Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds promise as a technology that can be used to improve government and economic policy-making. This paper proposes a new research agenda towards this end by introducing Social Environment Design, a general framework for the use of AI for automated policy-making that connects with the Reinforcement Learning, EconCS, and Computational Social Choice communities. The framework seeks to capture general economic environments, includes voting on policy objectives, and gives a direction for the systematic analysis of government and economic policy through AI simulation. We highlight key open problems for future research in AI-based policy-making. By solving these challenges, we hope to achieve various social welfare objectives, thereby promoting more ethical and responsible decision making.
We propose ABCs (Adaptive Branching through Child stationarity), a best-of-both-worlds algorithm combining Boltzmann Q-learning (BQL), a classic reinforcement learning algorithm for single-agent domains, and counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), a central algorithm for learning in multi-agent domains. ABCs adaptively chooses what fraction of the environment to explore each iteration by measuring the stationarity of the environment's reward and transition dynamics. In Markov decision processes, ABCs converges to the optimal policy with at most an O(A) factor slowdown compared to BQL, where A is the number of actions in the environment. In two-player zero-sum games, ABCs is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium (assuming access to a perfect oracle for detecting stationarity), while BQL has no such guarantees. Empirically, ABCs demonstrates strong performance when benchmarked across environments drawn from the OpenSpiel game library and OpenAI Gym and exceeds all prior methods in environments which are neither fully stationary nor fully nonstationary.
The role of a market maker is to simultaneously offer to buy and sell quantities of goods, often a financial asset such as a share, at specified prices. An automated market maker (AMM) is a mechanism that offers to trade according to some predetermined schedule; the best choice of this schedule depends on the market maker's goals. The literature on the design of AMMs has mainly focused on prediction markets with the goal of information elicitation. More recent work motivated by DeFi has focused instead on the goal of profit maximization, but considering only a single type of good (traded with a numeraire), including under adverse selection (Milionis et al. 2022). Optimal market making in the presence of multiple goods, including the possibility of complex bundling behavior, is not well understood. In this paper, we show that finding an optimal market maker is dual to an optimal transport problem, with specific geometric constraints on the transport plan in the dual. We show that optimal mechanisms for multiple goods and under adverse selection can take advantage of bundling, both improved prices for bundled purchases and sales as well as sometimes accepting payment "in kind." We present conjectures of optimal mechanisms in additional settings which show further complex behavior. From a methodological perspective, we make essential use of the tools of differentiable economics to generate conjectures of optimal mechanisms, and give a proof-of-concept for the use of such tools in guiding theoretical investigations.
Machine learning models in modern mass-market applications are often updated over time. One of the foremost challenges faced is that, despite increasing overall performance, these updates may flip specific model predictions in unpredictable ways. In practice, researchers quantify the number of unstable predictions between models pre and post update -- i.e., predictive churn. In this paper, we study this effect through the lens of predictive multiplicity -- i.e., the prevalence of conflicting predictions over the set of near-optimal models (the Rashomon set). We show how traditional measures of predictive multiplicity can be used to examine expected churn over this set of prospective models -- i.e., the set of models that may be used to replace a baseline model in deployment. We present theoretical results on the expected churn between models within the Rashomon set from different perspectives. And we characterize expected churn over model updates via the Rashomon set, pairing our analysis with empirical results on real-world datasets -- showing how our approach can be used to better anticipate, reduce, and avoid churn in consumer-facing applications. Further, we show that our approach is useful even for models enhanced with uncertainty awareness.
We consider multiple senders with informational advantage signaling to convince a single self-interested actor towards certain actions. Generalizing the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework, such settings are ubiquitous in computational economics, multi-agent learning, and machine learning with multiple objectives. The core solution concept here is the Nash equilibrium of senders' signaling policies. Theoretically, we prove that finding an equilibrium in general is PPAD-Hard; in fact, even computing a sender's best response is NP-Hard. Given these intrinsic difficulties, we turn to finding local Nash equilibria. We propose a novel differentiable neural network to approximate this game's non-linear and discontinuous utilities. Complementing this with the extra-gradient algorithm, we discover local equilibria that Pareto dominates full-revelation equilibria and those found by existing neural networks. Broadly, our theoretical and empirical contributions are of interest to a large class of economic problems.
