Developing robust and interpretable vision systems is a crucial step towards trustworthy artificial intelligence. In this regard, a promising paradigm considers embedding task-required invariant structures, e.g., geometric invariance, in the fundamental image representation. However, such invariant representations typically exhibit limited discriminability, limiting their applications in larger-scale trustworthy vision tasks. For this open problem, we conduct a systematic investigation of hierarchical invariance, exploring this topic from theoretical, practical, and application perspectives. At the theoretical level, we show how to construct over-complete invariants with a Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)-like hierarchical architecture yet in a fully interpretable manner. The general blueprint, specific definitions, invariant properties, and numerical implementations are provided. At the practical level, we discuss how to customize this theoretical framework into a given task. With the over-completeness, discriminative features w.r.t. the task can be adaptively formed in a Neural Architecture Search (NAS)-like manner. We demonstrate the above arguments with accuracy, invariance, and efficiency results on texture, digit, and parasite classification experiments. Furthermore, at the application level, our representations are explored in real-world forensics tasks on adversarial perturbations and Artificial Intelligence Generated Content (AIGC). Such applications reveal that the proposed strategy not only realizes the theoretically promised invariance, but also exhibits competitive discriminability even in the era of deep learning. For robust and interpretable vision tasks at larger scales, hierarchical invariant representation can be considered as an effective alternative to traditional CNN and invariants.
Autoregressive Visual Language Models (VLMs) showcase impressive few-shot learning capabilities in a multimodal context. Recently, multimodal instruction tuning has been proposed to further enhance instruction-following abilities. However, we uncover the potential threat posed by backdoor attacks on autoregressive VLMs during instruction tuning. Adversaries can implant a backdoor by injecting poisoned samples with triggers embedded in instructions or images, enabling malicious manipulation of the victim model's predictions with predefined triggers. Nevertheless, the frozen visual encoder in autoregressive VLMs imposes constraints on the learning of conventional image triggers. Additionally, adversaries may encounter restrictions in accessing the parameters and architectures of the victim model. To address these challenges, we propose a multimodal instruction backdoor attack, namely VL-Trojan. Our approach facilitates image trigger learning through an isolating and clustering strategy and enhance black-box-attack efficacy via an iterative character-level text trigger generation method. Our attack successfully induces target outputs during inference, significantly surpassing baselines (+62.52\%) in ASR. Moreover, it demonstrates robustness across various model scales and few-shot in-context reasoning scenarios.
The proliferation of face forgery techniques has raised significant concerns within society, thereby motivating the development of face forgery detection methods. These methods aim to distinguish forged faces from genuine ones and have proven effective in practical applications. However, this paper introduces a novel and previously unrecognized threat in face forgery detection scenarios caused by backdoor attack. By embedding backdoors into models and incorporating specific trigger patterns into the input, attackers can deceive detectors into producing erroneous predictions for forged faces. To achieve this goal, this paper proposes \emph{Poisoned Forgery Face} framework, which enables clean-label backdoor attacks on face forgery detectors. Our approach involves constructing a scalable trigger generator and utilizing a novel convolving process to generate translation-sensitive trigger patterns. Moreover, we employ a relative embedding method based on landmark-based regions to enhance the stealthiness of the poisoned samples. Consequently, detectors trained on our poisoned samples are embedded with backdoors. Notably, our approach surpasses SoTA backdoor baselines with a significant improvement in attack success rate (+16.39\% BD-AUC) and reduction in visibility (-12.65\% $L_\infty$). Furthermore, our attack exhibits promising performance against backdoor defenses. We anticipate that this paper will draw greater attention to the potential threats posed by backdoor attacks in face forgery detection scenarios. Our codes will be made available at \url{https://github.com/JWLiang007/PFF}
Image attribution algorithms aim to identify important regions that are highly relevant to model decisions. Although existing attribution solutions can effectively assign importance to target elements, they still face the following challenges: 1) existing attribution methods generate inaccurate small regions thus misleading the direction of correct attribution, and 2) the model cannot produce good attribution results for samples with wrong predictions. To address the above challenges, this paper re-models the above image attribution problem as a submodular subset selection problem, aiming to enhance model interpretability using fewer regions. To address the lack of attention to local regions, we construct a novel submodular function to discover more accurate fine-grained interpretation regions. To enhance the attribution effect for all samples, we also impose four different constraints on the selection of sub-regions, i.e., confidence, effectiveness, consistency, and collaboration scores, to assess the importance of various subsets. Moreover, our theoretical analysis substantiates that the proposed function is in fact submodular. Extensive experiments show that the proposed method outperforms SOTA methods on two face datasets (Celeb-A and VGG-Face2) and one fine-grained dataset (CUB-200-2011). For correctly predicted samples, the proposed method improves the Deletion and Insertion scores with an average of 4.9% and 2.5% gain relative to HSIC-Attribution. For incorrectly predicted samples, our method achieves gains of 81.0% and 18.4% compared to the HSIC-Attribution algorithm in the average highest confidence and Insertion score respectively. The code is released at https://github.com/RuoyuChen10/SMDL-Attribution.
