Fully Dynamic Online Selection through Online Contention Resolution Schemes

We study fully dynamic online selection problems in an adversarial/stochastic setting that includes Bayesian online selection, prophet inequalities, posted price mechanisms, and stochastic probing problems subject to combinatorial constraints. In the classical ``incremental'' version of the problem, selected elements remain active until the end of the input sequence. On the other hand, in the fully dynamic version of the problem, elements stay active for a limited time interval, and then leave. This models, for example, the online matching of tasks to workers with task/worker-dependent working times, and sequential posted pricing of perishable goods. A successful approach to online selection problems in the adversarial setting is given by the notion of Online Contention Resolution Scheme (OCRS), that uses a priori information to formulate a linear relaxation of the underlying optimization problem, whose optimal fractional solution is rounded online for any adversarial order of the input sequence. Our main contribution is providing a general method for constructing an OCRS for fully dynamic online selection problems. Then, we show how to employ such OCRS to construct no-regret algorithms in a partial information model with semi-bandit feedback and adversarial inputs.

Poisoning Attacks with Generative Adversarial Nets

Machine learning algorithms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks: An adversary can inject malicious points in the training dataset to influence the learning process and degrade its performance. Optimal poisoning attacks have already been proposed to evaluate worst-case scenarios, modelling attacks as a bi-level optimisation problem. Solving these problems is computationally demanding and has limited applicability for some models such as deep networks. In this paper we introduce a novel generative model to craft systematic poisoning attacks against machine learning classifiers generating adversarial training examples, i.e. samples that look like genuine data points but that degrade the classifier's accuracy when used for training. We propose a Generative Adversarial Net with three components: generator, discriminator, and the target classifier. This approach allows us to model naturally the detectability constrains that can be expected in realistic attacks and to identify the regions of the underlying data distribution that can be more vulnerable to data poisoning. Our experimental evaluation shows the effectiveness of our attack to compromise machine learning classifiers, including deep networks.