A General Framework for Dynamic Consistent Submodular Maximization

Consistency is an important property in dynamic submodular maximization and entails maintaining a near-optimal solution at all times, making only a small number of adjustments to the solution in each step. Prior work has explored this question for the insertion-only case, where the algorithm faces a stream of $n$ insertions, and has established lower and upper bounds for the cardinality-constrained version of the problem. We consider this question in the fully dynamic setting, where the stream of operations may contain both insertions and deletions. We develop a general framework for designing algorithms for this setting, and instantiate it to obtain the first constant-factor approximations with sublinear consistency. For cardinality constraints, we propose a $\frac 12 - O(\varepsilon)$ approximation that is $O\left(\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$ consistent. For rank-$k$ matroid constraints, we construct a $\frac 14 - O(\varepsilon)$ approximation to the dynamic optimum that is $O\left(\frac{\log k}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$ consistent.

Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker within an online learning framework, where the agents' valuations are generated by a smooth adversary. We devise a learning algorithm that guarantees a $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound, which is tight in the time horizon $T$ up to poly-logarithmic factors. This matches the minimax rate for the stochastic i.i.d. case, and is also well separated from the adversarial setting, where sublinear-regret is unattainable. By extending the strong regret guarantees from the i.i.d. case to the smooth adversary, we significantly broaden the scope of settings where such fast rate is achievable, while closing an important gap in the regret landscape of this fundamental economic problem. To overcome the challenges posed by this adversary, we leverage a continuity property of smooth instances and combines this with a hierarchical net-construction of the broker's action space, which is analyzed via algorithmic chaining. We showcase the applicability of these techniques by deriving a similarly tight $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound for a related mechanism design model: the joint ads problem.

Contextual Online Bilateral Trade

We study repeated bilateral trade when the valuations of the sellers and the buyers are contextual. More precisely, the agents' valuations are given by the inner product of a context vector with two unknown $d$-dimensional vectors -- one for the buyers and one for the sellers. At each time step $t$, the learner receives a context and posts two prices, one for the seller and one for the buyer, and the trade happens if both agents accept their price. We study two objectives for this problem, gain from trade and profit, proving no-regret with respect to a surprisingly strong benchmark: the best omniscient dynamic strategy. In the natural scenario where the learner observes \emph{separately} whether the agents accept their price -- the so-called \emph{two-bit} feedback -- we design algorithms that achieve $O(d\log d)$ regret for gain from trade, and $O(d \log\log T + d\log d)$ regret for profit maximization. Both results are tight, up to the $\log(d)$ factor, and implement per-step budget balance, meaning that the learner never incurs negative profit. In the less informative \emph{one-bit} feedback model, the learner only observes whether a trade happens or not. For this scenario, we show that the tight two-bit regret regimes are still attainable, at the cost of allowing the learner to possibly incur a small negative profit of order $O(d\log d)$, which is notably independent of the time horizon. As a final set of results, we investigate the combination of one-bit feedback and per-step budget balance. There, we design an algorithm for gain from trade that suffers regret independent of the time horizon, but \emph{exponential} in the dimension $d$. For profit maximization, we maintain this exponential dependence on the dimension, which gets multiplied by a $\log T$ factor.

Multicalibration yields better matchings

Consider the problem of finding the best matching in a weighted graph where we only have access to predictions of the actual stochastic weights, based on an underlying context. If the predictor is the Bayes optimal one, then computing the best matching based on the predicted weights is optimal. However, in practice, this perfect information scenario is not realistic. Given an imperfect predictor, a suboptimal decision rule may compensate for the induced error and thus outperform the standard optimal rule. In this paper, we propose multicalibration as a way to address this problem. This fairness notion requires a predictor to be unbiased on each element of a family of protected sets of contexts. Given a class of matching algorithms $\mathcal C$ and any predictor $γ$ of the edge-weights, we show how to construct a specific multicalibrated predictor $\hat γ$, with the following property. Picking the best matching based on the output of $\hat γ$ is competitive with the best decision rule in $\mathcal C$ applied onto the original predictor $γ$. We complement this result by providing sample complexity bounds.

Nearly Tight Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a broker, in a regret minimization framework. At each time step, a new seller and buyer arrive, and the broker has to propose a mechanism that is incentive-compatible and individually rational, with the goal of maximizing profit. We propose a learning algorithm that guarantees a nearly tight $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in the stochastic setting when seller and buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a fixed and possibly correlated unknown distribution. We further show that it is impossible to achieve sublinear regret in the non-stationary scenario where valuations are generated upfront by an adversary. Our ambitious benchmark for these results is the best incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism. This separates us from previous works on efficiency maximization in bilateral trade, where the benchmark is a single number: the best fixed price in hindsight. A particular challenge we face is that uniform convergence for all mechanisms' profits is impossible. We overcome this difficulty via a careful chaining analysis that proves convergence for a provably near-optimal mechanism at (essentially) optimal rate. We further showcase the broader applicability of our techniques by providing nearly optimal results for the joint ads problem.

