Language Agents with Reinforcement Learning for Strategic Play in the Werewolf Game

Agents built with large language models (LLMs) have recently achieved great advancements. However, most of the efforts focus on single-agent or cooperative settings, leaving more general multi-agent environments underexplored. We propose a new framework powered by reinforcement learning (RL) to develop strategic language agents, i.e., LLM-based agents with strategic thinking ability, for a popular language game, Werewolf. Werewolf is a social deduction game with hidden roles that involves both cooperation and competition and emphasizes deceptive communication and diverse gameplay. Our agent tackles this game by first using LLMs to reason about potential deceptions and generate a set of strategically diverse actions. Then an RL policy, which selects an action from the candidates, is learned by population-based training to enhance the agents' decision-making ability. By combining LLMs with the RL policy, our agent produces a variety of emergent strategies, achieves the highest win rate against other LLM-based agents, and stays robust against adversarial human players in the Werewolf game.

Accelerate Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning in Zero-Sum Games with Subgame Curriculum Learning

Learning Nash equilibrium (NE) in complex zero-sum games with multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) can be extremely computationally expensive. Curriculum learning is an effective way to accelerate learning, but an under-explored dimension for generating a curriculum is the difficulty-to-learn of the subgames -- games induced by starting from a specific state. In this work, we present a novel subgame curriculum learning framework for zero-sum games. It adopts an adaptive initial state distribution by resetting agents to some previously visited states where they can quickly learn to improve performance. Building upon this framework, we derive a subgame selection metric that approximates the squared distance to NE values and further adopt a particle-based state sampler for subgame generation. Integrating these techniques leads to our new algorithm, Subgame Automatic Curriculum Learning (SACL), which is a realization of the subgame curriculum learning framework. SACL can be combined with any MARL algorithm such as MAPPO. Experiments in the particle-world environment and Google Research Football environment show SACL produces much stronger policies than baselines. In the challenging hide-and-seek quadrant environment, SACL produces all four emergent stages and uses only half the samples of MAPPO with self-play. The project website is at https://sites.google.com/view/sacl-rl.

Fictitious Cross-Play: Learning Global Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Cooperative-Competitive Games

Self-play (SP) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for solving competitive games, where each agent optimizes policy by treating others as part of the environment. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical properties of SP-based methods are limited to two-player zero-sum games. However, for mixed cooperative-competitive games where agents on the same team need to cooperate with each other, we can show a simple counter-example where SP-based methods cannot converge to a global Nash equilibrium (NE) with high probability. Alternatively, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an iterative framework for learning NE, where the best responses w.r.t. previous policies are learned in each iteration. PSRO can be directly extended to mixed cooperative-competitive settings by jointly learning team best responses with all convergence properties unchanged. However, PSRO requires repeatedly training joint policies from scratch till convergence, which makes it hard to scale to complex games. In this work, we develop a novel algorithm, Fictitious Cross-Play (FXP), which inherits the benefits from both frameworks. FXP simultaneously trains an SP-based main policy and a counter population of best response policies. The main policy is trained by fictitious self-play and cross-play against the counter population, while the counter policies are trained as the best responses to the main policy's past versions. We validate our method in matrix games and show that FXP converges to global NEs while SP methods fail. We also conduct experiments in a gridworld domain, where FXP achieves higher Elo ratings and lower exploitabilities than baselines, and a more challenging football game, where FXP defeats SOTA models with over 94% win rate.

Revisiting Some Common Practices in Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Many advances in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) are based on two common design principles: value decomposition and parameter sharing. A typical MARL algorithm of this fashion decomposes a centralized Q-function into local Q-networks with parameters shared across agents. Such an algorithmic paradigm enables centralized training and decentralized execution (CTDE) and leads to efficient learning in practice. Despite all the advantages, we revisit these two principles and show that in certain scenarios, e.g., environments with a highly multi-modal reward landscape, value decomposition, and parameter sharing can be problematic and lead to undesired outcomes. In contrast, policy gradient (PG) methods with individual policies provably converge to an optimal solution in these cases, which partially supports some recent empirical observations that PG can be effective in many MARL testbeds. Inspired by our theoretical analysis, we present practical suggestions on implementing multi-agent PG algorithms for either high rewards or diverse emergent behaviors and empirically validate our findings on a variety of domains, ranging from the simplified matrix and grid-world games to complex benchmarks such as StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge and Google Research Football. We hope our insights could benefit the community towards developing more general and more powerful MARL algorithms. Check our project website at https://sites.google.com/view/revisiting-marl.