With the development of deep learning processors and accelerators, deep learning models have been widely deployed on edge devices as part of the Internet of Things. Edge device models are generally considered as valuable intellectual properties that are worth for careful protection. Unfortunately, these models have a great risk of being stolen or illegally copied. The existing model protections using encryption algorithms are suffered from high computation overhead which is not practical due to the limited computing capacity on edge devices. In this work, we propose a light-weight, practical, and general Edge device model Pro tection method at neuron level, denoted as EdgePro. Specifically, we select several neurons as authorization neurons and set their activation values to locking values and scale the neuron outputs as the "asswords" during training. EdgePro protects the model by ensuring it can only work correctly when the "passwords" are met, at the cost of encrypting and storing the information of the "passwords" instead of the whole model. Extensive experimental results indicate that EdgePro can work well on the task of protecting on datasets with different modes. The inference time increase of EdgePro is only 60% of state-of-the-art methods, and the accuracy loss is less than 1%. Additionally, EdgePro is robust against adaptive attacks including fine-tuning and pruning, which makes it more practical in real-world applications. EdgePro is also open sourced to facilitate future research: https://github.com/Leon022/Edg
Recently, face swapping has been developing rapidly and achieved a surprising reality, raising concerns about fake content. As a countermeasure, various detection approaches have been proposed and achieved promising performance. However, most existing detectors struggle to maintain performance on unseen face swapping methods and low-quality images. Apart from the generalization problem, current detection approaches have been shown vulnerable to evasion attacks crafted by detection-aware manipulators. Lack of robustness under adversary scenarios leaves threats for applying face swapping detection in real world. In this paper, we propose a novel face swapping detection approach based on face identification probability distributions, coined as IdP_FSD, to improve the generalization and robustness. IdP_FSD is specially designed for detecting swapped faces whose identities belong to a finite set, which is meaningful in real-world applications. Compared with previous general detection methods, we make use of the available real faces with concerned identities and require no fake samples for training. IdP_FSD exploits face swapping's common nature that the identity of swapped face combines that of two faces involved in swapping. We reflect this nature with the confusion of a face identification model and measure the confusion with the maximum value of the output probability distribution. What's more, to defend our detector under adversary scenarios, an attention-based finetuning scheme is proposed for the face identification models used in IdP_FSD. Extensive experiments show that the proposed IdP_FSD not only achieves high detection performance on different benchmark datasets and image qualities but also raises the bar for manipulators to evade the detection.
Trojan attack on deep neural networks, also known as backdoor attack, is a typical threat to artificial intelligence. A trojaned neural network behaves normally with clean inputs. However, if the input contains a particular trigger, the trojaned model will have attacker-chosen abnormal behavior. Although many backdoor detection methods exist, most of them assume that the defender has access to a set of clean validation samples or samples with the trigger, which may not hold in some crucial real-world cases, e.g., the case where the defender is the maintainer of model-sharing platforms. Thus, in this paper, we propose FreeEagle, the first data-free backdoor detection method that can effectively detect complex backdoor attacks on deep neural networks, without relying on the access to any clean samples or samples with the trigger. The evaluation results on diverse datasets and model architectures show that FreeEagle is effective against various complex backdoor attacks, even outperforming some state-of-the-art non-data-free backdoor detection methods.
Currently, natural language processing (NLP) models are wildly used in various scenarios. However, NLP models, like all deep models, are vulnerable to adversarially generated text. Numerous works have been working on mitigating the vulnerability from adversarial attacks. Nevertheless, there is no comprehensive defense in existing works where each work targets a specific attack category or suffers from the limitation of computation overhead, irresistible to adaptive attack, etc. In this paper, we exhaustively investigate the adversarial attack algorithms in NLP, and our empirical studies have discovered that the attack algorithms mainly disrupt the importance distribution of words in a text. A well-trained model can distinguish subtle importance distribution differences between clean and adversarial texts. Based on this intuition, we propose TextDefense, a new adversarial example detection framework that utilizes the target model's capability to defend against adversarial attacks while requiring no prior knowledge. TextDefense differs from previous approaches, where it utilizes the target model for detection and thus is attack type agnostic. Our extensive experiments show that TextDefense can be applied to different architectures, datasets, and attack methods and outperforms existing methods. We also discover that the leading factor influencing the performance of TextDefense is the target model's generalizability. By analyzing the property of the target model and the property of the adversarial example, we provide our insights into the adversarial attacks in NLP and the principles of our defense method.
Vertical federated learning is a trending solution for multi-party collaboration in training machine learning models. Industrial frameworks adopt secure multi-party computation methods such as homomorphic encryption to guarantee data security and privacy. However, a line of work has revealed that there are still leakage risks in VFL. The leakage is caused by the correlation between the intermediate representations and the raw data. Due to the powerful approximation ability of deep neural networks, an adversary can capture the correlation precisely and reconstruct the data. To deal with the threat of the data reconstruction attack, we propose a hashing-based VFL framework, called \textit{HashVFL}, to cut off the reversibility directly. The one-way nature of hashing allows our framework to block all attempts to recover data from hash codes. However, integrating hashing also brings some challenges, e.g., the loss of information. This paper proposes and addresses three challenges to integrating hashing: learnability, bit balance, and consistency. Experimental results demonstrate \textit{HashVFL}'s efficiency in keeping the main task's performance and defending against data reconstruction attacks. Furthermore, we also analyze its potential value in detecting abnormal inputs. In addition, we conduct extensive experiments to prove \textit{HashVFL}'s generalization in various settings. In summary, \textit{HashVFL} provides a new perspective on protecting multi-party's data security and privacy in VFL. We hope our study can attract more researchers to expand the application domains of \textit{HashVFL}.