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving capabilities in various vision fields (e.g., generic object recognition and grounding) based on strong visual semantic representation and language reasoning ability. However, whether MLLMs are sensitive to subtle visual spoof/forged clues and how they perform in the domain of face attack detection (e.g., face spoofing and forgery detection) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark, namely SHIELD, to evaluate the ability of MLLMs on face spoofing and forgery detection. Specifically, we design true/false and multiple-choice questions to evaluate multimodal face data in these two face security tasks. For the face anti-spoofing task, we evaluate three different modalities (i.e., RGB, infrared, depth) under four types of presentation attacks (i.e., print attack, replay attack, rigid mask, paper mask). For the face forgery detection task, we evaluate GAN-based and diffusion-based data with both visual and acoustic modalities. Each question is subjected to both zero-shot and few-shot tests under standard and chain of thought (COT) settings. The results indicate that MLLMs hold substantial potential in the face security domain, offering advantages over traditional specific models in terms of interpretability, multimodal flexible reasoning, and joint face spoof and forgery detection. Additionally, we develop a novel Multi-Attribute Chain of Thought (MA-COT) paradigm for describing and judging various task-specific and task-irrelevant attributes of face images, which provides rich task-related knowledge for subtle spoof/forged clue mining. Extensive experiments in separate face anti-spoofing, separate face forgery detection, and joint detection tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed MA-COT. The project is available at https$:$//github.com/laiyingxin2/SHIELD
Single-domain generalized object detection aims to enhance a model's generalizability to multiple unseen target domains using only data from a single source domain during training. This is a practical yet challenging task as it requires the model to address domain shift without incorporating target domain data into training. In this paper, we propose a novel phrase grounding-based style transfer (PGST) approach for the task. Specifically, we first define textual prompts to describe potential objects for each unseen target domain. Then, we leverage the grounded language-image pre-training (GLIP) model to learn the style of these target domains and achieve style transfer from the source to the target domain. The style-transferred source visual features are semantically rich and could be close to imaginary counterparts in the target domain. Finally, we employ these style-transferred visual features to fine-tune GLIP. By introducing imaginary counterparts, the detector could be effectively generalized to unseen target domains using only a single source domain for training. Extensive experimental results on five diverse weather driving benchmarks demonstrate our proposed approach achieves state-of-the-art performance, even surpassing some domain adaptive methods that incorporate target domain images into the training process.The source codes and pre-trained models will be made available.
Diffusion models have been widely deployed in various image generation tasks, demonstrating an extraordinary connection between image and text modalities. However, they face challenges of being maliciously exploited to generate harmful or sensitive images by appending a specific suffix to the original prompt. Existing works mainly focus on using single-modal information to conduct attacks, which fails to utilize multi-modal features and results in less than satisfactory performance. Integrating multi-modal priors (MMP), i.e. both text and image features, we propose a targeted attack method named MMP-Attack in this work. Specifically, the goal of MMP-Attack is to add a target object into the image content while simultaneously removing the original object. The MMP-Attack shows a notable advantage over existing works with superior universality and transferability, which can effectively attack commercial text-to-image (T2I) models such as DALL-E 3. To the best of our knowledge, this marks the first successful attempt of transfer-based attack to commercial T2I models. Our code is publicly available at \url{https://github.com/ydc123/MMP-Attack}.