The $\textit{data market design}$ problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller, where each experiment reveals some of the information known to a seller and has a corresponding price [Bergemann et al., 2018]. Each buyer has their own decision to make in a world environment, and their subjective expected value for the information associated with a particular experiment comes from the improvement in this decision and depends on their prior and value for different outcomes. In a setting with multiple buyers, a buyer's expected value for an experiment may also depend on the information sold to others [Bonatti et al., 2022]. We introduce the application of deep learning for the design of revenue-optimal data markets, looking to expand the frontiers of what can be understood and achieved. Relative to earlier work on deep learning for auction design [D\"utting et al., 2023], we must learn signaling schemes rather than allocation rules and handle $\textit{obedience constraints}$ $-$ these arising from modeling the downstream actions of buyers $-$ in addition to incentive constraints on bids. Our experiments demonstrate that this new deep learning framework can almost precisely replicate all known solutions from theory, expand to more complex settings, and be used to establish the optimality of new designs for data markets and make conjectures in regard to the structure of optimal designs.
Large language models have astounded the world with fascinating new capabilities. However, they currently lack the ability to teach themselves new skills, relying instead on being trained on large amounts of human-generated data. We introduce SECToR (Self-Education via Chain-of-Thought Reasoning), a proof-of-concept demonstration that language models can successfully teach themselves new skills using chain-of-thought reasoning. Inspired by previous work in both reinforcement learning (Silver et al., 2017) and human cognition (Kahneman, 2011), SECToR first uses chain-of-thought reasoning to slowly think its way through problems. SECToR then fine-tunes the model to generate those same answers, this time without using chain-of-thought reasoning. Language models trained via SECToR autonomously learn to add up to 29-digit numbers without any access to any ground truth examples beyond an initial supervised fine-tuning phase consisting only of numbers with 6 or fewer digits. Our central hypothesis is that chain-of-thought reasoning can act as a policy improvement operator, analogously to how Monte-Carlo Tree Search is used in AlphaZero. We hope that this research can lead to new directions in which language models can learn to teach themselves without the need for human demonstrations.
Traditionally, social choice theory has only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives but not to more complex decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a framework that combines the mathematical rigor of social choice theory with large language models' capability to generate text and extrapolate preferences. This framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies rigorous representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We illustrate this framework by applying it to the problem of generating a slate of statements that is representative of opinions expressed as free-form text, for instance in an online deliberative process.
Contract design involves a principal who establishes contractual agreements about payments for outcomes that arise from the actions of an agent. In this paper, we initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of optimal contracts. We formulate this as an offline learning problem, where a deep network is used to represent the principal's expected utility as a function of the design of a contract. We introduce a novel representation: the Discontinuous ReLU (DeLU) network, which models the principal's utility as a discontinuous piecewise affine function where each piece corresponds to the agent taking a particular action. DeLU networks implicitly learn closed-form expressions for the incentive compatibility constraints of the agent and the utility maximization objective of the principal, and support parallel inference on each piece through linear programming or interior-point methods that solve for optimal contracts. We provide empirical results that demonstrate success in approximating the principal's utility function with a small number of training samples and scaling to find approximately optimal contracts on problems with a large number of actions and outcomes.
AI methods are used in societally important settings, ranging from credit to employment to housing, and it is crucial to provide fairness in regard to algorithmic decision making. Moreover, many settings are dynamic, with populations responding to sequential decision policies. We introduce the study of reinforcement learning (RL) with stepwise fairness constraints, requiring group fairness at each time step. Our focus is on tabular episodic RL, and we provide learning algorithms with strong theoretical guarantees in regard to policy optimality and fairness violation. Our framework provides useful tools to study the impact of fairness constraints in sequential settings and brings up new challenges in RL.