Vertical federated learning (VFL) is an emerging paradigm that enables collaborators to build machine learning models together in a distributed fashion. In general, these parties have a group of users in common but own different features. Existing VFL frameworks use cryptographic techniques to provide data privacy and security guarantees, leading to a line of works studying computing efficiency and fast implementation. However, the security of VFL's model remains underexplored.
As an emerging machine learning paradigm, self-supervised learning (SSL) is able to learn high-quality representations for complex data without data labels. Prior work shows that, besides obviating the reliance on labeling, SSL also benefits adversarial robustness by making it more challenging for the adversary to manipulate model prediction. However, whether this robustness benefit generalizes to other types of attacks remains an open question. We explore this question in the context of trojan attacks by showing that SSL is comparably vulnerable as supervised learning to trojan attacks. Specifically, we design and evaluate CTRL, an extremely simple self-supervised trojan attack. By polluting a tiny fraction of training data (less than 1%) with indistinguishable poisoning samples, CTRL causes any trigger-embedded input to be misclassified to the adversary's desired class with a high probability (over 99%) at inference. More importantly, through the lens of CTRL, we study the mechanisms underlying self-supervised trojan attacks. With both empirical and analytical evidence, we reveal that the representation invariance property of SSL, which benefits adversarial robustness, may also be the very reason making SSL highly vulnerable to trojan attacks. We further discuss the fundamental challenges to defending against self-supervised trojan attacks, pointing to promising directions for future research.
Recently, knowledge representation learning (KRL) is emerging as the state-of-the-art approach to process queries over knowledge graphs (KGs), wherein KG entities and the query are embedded into a latent space such that entities that answer the query are embedded close to the query. Yet, despite the intensive research on KRL, most existing studies either focus on homogenous KGs or assume KG completion tasks (i.e., inference of missing facts), while answering complex logical queries over KGs with multiple aspects (multi-view KGs) remains an open challenge. To bridge this gap, in this paper, we present ROMA, a novel KRL framework for answering logical queries over multi-view KGs. Compared with the prior work, ROMA departs in major aspects. (i) It models a multi-view KG as a set of overlaying sub-KGs, each corresponding to one view, which subsumes many types of KGs studied in the literature (e.g., temporal KGs). (ii) It supports complex logical queries with varying relation and view constraints (e.g., with complex topology and/or from multiple views); (iii) It scales up to KGs of large sizes (e.g., millions of facts) and fine-granular views (e.g., dozens of views); (iv) It generalizes to query structures and KG views that are unobserved during training. Extensive empirical evaluation on real-world KGs shows that \system significantly outperforms alternative methods.
Understanding the decision process of neural networks is hard. One vital method for explanation is to attribute its decision to pivotal features. Although many algorithms are proposed, most of them solely improve the faithfulness to the model. However, the real environment contains many random noises, which may leads to great fluctuations in the explanations. More seriously, recent works show that explanation algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. All of these make the explanation hard to trust in real scenarios. To bridge this gap, we propose a model-agnostic method \emph{Median Test for Feature Attribution} (MeTFA) to quantify the uncertainty and increase the stability of explanation algorithms with theoretical guarantees. MeTFA has the following two functions: (1) examine whether one feature is significantly important or unimportant and generate a MeTFA-significant map to visualize the results; (2) compute the confidence interval of a feature attribution score and generate a MeTFA-smoothed map to increase the stability of the explanation. Experiments show that MeTFA improves the visual quality of explanations and significantly reduces the instability while maintaining the faithfulness. To quantitatively evaluate the faithfulness of an explanation under different noise settings, we further propose several robust faithfulness metrics. Experiment results show that the MeTFA-smoothed explanation can significantly increase the robust faithfulness. In addition, we use two scenarios to show MeTFA's potential in the applications. First, when applied to the SOTA explanation method to locate context bias for semantic segmentation models, MeTFA-significant explanations use far smaller regions to maintain 99\%+ faithfulness. Second, when tested with different explanation-oriented attacks, MeTFA can help defend vanilla, as well as adaptive, adversarial attacks against explanations.
Federated learning (FL) is a collaborative learning paradigm where participants jointly train a powerful model without sharing their private data. One desirable property for FL is the implementation of the right to be forgotten (RTBF), i.e., a leaving participant has the right to request to delete its private data from the global model. However, unlearning itself may not be enough to implement RTBF unless the unlearning effect can be independently verified, an important aspect that has been overlooked in the current literature. In this paper, we prompt the concept of verifiable federated unlearning, and propose VeriFi, a unified framework integrating federated unlearning and verification that allows systematic analysis of the unlearning and quantification of its effect, with different combinations of multiple unlearning and verification methods. In VeriFi, the leaving participant is granted the right to verify (RTV), that is, the participant notifies the server before leaving, then actively verifies the unlearning effect in the next few communication rounds. The unlearning is done at the server side immediately after receiving the leaving notification, while the verification is done locally by the leaving participant via two steps: marking (injecting carefully-designed markers to fingerprint the leaver) and checking (examining the change of the global model's performance on the markers). Based on VeriFi, we conduct the first systematic and large-scale study for verifiable federated unlearning, considering 7 unlearning methods and 5 verification methods. Particularly, we propose a more efficient and FL-friendly unlearning method, and two more effective and robust non-invasive-verification methods. We extensively evaluate VeriFi on 7 datasets and 4 types of deep learning models. Our analysis establishes important empirical understandings for more trustworthy federated unlearning.