The Cost of Consistency: Submodular Maximization with Constant Recourse

In this work, we study online submodular maximization, and how the requirement of maintaining a stable solution impacts the approximation. In particular, we seek bounds on the best-possible approximation ratio that is attainable when the algorithm is allowed to make at most a constant number of updates per step. We show a tight information-theoretic bound of $\tfrac{2}{3}$ for general monotone submodular functions, and an improved (also tight) bound of $\tfrac{3}{4}$ for coverage functions. Since both these bounds are attained by non poly-time algorithms, we also give a poly-time randomized algorithm that achieves a $0.51$-approximation. Combined with an information-theoretic hardness of $\tfrac{1}{2}$ for deterministic algorithms from prior work, our work thus shows a separation between deterministic and randomized algorithms, both information theoretically and for poly-time algorithms.

Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective

Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for example, situations where a merchant and a brand cooperatively bid in an auction to advertise a product, and both benefit from the ad being shown. A mechanism collects bids from the two and decides whether to allocate and which payments the two parties should make. This gives rise to intricate incentive compatibility constraints, e.g., on how to split payments between the two parties. We approach the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing incentive-compatible mechanism from an online learning perspective; this poses significant technical challenges. First, the action space (the class of all possible mechanisms) is huge; second, the function that maps mechanisms to revenue is highly irregular, ruling out standard discretization-based approaches. In the stochastic setting, we design an efficient learning algorithm achieving a regret bound of $O(T^{3/4})$. Our approach is based on an adaptive discretization scheme of the space of mechanisms, as any non-adaptive discretization fails to achieve sublinear regret. In the adversarial setting, we exploit the non-Lipschitzness of the problem to prove a strong negative result, namely that no learning algorithm can achieve more than half of the revenue of the best fixed mechanism in hindsight. We then consider the $\sigma$-smooth adversary; we construct an efficient learning algorithm that achieves a regret bound of $O(T^{2/3})$ and builds on a succinct encoding of exponentially many experts. Finally, we prove that no learning algorithm can achieve less than $\Omega(\sqrt T)$ regret in both the stochastic and the smooth setting, thus narrowing the range where the minimax regret rates for these two problems lie.

Online Learning with Sublinear Best-Action Queries

In online learning, a decision maker repeatedly selects one of a set of actions, with the goal of minimizing the overall loss incurred. Following the recent line of research on algorithms endowed with additional predictive features, we revisit this problem by allowing the decision maker to acquire additional information on the actions to be selected. In particular, we study the power of \emph{best-action queries}, which reveal beforehand the identity of the best action at a given time step. In practice, predictive features may be expensive, so we allow the decision maker to issue at most $k$ such queries. We establish tight bounds on the performance any algorithm can achieve when given access to $k$ best-action queries for different types of feedback models. In particular, we prove that in the full feedback model, $k$ queries are enough to achieve an optimal regret of $\Theta\left(\min\left\{\sqrt T, \frac Tk\right\}\right)$. This finding highlights the significant multiplicative advantage in the regret rate achievable with even a modest (sublinear) number $k \in \Omega(\sqrt{T})$ of queries. Additionally, we study the challenging setting in which the only available feedback is obtained during the time steps corresponding to the $k$ best-action queries. There, we provide a tight regret rate of $\Theta\left(\min\left\{\frac{T}{\sqrt k},\frac{T^2}{k^2}\right\}\right)$, which improves over the standard $\Theta\left(\frac{T}{\sqrt k}\right)$ regret rate for label efficient prediction for $k \in \Omega(T^{2/3})$.

Consistent Submodular Maximization

Maximizing monotone submodular functions under cardinality constraints is a classic optimization task with several applications in data mining and machine learning. In this paper we study this problem in a dynamic environment with consistency constraints: elements arrive in a streaming fashion and the goal is maintaining a constant approximation to the optimal solution while having a stable solution (i.e., the number of changes between two consecutive solutions is bounded). We provide algorithms in this setting with different trade-offs between consistency and approximation quality. We also complement our theoretical results with an experimental analysis showing the effectiveness of our algorithms in real-world instances.

Beyond Primal-Dual Methods in Bandits with Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints

We address a generalization of the bandit with knapsacks problem, where a learner aims to maximize rewards while satisfying an arbitrary set of long-term constraints. Our goal is to design best-of-both-worlds algorithms that perform optimally under both stochastic and adversarial constraints. Previous works address this problem via primal-dual methods, and require some stringent assumptions, namely the Slater's condition, and in adversarial settings, they either assume knowledge of a lower bound on the Slater's parameter, or impose strong requirements on the primal and dual regret minimizers such as requiring weak adaptivity. We propose an alternative and more natural approach based on optimistic estimations of the constraints. Surprisingly, we show that estimating the constraints with an UCB-like approach guarantees optimal performances. Our algorithm consists of two main components: (i) a regret minimizer working on \emph{moving strategy sets} and (ii) an estimate of the feasible set as an optimistic weighted empirical mean of previous samples. The key challenge in this approach is designing adaptive weights that meet the different requirements for stochastic and adversarial constraints. Our algorithm is significantly simpler than previous approaches, and has a cleaner analysis. Moreover, ours is the first best-of-both-worlds algorithm providing bounds logarithmic in the number of constraints. Additionally, in stochastic settings, it provides $\widetilde O(\sqrt{T})$ regret \emph{without} Slater's condition.