Multi-Player Bandits Robust to Adversarial Collisions

Motivated by cognitive radios, stochastic Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandits has been extensively studied in recent years. In this setting, each player pulls an arm, and receives a reward corresponding to the arm if there is no collision, namely the arm was selected by one single player. Otherwise, the player receives no reward if collision occurs. In this paper, we consider the presence of malicious players (or attackers) who obstruct the cooperative players (or defenders) from maximizing their rewards, by deliberately colliding with them. We provide the first decentralized and robust algorithm RESYNC for defenders whose performance deteriorates gracefully as $\tilde{O}(C)$ as the number of collisions $C$ from the attackers increases. We show that this algorithm is order-optimal by proving a lower bound which scales as $\Omega(C)$. This algorithm is agnostic to the algorithm used by the attackers and agnostic to the number of collisions $C$ faced from attackers.

CS-Shapley: Class-wise Shapley Values for Data Valuation in Classification

Data valuation, or the valuation of individual datum contributions, has seen growing interest in machine learning due to its demonstrable efficacy for tasks such as noisy label detection. In particular, due to the desirable axiomatic properties, several Shapley value approximation methods have been proposed. In these methods, the value function is typically defined as the predictive accuracy over the entire development set. However, this limits the ability to differentiate between training instances that are helpful or harmful to their own classes. Intuitively, instances that harm their own classes may be noisy or mislabeled and should receive a lower valuation than helpful instances. In this work, we propose CS-Shapley, a Shapley value with a new value function that discriminates between training instances' in-class and out-of-class contributions. Our theoretical analysis shows the proposed value function is (essentially) the unique function that satisfies two desirable properties for evaluating data values in classification. Further, our experiments on two benchmark evaluation tasks (data removal and noisy label detection) and four classifiers demonstrate the effectiveness of CS-Shapley over existing methods. Lastly, we evaluate the "transferability" of data values estimated from one classifier to others, and our results suggest Shapley-based data valuation is transferable for application across different models.

Understanding the Limits of Poisoning Attacks in Episodic Reinforcement Learning

To understand the security threats to reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, this paper studies poisoning attacks to manipulate \emph{any} order-optimal learning algorithm towards a targeted policy in episodic RL and examines the potential damage of two natural types of poisoning attacks, i.e., the manipulation of \emph{reward} and \emph{action}. We discover that the effect of attacks crucially depend on whether the rewards are bounded or unbounded. In bounded reward settings, we show that only reward manipulation or only action manipulation cannot guarantee a successful attack. However, by combining reward and action manipulation, the adversary can manipulate any order-optimal learning algorithm to follow any targeted policy with $\tilde{\Theta}(\sqrt{T})$ total attack cost, which is order-optimal, without any knowledge of the underlying MDP. In contrast, in unbounded reward settings, we show that reward manipulation attacks are sufficient for an adversary to successfully manipulate any order-optimal learning algorithm to follow any targeted policy using $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ amount of contamination. Our results reveal useful insights about what can or cannot be achieved by poisoning attacks, and are set to spur more works on the design of robust RL algorithms.

Incrementality Bidding via Reinforcement Learning under Mixed and Delayed Rewards

Incrementality, which is used to measure the causal effect of showing an ad to a potential customer (e.g. a user in an internet platform) versus not, is a central object for advertisers in online advertising platforms. This paper investigates the problem of how an advertiser can learn to optimize the bidding sequence in an online manner \emph{without} knowing the incrementality parameters in advance. We formulate the offline version of this problem as a specially structured episodic Markov Decision Process (MDP) and then, for its online learning counterpart, propose a novel reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm with regret at most $\widetilde{O}(H^2\sqrt{T})$, which depends on the number of rounds $H$ and number of episodes $T$, but does not depend on the number of actions (i.e., possible bids). A fundamental difference between our learning problem from standard RL problems is that the realized reward feedback from conversion incrementality is \emph{mixed} and \emph{delayed}. To handle this difficulty we propose and analyze a novel pairwise moment-matching algorithm to learn the conversion incrementality, which we believe is of independent of interest.

Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning

In today's economy, it becomes important for Internet platforms to consider the sequential information design problem to align its long term interest with incentives of the gig service providers. This paper proposes a novel model of sequential information design, namely the Markov persuasion processes (MPPs), where a sender, with informational advantage, seeks to persuade a stream of myopic receivers to take actions that maximizes the sender's cumulative utilities in a finite horizon Markovian environment with varying prior and utility functions. Planning in MPPs thus faces the unique challenge in finding a signaling policy that is simultaneously persuasive to the myopic receivers and inducing the optimal long-term cumulative utilities of the sender. Nevertheless, in the population level where the model is known, it turns out that we can efficiently determine the optimal (resp. $\epsilon$-optimal) policy with finite (resp. infinite) states and outcomes, through a modified formulation of the Bellman equation. Our main technical contribution is to study the MPP under the online reinforcement learning (RL) setting, where the goal is to learn the optimal signaling policy by interacting with with the underlying MPP, without the knowledge of the sender's utility functions, prior distributions, and the Markov transition kernels. We design a provably efficient no-regret learning algorithm, the Optimism-Pessimism Principle for Persuasion Process (OP4), which features a novel combination of both optimism and pessimism principles. Our algorithm enjoys sample efficiency by achieving a sublinear $\sqrt{T}$-regret upper bound. Furthermore, both our algorithm and theory can be applied to MPPs with large space of outcomes and states via function approximation, and we showcase such a success under the linear setting.

Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret

We introduce and study the online Bayesian recommendation problem for a platform, who can observe a utility-relevant state of a product, repeatedly interacting with a population of myopic users through an online recommendation mechanism. This paradigm is common in a wide range of scenarios in the current Internet economy. For each user with her own private preference and belief, the platform commits to a recommendation strategy to utilize his information advantage on the product state to persuade the self-interested user to follow the recommendation. The platform does not know user's preferences and beliefs, and has to use an adaptive recommendation strategy to persuade with gradually learning user's preferences and beliefs in the process. We aim to design online learning policies with no Stackelberg regret for the platform, i.e., against the optimum policy in hindsight under the assumption that users will correspondingly adapt their behaviors to the benchmark policy. Our first result is an online policy that achieves double logarithm regret dependence on the number of rounds. We then present a hardness result showing that no adaptive online policy can achieve regret with better dependency on the number of rounds. Finally, by formulating the platform's problem as optimizing a linear program with membership oracle access, we present our second online policy that achieves regret with polynomial dependence on the number of states but logarithm dependence on the number of rounds.

Learning from a Learning User for Optimal Recommendations

In real-world recommendation problems, especially those with a formidably large item space, users have to gradually learn to estimate the utility of any fresh recommendations from their experience about previously consumed items. This in turn affects their interaction dynamics with the system and can invalidate previous algorithms built on the omniscient user assumption. In this paper, we formalize a model to capture such "learning users" and design an efficient system-side learning solution, coined Noise-Robust Active Ellipsoid Search (RAES), to confront the challenges brought by the non-stationary feedback from such a learning user. Interestingly, we prove that the regret of RAES deteriorates gracefully as the convergence rate of user learning becomes worse, until reaching linear regret when the user's learning fails to converge. Experiments on synthetic datasets demonstrate the strength of RAES for such a contemporaneous system-user learning problem. Our study provides a novel perspective on modeling the feedback loop in recommendation problems.

Multi-Agent Learning for Iterative Dominance Elimination: Formal Barriers and New Algorithms

Dominated actions are natural (and perhaps the simplest possible) multi-agent generalizations of sub-optimal actions as in standard single-agent decision making. Thus similar to standard bandit learning, a basic learning question in multi-agent systems is whether agents can learn to efficiently eliminate all dominated actions in an unknown game if they can only observe noisy bandit feedback about the payoff of their played actions. Surprisingly, despite a seemingly simple task, we show a quite negative result; that is, standard no regret algorithms -- including the entire family of Dual Averaging algorithms -- provably take exponentially many rounds to eliminate all dominated actions. Moreover, algorithms with the stronger no swap regret also suffer similar exponential inefficiency. To overcome these barriers, we develop a new algorithm that adjusts Exp3 with Diminishing Historical rewards (termed Exp3-DH); Exp3-DH gradually forgets history at carefully tailored rates. We prove that when all agents run Exp3-DH (a.k.a., self-play in multi-agent learning), all dominated actions can be iteratively eliminated within polynomially many rounds. Our experimental results further demonstrate the efficiency of Exp3-DH, and that state-of-the-art bandit algorithms, even those developed specifically for learning in games, fail to eliminate all dominated actions efficiently.

(Almost) Free Incentivized Exploration from Decentralized Learning Agents

Incentivized exploration in multi-armed bandits (MAB) has witnessed increasing interests and many progresses in recent years, where a principal offers bonuses to agents to do explorations on her behalf. However, almost all existing studies are confined to temporary myopic agents. In this work, we break this barrier and study incentivized exploration with multiple and long-term strategic agents, who have more complicated behaviors that often appear in real-world applications. An important observation of this work is that strategic agents' intrinsic needs of learning benefit (instead of harming) the principal's explorations by providing "free pulls". Moreover, it turns out that increasing the population of agents significantly lowers the principal's burden of incentivizing. The key and somewhat surprising insight revealed from our results is that when there are sufficiently many learning agents involved, the exploration process of the principal can be (almost) free. Our main results are built upon three novel components which may be of independent interest: (1) a simple yet provably effective incentive-provision strategy; (2) a carefully crafted best arm identification algorithm for rewards aggregated under unequal confidences; (3) a high-probability finite-time lower bound of UCB algorithms. Experimental results are provided to complement the theoretical analysis.

Least Square Calibration for Peer Review

Peer review systems such as conference paper review often suffer from the issue of miscalibration. Previous works on peer review calibration usually only use the ordinal information or assume simplistic reviewer scoring functions such as linear functions. In practice, applications like academic conferences often rely on manual methods, such as open discussions, to mitigate miscalibration. It remains an important question to develop algorithms that can handle different types of miscalibrations based on available prior knowledge. In this paper, we propose a flexible framework, namely least square calibration (LSC), for selecting top candidates from peer ratings. Our framework provably performs perfect calibration from noiseless linear scoring functions under mild assumptions, yet also provides competitive calibration results when the scoring function is from broader classes beyond linear functions and with arbitrary noise. On our synthetic dataset, we empirically demonstrate that our algorithm consistently outperforms the baseline which select top papers based on the highest average ratings.