Abstract:Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences. This makes them vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks, in which seemingly benign content embeds adversarial instructions that manipulate agent behaviour. Existing security benchmarks adopt an \textit{attack-centric} perspective, focusing on the technical feasibility of injections while overlooking the nuanced distribution of resulting harms. In practice, however, prompt-injection risk is victim-dependent: a single exploit can produce asymmetric consequences for different stakeholders, and the same attack pattern may exhibit substantially different effectiveness depending on whom it targets. To capture these properties, we introduce \textbf{\sysname}, a \textit{stakeholder-centric} benchmark to systematically categorize and attribute harm in real-world web agent systems. It distinguishes between affected entities (e.g., user, seller, platform), decomposes the attacks into concrete objectives, and evaluates each case with complementary outcome- and process-level metrics. Our results reveal substantial and heterogeneous vulnerabilities: not a single attack objective is reliably resisted by current agents, and failures distribute across qualitatively distinct modes ranging from \emph{stealthy parasitism} (attack succeeds without disrupting the user's delegated task) to \emph{misaligned disruption} (task disrupted without attack success) and \emph{compounded failure} (both adversarial objective and task integrity simultaneously violated). These patterns are missed by conventional evaluation, highlighting the need for stakeholder-aware assessment of LLM-based agents in real-world deployments. Benchmark is available at https://github.com/StakeBench/SBC.
Abstract:Interactive LLM agents are becoming part of daily work, but they do not reliably become easier to work with over time: a correction remembered in one session may still be violated in the next. We study this gap between preference access and preference compliance. In tasks derived from anonymized real-user friction cases, Mem0 memory still leaves 57.5% of applicable preference checks violated. We introduce Test-time Rule Acquisition and Compiled Enforcement (TRACE), a drop-in skill-layer pipeline for coding-agent runtimes that mines user corrections, rewrites them as atomic rules, and compiles them into runtime checks that must pass before an agent completes future tasks. Unlike runtime checks written ahead of time by developers, TRACE skills come from the user's own chat corrections. We evaluate TRACE with simulated user-in-the-loop experiments on ClawArena coding-agent tasks and MemoryArena-derived memory-intensive tasks. On ClawArena, TRACE reduces held-out preference violation from 100.0% to 37.6% on in-distribution tasks and from 100.0% to 2.0% on out-of-distribution tasks. On MemoryArena-derived tasks, TRACE reduces in-distribution violation from 100.0% to 60.5% while matching or exceeding the strongest memory baseline on task pass. These results suggest that compiling corrections into runtime enforcement can address a repeated-friction failure mode that memory alone does not reliably solve, reducing the need for users to restate the same correction across future sessions. Experiment code is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/TRACE_exp, and the deployable skill is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/tellonce.
Abstract:Compact language models (LMs) reduce cost, latency, and deployment risk for tool agents. Yet MCP-style tool use requires more than isolated function calling: an agent must discover tools from live catalogs, satisfy schemas, preserve dependencies across intermediate outputs, and ground final responses in executed evidence. Small planners often generate plausible workflow graphs that fail under tool resolution, parameter validation, dependency tracking, or execution. We argue that this failure mode is poorly handled by small-corpus distillation. A few hundred teacher traces can teach workflow format, but rarely cover the recovery behavior needed to repair failed plans over changing tool catalogs. We introduce Evoflux, an inference-time evolutionary search method that treats compact tool use as the repair of executable tool workflows. It evolves typed workflow graphs through structured edits, execution feedback, adaptive intensity, meta-guided redesign, and diversity pruning. On held-out MCP-Bench tasks spanning live MCP servers and 250 tools, Evoflux raises execution feasibility from roughly 3% to 17-24% across small planners. In contrast, SFT and SFT+DPO on the same search-mined data match, underperform, or collapse below zero-shot performance; ReAct reaches higher peaks, but with higher variance and token cost. These results show that execution-grounded search is more reliable under scarce teacher-trace budgets.
Abstract:Masked diffusion language models (MDLMs) are emerging as a compelling new paradigm for text generation, but their training-time security remains largely unexplored. Existing backdoor attacks on Gaussian diffusion models or autoregressive language models do not directly apply to MDLMs because MDLMs rely on discrete state corruption and iterative denoising rather than continuous noising or left-to-right prediction. In this work, we present the first systematic study of training-time backdoor attacks on MDLMs. We propose SHADOWMASK, a backdoor attack that modifies the MDLM forward corruption process by replacing the standard all-mask terminal distribution with a trigger-mask mixture prior. This creates a dedicated denoising pathway from trigger-corrupted states to attacker-specified targets while preserving clean denoising behavior. We further provide a principled mathematical formulation by defining the backdoored forward process, deriving the reverse-time posterior, and obtaining the continuous-time training objective. Evaluations on DiT-based MDLM and LLaDA-8B-Instruct across WikiText-103, OpenWebText, and Alpaca show that SHADOWMASK achieves near-100% attack success, substantially outperforms standard data poisoning, largely preserves clean utility, remains effective under full-model and parameter-efficient fine-tuning, and is robust against representative defenses.
Abstract:Existing text-to-image (T2I) evaluation metrics mainly assess whether generated images align with information explicitly stated in the prompt, but often fail to capture factual requirements that are implicit, externally grounded, or identity-defining. As a result, they are not well suited for evaluating factual correctness in prompts involving scientific knowledge, historical facts, products, or culture-specific concepts. We propose FActually Grounded Evaluation and Refinement (FAGER), an agentic framework that evaluates whether generated images correctly reflect visually verifiable facts grounded in or implied by the prompt, while also providing actionable feedback for improvement. FAGER first constructs a structured factual rubric by combining LLM-based fact proposal with reference-guided visual fact extraction and verification, then converts the rubric into question-answer pairs for VLM-based evaluation. To validate FAGER as a factuality metric, we introduce a Factual A/B test, which measures whether a metric prefers factual reference images over corresponding generated images. Across five datasets spanning science, history, products, culture, and knowledge-intensive concepts, FAGER consistently outperforms prior metrics on this test. We further show that FAGER can be used to refine T2I outputs in a fully training-free manner, yielding substantial factuality gains across datasets.
