Efficient Ensemble Selection from Binary and Pairwise Feedback

Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human evaluation. We study this selection problem as a distributional variant of multiwinner voting: tasks are drawn from an unknown domain distribution, each task induces feedback over candidate experts, and a committee's value on a task is determined by its best-performing member. We analyze both binary feedback, for tasks with correct/incorrect outcomes, and pairwise feedback, for tasks where candidate outputs are compared by preference. In the binary setting, the induced objective is coverage. We give exhaustive-elicitation baselines and matching worst-case query lower bounds, and we design a failure-conditioned greedy algorithm that preserves the standard $(1-1/e)$ guarantee while obtaining instance-dependent query savings. In the pairwise setting, we study $θ$-winning committees. We show that full-information optimization admits a PTAS but no EPTAS under Gap-ETH, and that the objective is monotone but not submodular. This motivates a weighted ordinal coverage relaxation, which is submodular and supports a failure-conditioned greedy oracle under pairwise feedback. We then convert this oracle back into $θ$-type guarantees through finite-family auditing or a minimax wrapper. We also provide small-scale LLM experiments illustrating the predicted query savings and the role of complementarity in committee selection.

Decisions and Deployment: The Five-Year SAHELI Project (2020-2025) on Restless Multi-Armed Bandits for Improving Maternal and Child Health

Maternal and child health is a critical concern around the world. In many global health programs disseminating preventive care and health information, limited healthcare worker resources prevent continuous, personalised engagement with vulnerable beneficiaries. In such scenarios, it becomes crucial to optimally schedule limited live-service resources to maximise long-term engagement. To address this fundamental challenge, the multi-year SAHELI project (2020-2025), in collaboration with partner NGO ARMMAN, leverages AI to allocate scarce resources in a maternal and child health program in India. The SAHELI system solves this sequential resource allocation problem using a Restless Multi-Armed Bandit (RMAB) framework. A key methodological innovation is the transition from a traditional Two-Stage "predict-then-optimize" approach to Decision-Focused Learning (DFL), which directly aligns the framework's learning method with the ultimate goal of maximizing beneficiary engagement. Empirical evaluation through large-scale randomized controlled trials demonstrates that the DFL policy reduced cumulative engagement drops by 31% relative to the current standard of care, significantly outperforming the Two-Stage model. Crucially, the studies also confirmed that this increased program engagement translates directly into statistically significant improvements in real-world health behaviors, notably the continued consumption of vital iron and calcium supplements by new mothers. Ultimately, the SAHELI project provides a scalable blueprint for applying sequential decision-making AI to optimize resource allocation in health programs.

Many Preferences, Few Policies: Towards Scalable Language Model Personalization

The holy grail of LLM personalization is a single LLM for each user, perfectly aligned with that user's preferences. However, maintaining a separate LLM per user is impractical due to constraints on compute, memory, and system complexity. We address this challenge by developing a principled method for selecting a small portfolio of LLMs that captures representative behaviors across heterogeneous users. We model user preferences across multiple traits (e.g., safety, humor, brevity) through a multi-dimensional weight vector. Given reward functions across these dimensions, our algorithm PALM (Portfolio of Aligned LLMs) generates a small portfolio of LLMs such that, for any weight vector, the portfolio contains a near-optimal LLM for the corresponding scalarized objective. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that provides theoretical guarantees on both the size and approximation quality of LLM portfolios for personalization. It characterizes the trade-off between system cost and personalization, as well as the diversity of LLMs required to cover the landscape of user preferences. We provide empirical results that validate these guarantees and demonstrate greater output diversity over common baselines.

Incentive-Aware AI Safety via Strategic Resource Allocation: A Stackelberg Security Games Perspective

As AI systems grow more capable and autonomous, ensuring their safety and reliability requires not only model-level alignment but also strategic oversight of the humans and institutions involved in their development and deployment. Existing safety frameworks largely treat alignment as a static optimization problem (e.g., tuning models to desired behavior) while overlooking the dynamic, adversarial incentives that shape how data are collected, how models are evaluated, and how they are ultimately deployed. We propose a new perspective on AI safety grounded in Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs): a class of game-theoretic models designed for adversarial resource allocation under uncertainty. By viewing AI oversight as a strategic interaction between defenders (auditors, evaluators, and deployers) and attackers (malicious actors, misaligned contributors, or worst-case failure modes), SSGs provide a unifying framework for reasoning about incentive design, limited oversight capacity, and adversarial uncertainty across the AI lifecycle. We illustrate how this framework can inform (1) training-time auditing against data/feedback poisoning, (2) pre-deployment evaluation under constrained reviewer resources, and (3) robust multi-model deployment in adversarial environments. This synthesis bridges algorithmic alignment and institutional oversight design, highlighting how game-theoretic deterrence can make AI oversight proactive, risk-aware, and resilient to manipulation.

LLM Active Alignment: A Nash Equilibrium Perspective

We develop a game-theoretic framework for predicting and steering the behavior of populations of large language models (LLMs) through Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis. To avoid the intractability of equilibrium computation in open-ended text spaces, we model each agent's action as a mixture over human subpopulations. Agents choose actively and strategically which groups to align with, yielding an interpretable and behaviorally substantive policy class. We derive closed-form NE characterizations, adopting standard concave-utility assumptions to enable analytical system-level predictions and give explicit, actionable guidance for shifting alignment targets toward socially desirable outcomes. The method functions as an active alignment layer on top of existing alignment pipelines such as RLHF. In a social-media setting, we show that a population of LLMs, especially reasoning-based models, may exhibit political exclusion, pathologies where some subpopulations are ignored by all LLM agents, which can be avoided by our method, illustrating the promise of applying the method to regulate multi-agent LLM dynamics across domains.

