A Fragile Guardrail: Diffusion LLM's Safety Blessing and Its Failure Mode

Diffusion large language models (D-LLMs) offer an alternative to autoregressive LLMs (AR-LLMs) and have demonstrated advantages in generation efficiency. Beyond the utility benefits, we argue that D-LLMs exhibit a previously underexplored safety blessing: their diffusion-style generation confers intrinsic robustness against jailbreak attacks originally designed for AR-LLMs. In this work, we provide an initial analysis of the underlying mechanism, showing that the diffusion trajectory induces a stepwise reduction effect that progressively suppresses unsafe generations. This robustness, however, is not absolute. We identify a simple yet effective failure mode, termed context nesting, where harmful requests are embedded within structured benign contexts, effectively bypassing the stepwise reduction mechanism. Empirically, we show that this simple strategy is sufficient to bypass D-LLMs' safety blessing, achieving state-of-the-art attack success rates across models and benchmarks. Most notably, it enables the first successful jailbreak of Gemini Diffusion, to our knowledge, exposing a critical vulnerability in commercial D-LLMs. Together, our results characterize both the origins and the limits of D-LLMs' safety blessing, constituting an early-stage red-teaming of D-LLMs.

The Alignment Curse: Cross-Modality Jailbreak Transfer in Omni-Models

Recent advances in end-to-end trained omni-models have significantly improved multimodal understanding. At the same time, safety red-teaming has expanded beyond text to encompass audio-based jailbreak attacks. However, an important bridge between textual and audio jailbreaks remains underexplored. In this work, we study the cross-modality transfer of jailbreak attacks from text to audio, motivated by the semantic similarity between the two modalities and the maturity of textual jailbreak methods. We first analyze the connection between modality alignment and cross-modality jailbreak transfer, showing that strong alignment can inadvertently propagate textual vulnerabilities to the audio modality, which we term the alignment curse. Guided by this analysis, we conduct an empirical evaluation of textual jailbreaks, text-transferred audio jailbreaks, and existing audio-based jailbreaks on recent omni-models. Our results show that text-transferred audio jailbreaks perform comparably to, and often better than, audio-based jailbreaks, establishing them as simple yet powerful baselines for future audio red-teaming. We further demonstrate strong cross-model transferability and show that text-transferred audio attacks remain effective even under a stricter audio-only access threat model.

It's a TRAP! Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark for Web Agents

Web-based agents powered by large language models are increasingly used for tasks such as email management or professional networking. Their reliance on dynamic web content, however, makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: adversarial instructions hidden in interface elements that persuade the agent to divert from its original task. We introduce the Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark (TRAP), an evaluation for studying how persuasion techniques misguide autonomous web agents on realistic tasks. Across six frontier models, agents are susceptible to prompt injection in 25\% of tasks on average (13\% for GPT-5 to 43\% for DeepSeek-R1), with small interface or contextual changes often doubling success rates and revealing systemic, psychologically driven vulnerabilities in web-based agents. We also provide a modular social-engineering injection framework with controlled experiments on high-fidelity website clones, allowing for further benchmark expansion.

Unforgotten Safety: Preserving Safety Alignment of Large Language Models with Continual Learning

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) is becoming increasingly important with their democratization. In this paper, we study the safety degradation that comes with adapting LLMs to new tasks. We attribute this safety compromise to catastrophic forgetting and frame the problem of preserving safety when fine-tuning as a continual learning (CL) problem. We consider the fine-tuning-as-a-service setup where the user uploads their data to a service provider to get a customized model that excels on the user's selected task. We adapt several CL approaches from the literature and systematically evaluate their ability to mitigate safety degradation. These include regularization-based, memory-based, and model merging approaches. We consider two scenarios, (1) benign user data and (2) poisoned user data. Our results demonstrate that CL approaches consistently achieve lower attack success rates than standard fine-tuning. Among these, DER outperforms both other CL methods and existing safety-preserving baselines while maintaining task utility. These findings generalize across three downstream tasks (GSM8K, SST2, Code) and three model families (LLaMA2-7B, Mistral-7B, Gemma-2B), establishing CL as a practical solution to preserve safety.

Rethinking Safety in LLM Fine-tuning: An Optimization Perspective

Fine-tuning language models is commonly believed to inevitably harm their safety, i.e., refusing to respond to harmful user requests, even when using harmless datasets, thus requiring additional safety measures. We challenge this belief through systematic testing, showing that poor optimization choices, rather than inherent trade-offs, often cause safety problems, measured as harmful responses to adversarial prompts. By properly selecting key training hyper-parameters, e.g., learning rate, batch size, and gradient steps, we reduce unsafe model responses from 16\% to approximately 5\%, as measured by keyword matching, while maintaining utility performance. Based on this observation, we propose a simple exponential moving average (EMA) momentum technique in parameter space that preserves safety performance by creating a stable optimization path and retains the original pre-trained model's safety properties. Our experiments on the Llama families across multiple datasets (Dolly, Alpaca, ORCA) demonstrate that safety problems during fine-tuning can largely be avoided without specialized interventions, outperforming existing approaches that require additional safety data while offering practical guidelines for maintaining both model performance and safety during adaptation.