The field of few-shot learning (FSL) has shown promising results in scenarios where training data is limited, but its vulnerability to backdoor attacks remains largely unexplored. We first explore this topic by first evaluating the performance of the existing backdoor attack methods on few-shot learning scenarios. Unlike in standard supervised learning, existing backdoor attack methods failed to perform an effective attack in FSL due to two main issues. Firstly, the model tends to overfit to either benign features or trigger features, causing a tough trade-off between attack success rate and benign accuracy. Secondly, due to the small number of training samples, the dirty label or visible trigger in the support set can be easily detected by victims, which reduces the stealthiness of attacks. It seemed that FSL could survive from backdoor attacks. However, in this paper, we propose the Few-shot Learning Backdoor Attack (FLBA) to show that FSL can still be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Specifically, we first generate a trigger to maximize the gap between poisoned and benign features. It enables the model to learn both benign and trigger features, which solves the problem of overfitting. To make it more stealthy, we hide the trigger by optimizing two types of imperceptible perturbation, namely attractive and repulsive perturbation, instead of attaching the trigger directly. Once we obtain the perturbations, we can poison all samples in the benign support set into a hidden poisoned support set and fine-tune the model on it. Our method demonstrates a high Attack Success Rate (ASR) in FSL tasks with different few-shot learning paradigms while preserving clean accuracy and maintaining stealthiness. This study reveals that few-shot learning still suffers from backdoor attacks, and its security should be given attention.
Pre-trained vision models (PVMs) have become a dominant component due to their exceptional performance when fine-tuned for downstream tasks. However, the presence of backdoors within PVMs poses significant threats. Unfortunately, existing studies primarily focus on backdooring PVMs for the classification task, neglecting potential inherited backdoors in downstream tasks such as detection and segmentation. In this paper, we propose the Pre-trained Trojan attack, which embeds backdoors into a PVM, enabling attacks across various downstream vision tasks. We highlight the challenges posed by cross-task activation and shortcut connections in successful backdoor attacks. To achieve effective trigger activation in diverse tasks, we stylize the backdoor trigger patterns with class-specific textures, enhancing the recognition of task-irrelevant low-level features associated with the target class in the trigger pattern. Moreover, we address the issue of shortcut connections by introducing a context-free learning pipeline for poison training. In this approach, triggers without contextual backgrounds are directly utilized as training data, diverging from the conventional use of clean images. Consequently, we establish a direct shortcut from the trigger to the target class, mitigating the shortcut connection issue. We conducted extensive experiments to thoroughly validate the effectiveness of our attacks on downstream detection and segmentation tasks. Additionally, we showcase the potential of our approach in more practical scenarios, including large vision models and 3D object detection in autonomous driving. This paper aims to raise awareness of the potential threats associated with applying PVMs in practical scenarios. Our codes will be available upon paper publication.
Current Visual-Language Pre-training (VLP) models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. These adversarial examples present substantial security risks to VLP models, as they can leverage inherent weaknesses in the models, resulting in incorrect predictions. In contrast to white-box adversarial attacks, transfer attacks (where the adversary crafts adversarial examples on a white-box model to fool another black-box model) are more reflective of real-world scenarios, thus making them more meaningful for research. By summarizing and analyzing existing research, we identified two factors that can influence the efficacy of transfer attacks on VLP models: inter-modal interaction and data diversity. Based on these insights, we propose a self-augment-based transfer attack method, termed SA-Attack. Specifically, during the generation of adversarial images and adversarial texts, we apply different data augmentation methods to the image modality and text modality, respectively, with the aim of improving the adversarial transferability of the generated adversarial images and texts. Experiments conducted on the FLickr30K and COCO datasets have validated the effectiveness of our method. Our code will be available after this paper is accepted.