Abstract:Hidden malicious intent in multi-turn dialogue poses a growing threat to deployed large language models (LLMs). Rather than exposing a harmful objective in a single prompt, increasingly capable attackers can distribute their intent across multiple benign-looking turns. Recent studies show that even modern commercial models with advanced guardrails remain vulnerable to such attacks despite advances in safety alignment and external guardrails. In this work, we address this challenge by detecting the earliest turn at which delivering the candidate response would make the accumulated interaction sufficient to enable harmful action. This objective requires precise turn-level intervention that identifies the harm-enabling closure point while avoiding premature refusal of benign exploratory conversations. To further support training and evaluation, we construct the Multi-Turn Intent Dataset (MTID), which contains branching attack rollouts, matched benign hard negatives, and annotations of the earliest harm-enabling turns. We show that MTID helps enable a turn-level monitor TurnGate, which substantially outperforms existing baselines in harmful-intent detection while maintaining low over-refusal rates. TurnGate further generalizes across domains, attacker pipelines, and target models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/TurnGate.
Abstract:The rapid advancement in generative AI models has enabled the creation of photorealistic images. At the same time, there are growing concerns about the potential misuse and dangers of generated content, as well as a pressing need for effective AI-generated image detectors. However, current training-based detection techniques are typically computationally costly and can hardly be generalized to unseen data domains, while training-free methods fall short in detection performance. To bridge this gap, we propose a search-based method employing data embedding sensitivity in intermediate layers to detect AI-generated images. Given a set of real and AI-generated images, our method examines the similarity between original image embeddings and perturbed image embeddings, and detects AI-generated images based on the similarity. We examine the proposed method on two comprehensive benchmarks: GenImage and Forensics Small. Our method exhibits improved performance across different datasets compared to both training-free and training-based state-of-the-art methods. On average, our method achieves the largest performance gain on the Forensics Small benchmark by 39.61% compared to the best training-free method and 5.14% compared to the best training-based method in AUROC score.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) have shown great performance on complex reasoning tasks but often require generating long intermediate thoughts before reaching a final answer. During generation, LLMs rely on a key-value (KV) cache for autoregressive decoding. However, the memory footprint of the KV cache grows with output length. Prior work on KV cache optimization mostly focus on compressing the long input context, while retaining the full KV cache for decoding. For tasks requiring long output generation, this leads to increased computational and memory costs. In this paper, we introduce ZoomR, a novel approach that enables LLMs to adaptively compress verbose reasoning thoughts into summaries and uses a dynamic KV cache selection policy that leverages these summaries while also strategically "zooming in" on fine-grained details. By using summary keys as a coarse-grained index during decoding, ZoomR uses the query to retrieve details for only the most important thoughts. This hierarchical strategy significantly reduces memory usage by avoiding full-cache attention at each step. Experiments across math and reasoning tasks show that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to baselines, while reducing inference memory requirements by more than $4\times$. These results demonstrate that a multi-granularity KV selection enables more memory efficient decoding, especially for long output generation.
Abstract:Hard-gated safety checkers often over-refuse and misalign with a vendor's model spec; prevailing taxonomies also neglect robustness and honesty, yielding safer-on-paper yet less useful systems. This work introduces Guardian-as-an-Advisor (GaaA), a soft-gating pipeline where a guardian predicts a binary risk label plus a concise explanation and prepends this advice to the original query for re-inference, keeping the base model operating under its original spec. To support training and evaluation, GuardSet is constructed, a 208k+ multi-domain dataset unifying harmful and harmless cases with targeted robustness and honesty slices. GuardAdvisor is trained via SFT followed by RL to enforce label-explanation consistency. GuardAdvisor attains competitive detection accuracy while enabling the advisory workflow; when used to augment inputs, responses improve over unaugmented prompts. A latency study shows advisor inference uses below 5% of base-model compute and adds only 2-10% end-to-end overhead under realistic harmful-input rates. Overall, GaaA steers models to comply with the model spec, maintaining safety while reducing over-refusal.
Abstract:Visual prompting (VP) has emerged as a popular method to repurpose pretrained vision models for adaptation to downstream tasks. Unlike conventional model fine-tuning techniques, VP introduces a universal perturbation directly into the input data to facilitate task-specific fine-tuning rather than modifying model parameters. However, there exists a noticeable performance gap between VP and conventional fine-tuning methods, highlighting an unexplored realm in theory and practice to understand and advance the input-level VP to reduce its current performance gap. Towards this end, we introduce a generalized concept, termed activation prompt (AP), which extends the scope of the input-level VP by enabling universal perturbations to be applied to activation maps within the intermediate layers of the model. By using AP to revisit the problem of VP and employing it as an analytical tool, we demonstrate the intrinsic limitations of VP in both performance and efficiency, revealing why input-level prompting may lack effectiveness compared to AP, which exhibits a model-dependent layer preference. We show that AP is closely related to normalization tuning in convolutional neural networks and vision transformers, although each model type has distinct layer preferences for prompting. We also theoretically elucidate the rationale behind such a preference by analyzing global features across layers. Through extensive experiments across 29 datasets and various model architectures, we provide a comprehensive performance analysis of AP, comparing it with VP and parameter-efficient fine-tuning baselines. Our results demonstrate AP's superiority in both accuracy and efficiency, considering factors such as time, parameters, memory usage, and throughput.