Attacking Multimodal OS Agents with Malicious Image Patches

Recent advances in operating system (OS) agents enable vision-language models to interact directly with the graphical user interface of an OS. These multimodal OS agents autonomously perform computer-based tasks in response to a single prompt via application programming interfaces (APIs). Such APIs typically support low-level operations, including mouse clicks, keyboard inputs, and screenshot captures. We introduce a novel attack vector: malicious image patches (MIPs) that have been adversarially perturbed so that, when captured in a screenshot, they cause an OS agent to perform harmful actions by exploiting specific APIs. For instance, MIPs embedded in desktop backgrounds or shared on social media can redirect an agent to a malicious website, enabling further exploitation. These MIPs generalise across different user requests and screen layouts, and remain effective for multiple OS agents. The existence of such attacks highlights critical security vulnerabilities in OS agents, which should be carefully addressed before their widespread adoption.

Shh, don't say that! Domain Certification in LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) are often deployed to perform constrained tasks, with narrow domains. For example, customer support bots can be built on top of LLMs, relying on their broad language understanding and capabilities to enhance performance. However, these LLMs are adversarially susceptible, potentially generating outputs outside the intended domain. To formalize, assess, and mitigate this risk, we introduce domain certification; a guarantee that accurately characterizes the out-of-domain behavior of language models. We then propose a simple yet effective approach, which we call VALID that provides adversarial bounds as a certificate. Finally, we evaluate our method across a diverse set of datasets, demonstrating that it yields meaningful certificates, which bound the probability of out-of-domain samples tightly with minimum penalty to refusal behavior.

On the Coexistence and Ensembling of Watermarks

Watermarking, the practice of embedding imperceptible information into media such as images, videos, audio, and text, is essential for intellectual property protection, content provenance and attribution. The growing complexity of digital ecosystems necessitates watermarks for different uses to be embedded in the same media. However, to detect and decode all watermarks, they need to coexist well with one another. We perform the first study of coexistence of deep image watermarking methods and, contrary to intuition, we find that various open-source watermarks can coexist with only minor impacts on image quality and decoding robustness. The coexistence of watermarks also opens the avenue for ensembling watermarking methods. We show how ensembling can increase the overall message capacity and enable new trade-offs between capacity, accuracy, robustness and image quality, without needing to retrain the base models.

Open Problems in Machine Unlearning for AI Safety

As AI systems become more capable, widely deployed, and increasingly autonomous in critical areas such as cybersecurity, biological research, and healthcare, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is paramount. Machine unlearning -- the ability to selectively forget or suppress specific types of knowledge -- has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, which has been the primary focus of existing research. More recently, its potential application to AI safety has gained attention. In this paper, we identify key limitations that prevent unlearning from serving as a comprehensive solution for AI safety, particularly in managing dual-use knowledge in sensitive domains like cybersecurity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) safety. In these contexts, information can be both beneficial and harmful, and models may combine seemingly harmless information for harmful purposes -- unlearning this information could strongly affect beneficial uses. We provide an overview of inherent constraints and open problems, including the broader side effects of unlearning dangerous knowledge, as well as previously unexplored tensions between unlearning and existing safety mechanisms. Finally, we investigate challenges related to evaluation, robustness, and the preservation of safety features during unlearning. By mapping these limitations and open challenges, we aim to guide future research toward realistic applications of unlearning within a broader AI safety framework, acknowledging its limitations and highlighting areas where alternative approaches may be required.

Detecting LLM Hallucination Through Layer-wise Information Deficiency: Analysis of Unanswerable Questions and Ambiguous Prompts

Large language models (LLMs) frequently generate confident yet inaccurate responses, introducing significant risks for deployment in safety-critical domains. We present a novel approach to detecting model hallucination through systematic analysis of information flow across model layers when processing inputs with insufficient or ambiguous context. Our investigation reveals that hallucination manifests as usable information deficiencies in inter-layer transmissions. While existing approaches primarily focus on final-layer output analysis, we demonstrate that tracking cross-layer information dynamics ($\mathcal{L}$I) provides robust indicators of model reliability, accounting for both information gain and loss during computation. $\mathcal{L}$I improves model reliability by immediately integrating with universal LLMs without additional training or architectural modifications.