explored. This prompts the need for a comprehensive investigation of privacy risks in multi-exit networks. In this paper, we perform the first privacy analysis of multi-exit networks through the lens of membership leakages. In particular, we first leverage the existing attack methodologies to quantify the multi-exit networks' vulnerability to membership leakages. Our experimental results show that multi-exit networks are less vulnerable to membership leakages and the exit (number and depth) attached to the backbone model is highly correlated with the attack performance. Furthermore, we propose a hybrid attack that exploits the exit information to improve the performance of existing attacks. We evaluate membership leakage threat caused by our hybrid attack under three different adversarial setups, ultimately arriving at a model-free and data-free adversary. These results clearly demonstrate that our hybrid attacks are very broadly applicable, thereby the corresponding risks are much more severe than shown by existing membership inference attacks. We further present a defense mechanism called TimeGuard specifically for multi-exit networks and show that TimeGuard mitigates the newly proposed attacks perfectly.

Membership-Doctor: Comprehensive Assessment of Membership Inference Against Machine Learning Models

Machine learning models are prone to memorizing sensitive data, making them vulnerable to membership inference attacks in which an adversary aims to infer whether an input sample was used to train the model. Over the past few years, researchers have produced many membership inference attacks and defenses. However, these attacks and defenses employ a variety of strategies and are conducted in different models and datasets. The lack of comprehensive benchmark, however, means we do not understand the strengths and weaknesses of existing attacks and defenses. We fill this gap by presenting a large-scale measurement of different membership inference attacks and defenses. We systematize membership inference through the study of nine attacks and six defenses and measure the performance of different attacks and defenses in the holistic evaluation. We then quantify the impact of the threat model on the results of these attacks. We find that some assumptions of the threat model, such as same-architecture and same-distribution between shadow and target models, are unnecessary. We are also the first to execute attacks on the real-world data collected from the Internet, instead of laboratory datasets. We further investigate what determines the performance of membership inference attacks and reveal that the commonly believed overfitting level is not sufficient for the success of the attacks. Instead, the Jensen-Shannon distance of entropy/cross-entropy between member and non-member samples correlates with attack performance much better. This gives us a new way to accurately predict membership inference risks without running the attack. Finally, we find that data augmentation degrades the performance of existing attacks to a larger extent, and we propose an adaptive attack using augmentation to train shadow and attack models that improve attack performance.

AI for Global Climate Cooperation: Modeling Global Climate Negotiations, Agreements, and Long-Term Cooperation in RICE-N

Comprehensive global cooperation is essential to limit global temperature increases while continuing economic development, e.g., reducing severe inequality or achieving long-term economic growth. Achieving long-term cooperation on climate change mitigation with n strategic agents poses a complex game-theoretic problem. For example, agents may negotiate and reach climate agreements, but there is no central authority to enforce adherence to those agreements. Hence, it is critical to design negotiation and agreement frameworks that foster cooperation, allow all agents to meet their individual policy objectives, and incentivize long-term adherence. This is an interdisciplinary challenge that calls for collaboration between researchers in machine learning, economics, climate science, law, policy, ethics, and other fields. In particular, we argue that machine learning is a critical tool to address the complexity of this domain. To facilitate this research, here we introduce RICE-N, a multi-region integrated assessment model that simulates the global climate and economy, and which can be used to design and evaluate the strategic outcomes for different negotiation and agreement frameworks. We also describe how to use multi-agent reinforcement learning to train rational agents using RICE-N. This framework underpinsAI for Global Climate Cooperation, a working group collaboration and competition on climate negotiation and agreement design. Here, we invite the scientific community to design and evaluate their solutions using RICE-N, machine learning, economic intuition, and other domain knowledge. More information can be found on www.ai4climatecoop.org.

Semi-Leak: Membership Inference Attacks Against Semi-supervised Learning

Semi-supervised learning (SSL) leverages both labeled and unlabeled data to train machine learning (ML) models. State-of-the-art SSL methods can achieve comparable performance to supervised learning by leveraging much fewer labeled data. However, most existing works focus on improving the performance of SSL. In this work, we take a different angle by studying the training data privacy of SSL. Specifically, we propose the first data augmentation-based membership inference attacks against ML models trained by SSL. Given a data sample and the black-box access to a model, the goal of membership inference attack is to determine whether the data sample belongs to the training dataset of the model. Our evaluation shows that the proposed attack can consistently outperform existing membership inference attacks and achieves the best performance against the model trained by SSL. Moreover, we uncover that the reason for membership leakage in SSL is different from the commonly believed one in supervised learning, i.e., overfitting (the gap between training and testing accuracy). We observe that the SSL model is well generalized to the testing data (with almost 0 overfitting) but ''memorizes'' the training data by giving a more confident prediction regardless of its correctness. We also explore early stopping as a countermeasure to prevent membership inference attacks against SSL. The results show that early stopping can mitigate the membership inference attack, but with the cost of model's utility degradation.