Reward Shaping for Inference-Time Alignment: A Stackelberg Game Perspective

Existing alignment methods directly use the reward model learned from user preference data to optimize an LLM policy, subject to KL regularization with respect to the base policy. This practice is suboptimal for maximizing user's utility because the KL regularization may cause the LLM to inherit the bias in the base policy that conflicts with user preferences. While amplifying rewards for preferred outputs can mitigate this bias, it also increases the risk of reward hacking. This tradeoff motivates the problem of optimally designing reward models under KL regularization. We formalize this reward model optimization problem as a Stackelberg game, and show that a simple reward shaping scheme can effectively approximate the optimal reward model. We empirically evaluate our method in inference-time alignment settings and demonstrate that it integrates seamlessly into existing alignment methods with minimal overhead. Our method consistently improves average reward and achieves win-tie rates exceeding 66% against all baselines, averaged across evaluation settings.

Latent Spherical Flow Policy for Reinforcement Learning with Combinatorial Actions

Reinforcement learning (RL) with combinatorial action spaces remains challenging because feasible action sets are exponentially large and governed by complex feasibility constraints, making direct policy parameterization impractical. Existing approaches embed task-specific value functions into constrained optimization programs or learn deterministic structured policies, sacrificing generality and policy expressiveness. We propose a solver-induced \emph{latent spherical flow policy} that brings the expressiveness of modern generative policies to combinatorial RL while guaranteeing feasibility by design. Our method, LSFlow, learns a \emph{stochastic} policy in a compact continuous latent space via spherical flow matching, and delegates feasibility to a combinatorial optimization solver that maps each latent sample to a valid structured action. To improve efficiency, we train the value network directly in the latent space, avoiding repeated solver calls during policy optimization. To address the piecewise-constant and discontinuous value landscape induced by solver-based action selection, we introduce a smoothed Bellman operator that yields stable, well-defined learning targets. Empirically, our approach outperforms state-of-the-art baselines by an average of 20.6\% across a range of challenging combinatorial RL tasks.

Policy-Embedded Graph Expansion: Networked HIV Testing with Diffusion-Driven Network Samples

HIV is a retrovirus that attacks the human immune system and can lead to death without proper treatment. In collaboration with the WHO and Wits University, we study how to improve the efficiency of HIV testing with the goal of eventual deployment, directly supporting progress toward UN Sustainable Development Goal 3.3. While prior work has demonstrated the promise of intelligent algorithms for sequential, network-based HIV testing, existing approaches rely on assumptions that are impractical in our real-world implementations. Here, we study sequential testing on incrementally revealed disease networks and introduce Policy-Embedded Graph Expansion (PEGE), a novel framework that directly embeds a generative distribution over graph expansions into the decision-making policy rather than attempting explicit topological reconstruction. We further propose Dynamics-Driven Branching (DDB), a diffusion-based graph expansion model that supports decision making in PEGE and is designed for data-limited settings where forest structures arise naturally, as in our real-world referral process. Experiments on real HIV transmission networks show that the combined approach (PEGE + DDB) consistently outperforms existing baselines (e.g., 13% improvement in discounted reward and 9% more HIV detections with 25% of the population tested) and explore key tradeoffs that drive decision quality.

Health Facility Location in Ethiopia: Leveraging LLMs to Integrate Expert Knowledge into Algorithmic Planning

Ethiopia's Ministry of Health is upgrading health posts to improve access to essential services, particularly in rural areas. Limited resources, however, require careful prioritization of which facilities to upgrade to maximize population coverage while accounting for diverse expert and stakeholder preferences. In collaboration with the Ethiopian Public Health Institute and Ministry of Health, we propose a hybrid framework that systematically integrates expert knowledge with optimization techniques. Classical optimization methods provide theoretical guarantees but require explicit, quantitative objectives, whereas stakeholder criteria are often articulated in natural language and difficult to formalize. To bridge these domains, we develop the Large language model and Extended Greedy (LEG) framework. Our framework combines a provable approximation algorithm for population coverage optimization with LLM-driven iterative refinement that incorporates human-AI alignment to ensure solutions reflect expert qualitative guidance while preserving coverage guarantees. Experiments on real-world data from three Ethiopian regions demonstrate the framework's effectiveness and its potential to inform equitable, data-driven health system planning.

Beyond Majority Voting: LLM Aggregation by Leveraging Higher-Order Information

With the rapid progress of multi-agent large language model (LLM) reasoning, how to effectively aggregate answers from multiple LLMs has emerged as a fundamental challenge. Standard majority voting treats all answers equally, failing to consider latent heterogeneity and correlation across models. In this work, we design two new aggregation algorithms called Optimal Weight (OW) and Inverse Surprising Popularity (ISP), leveraging both first-order and second-order information. Our theoretical analysis shows these methods provably mitigate inherent limitations of majority voting under mild assumptions, leading to more reliable collective decisions. We empirically validate our algorithms on synthetic datasets, popular LLM fine-tuning benchmarks such as UltraFeedback and MMLU, and a real-world healthcare setting ARMMAN. Across all cases, our methods consistently outperform majority voting, offering both practical performance gains and conceptual insights for the design of robust multi-agent LLM pipelines.