Large language models (LLM), such as Google's Minerva and OpenAI's GPT families, are becoming increasingly capable of solving mathematical quantitative reasoning problems. However, they still make unjustified logical and computational errors in their reasoning steps and answers. In this paper, we leverage the fact that if the training corpus of LLMs contained sufficiently many examples of formal mathematics (e.g. in Isabelle, a formal theorem proving environment), they can be prompted to translate i.e. autoformalize informal mathematical statements into formal Isabelle code -- which can be verified automatically for internal consistency. This provides a mechanism to automatically reject solutions whose formalized versions are inconsistent within themselves or with the formalized problem statement. We evaluate our method on GSM8K, MATH and MultiArith datasets and demonstrate that our approach provides a consistently better heuristic than vanilla majority voting -- the previously best method to identify correct answers, by more than 12% on GSM8K. In our experiments it improves results consistently across all datasets and LLM model sizes. The code can be found at https://github.com/jinpz/dtv.
Human mathematicians are often good at recognizing modular and reusable theorems that make complex mathematical results within reach. In this paper, we propose a novel method called theoREm-from-prooF extrACTOR (REFACTOR) for training neural networks to mimic this ability in formal mathematical theorem proving. We show on a set of unseen proofs, REFACTOR is able to extract 19.6% of the theorems that humans would use to write the proofs. When applying the model to the existing Metamath library, REFACTOR extracted 16 new theorems. With newly extracted theorems, we show that the existing proofs in the MetaMath database can be refactored. The new theorems are used very frequently after refactoring, with an average usage of 733.5 times, and help shorten the proof lengths. Lastly, we demonstrate that the prover trained on the new-theorem refactored dataset proves more test theorems and outperforms state-of-the-art baselines by frequently leveraging a diverse set of newly extracted theorems. Code can be found at https://github.com/jinpz/refactor.
Machine learning algorithms are increasingly provided as black-box cloud services or pre-trained models, without access to their training data. This motivates the problem of zero-shot out-of-distribution (OOD) detection. Concretely, we aim to detect OOD objects that do not belong to the classifier's label set but are erroneously classified as in-distribution (ID) objects. Our approach, RONIN, uses an off-the-shelf diffusion model to replace detected objects with inpainting. RONIN conditions the inpainting process with the predicted ID label, drawing the input object closer to the in-distribution domain. As a result, the reconstructed object is very close to the original in the ID cases and far in the OOD cases, allowing RONIN to effectively distinguish ID and OOD samples. Throughout extensive experiments, we demonstrate that RONIN achieves competitive results compared to previous approaches across several datasets, both in zero-shot and non-zero-shot settings.
Abstractive summarization aims at generating natural language summaries of a source document that are succinct while preserving the important elements. Despite recent advances, neural text summarization models are known to be susceptible to hallucinating (or more correctly confabulating), that is to produce summaries with details that are not grounded in the source document. In this paper, we introduce a simple yet efficient technique, CoBa, to reduce hallucination in abstractive summarization. The approach is based on two steps: hallucination detection and mitigation. We show that the former can be achieved through measuring simple statistics about conditional word probabilities and distance to context words. Further, we demonstrate that straight-forward backtracking is surprisingly effective at mitigation. We thoroughly evaluate the proposed method with prior art on three benchmark datasets for text summarization. The results show that CoBa is effective and efficient in reducing hallucination, and offers great adaptability and flexibility.
Premise selection is a fundamental problem of automated theorem proving. Previous works often use intricate symbolic methods, rely on domain knowledge, and require significant engineering effort to solve this task. In this work, we show that Magnushammer, a neural transformer-based approach, can outperform traditional symbolic systems by a large margin. Tested on the PISA benchmark, Magnushammer achieves $59.5\%$ proof rate compared to a $38.3\%$ proof rate of Sledgehammer, the most mature and popular symbolic-based solver. Furthermore, by combining Magnushammer with a neural formal prover based on a language model, we significantly improve the previous state-of-the-art proof rate from $57.0\%$ to $71.0\%$.
Unsupervised out-of-distribution detection (OOD) seeks to identify out-of-domain data by learning only from unlabeled in-domain data. We present a novel approach for this task - Lift, Map, Detect (LMD) - that leverages recent advancement in diffusion models. Diffusion models are one type of generative models. At their core, they learn an iterative denoising process that gradually maps a noisy image closer to their training manifolds. LMD leverages this intuition for OOD detection. Specifically, LMD lifts an image off its original manifold by corrupting it, and maps it towards the in-domain manifold with a diffusion model. For an out-of-domain image, the mapped image would have a large distance away from its original manifold, and LMD would identify it as OOD accordingly. We show through extensive experiments that LMD achieves competitive performance across a broad variety of datasets.
A learned system uses machine learning (ML) internally to improve performance. We can expect such systems to be vulnerable to some adversarial-ML attacks. Often, the learned component is shared between mutually-distrusting users or processes, much like microarchitectural resources such as caches, potentially giving rise to highly-realistic attacker models. However, compared to attacks on other ML-based systems, attackers face a level of indirection as they cannot interact directly with the learned model. Additionally, the difference between the attack surface of learned and non-learned versions of the same system is often subtle. These factors obfuscate the de-facto risks that the incorporation of ML carries. We analyze the root causes of potentially-increased attack surface in learned systems and develop a framework for identifying vulnerabilities that stem from the use of ML. We apply our framework to a broad set of learned systems under active development. To empirically validate the many vulnerabilities surfaced by our framework, we choose 3 of them and implement and evaluate exploits against prominent learned-system instances. We show that the use of ML caused leakage of past queries in a database, enabled a poisoning attack that causes exponential memory blowup in an index structure and crashes it in seconds, and enabled index users to snoop on each others' key distributions by timing queries over their own keys. We find that adversarial ML is a universal threat against learned systems, point to open research gaps in our understanding of learned-systems security, and conclude by discussing mitigations, while noting that data leakage is inherent in systems whose learned component is shared between multiple parties.