Tackling Spoofing-Aware Speaker Verification with Multi-Model Fusion

Recent years have witnessed the extraordinary development of automatic speaker verification (ASV). However, previous works show that state-of-the-art ASV models are seriously vulnerable to voice spoofing attacks, and the recently proposed high-performance spoofing countermeasure (CM) models only focus solely on the standalone anti-spoofing tasks, and ignore the subsequent speaker verification process. How to integrate the CM and ASV together remains an open question. A spoofing aware speaker verification (SASV) challenge has recently taken place with the argument that better performance can be delivered when both CM and ASV subsystems are optimized jointly. Under the challenge's scenario, the integrated systems proposed by the participants are required to reject both impostor speakers and spoofing attacks from target speakers, which intuitively and effectively matches the expectation of a reliable, spoofing-robust ASV system. This work focuses on fusion-based SASV solutions and proposes a multi-model fusion framework to leverage the power of multiple state-of-the-art ASV and CM models. The proposed framework vastly improves the SASV-EER from 8.75% to 1.17\%, which is 86% relative improvement compared to the best baseline system in the SASV challenge.

Data-Efficient Double-Win Lottery Tickets from Robust Pre-training

Pre-training serves as a broadly adopted starting point for transfer learning on various downstream tasks. Recent investigations of lottery tickets hypothesis (LTH) demonstrate such enormous pre-trained models can be replaced by extremely sparse subnetworks (a.k.a. matching subnetworks) without sacrificing transferability. However, practical security-crucial applications usually pose more challenging requirements beyond standard transfer, which also demand these subnetworks to overcome adversarial vulnerability. In this paper, we formulate a more rigorous concept, Double-Win Lottery Tickets, in which a located subnetwork from a pre-trained model can be independently transferred on diverse downstream tasks, to reach BOTH the same standard and robust generalization, under BOTH standard and adversarial training regimes, as the full pre-trained model can do. We comprehensively examine various pre-training mechanisms and find that robust pre-training tends to craft sparser double-win lottery tickets with superior performance over the standard counterparts. For example, on downstream CIFAR-10/100 datasets, we identify double-win matching subnetworks with the standard, fast adversarial, and adversarial pre-training from ImageNet, at 89.26%/73.79%, 89.26%/79.03%, and 91.41%/83.22% sparsity, respectively. Furthermore, we observe the obtained double-win lottery tickets can be more data-efficient to transfer, under practical data-limited (e.g., 1% and 10%) downstream schemes. Our results show that the benefits from robust pre-training are amplified by the lottery ticket scheme, as well as the data-limited transfer setting. Codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/Double-Win-LTH.

mmFormer: Multimodal Medical Transformer for Incomplete Multimodal Learning of Brain Tumor Segmentation

Accurate brain tumor segmentation from Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is desirable to joint learning of multimodal images. However, in clinical practice, it is not always possible to acquire a complete set of MRIs, and the problem of missing modalities causes severe performance degradation in existing multimodal segmentation methods. In this work, we present the first attempt to exploit the Transformer for multimodal brain tumor segmentation that is robust to any combinatorial subset of available modalities. Concretely, we propose a novel multimodal Medical Transformer (mmFormer) for incomplete multimodal learning with three main components: the hybrid modality-specific encoders that bridge a convolutional encoder and an intra-modal Transformer for both local and global context modeling within each modality; an inter-modal Transformer to build and align the long-range correlations across modalities for modality-invariant features with global semantics corresponding to tumor region; a decoder that performs a progressive up-sampling and fusion with the modality-invariant features to generate robust segmentation. Besides, auxiliary regularizers are introduced in both encoder and decoder to further enhance the model's robustness to incomplete modalities. We conduct extensive experiments on the public BraTS $2018$ dataset for brain tumor segmentation. The results demonstrate that the proposed mmFormer outperforms the state-of-the-art methods for incomplete multimodal brain tumor segmentation on almost all subsets of incomplete modalities, especially by an average 19.07% improvement of Dice on tumor segmentation with only one available modality. The code is available at https://github.com/YaoZhang93/mmFormer.