Trustless Audits without Revealing Data or Models

There is an increasing conflict between business incentives to hide models and data as trade secrets, and the societal need for algorithmic transparency. For example, a rightsholder wishing to know whether their copyrighted works have been used during training must convince the model provider to allow a third party to audit the model and data. Finding a mutually agreeable third party is difficult, and the associated costs often make this approach impractical. In this work, we show that it is possible to simultaneously allow model providers to keep their model weights (but not architecture) and data secret while allowing other parties to trustlessly audit model and data properties. We do this by designing a protocol called ZkAudit in which model providers publish cryptographic commitments of datasets and model weights, alongside a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) certifying that published commitments are derived from training the model. Model providers can then respond to audit requests by privately computing any function F of the dataset (or model) and releasing the output of F alongside another ZKP certifying the correct execution of F. To enable ZkAudit, we develop new methods of computing ZKPs for SGD on modern neural nets for simple recommender systems and image classification models capable of high accuracies on ImageNet. Empirically, we show it is possible to provide trustless audits of DNNs, including copyright, censorship, and counterfactual audits with little to no loss in accuracy.

A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming

Independent evaluation and red teaming are critical for identifying the risks posed by generative AI systems. However, the terms of service and enforcement strategies used by prominent AI companies to deter model misuse have disincentives on good faith safety evaluations. This causes some researchers to fear that conducting such research or releasing their findings will result in account suspensions or legal reprisal. Although some companies offer researcher access programs, they are an inadequate substitute for independent research access, as they have limited community representation, receive inadequate funding, and lack independence from corporate incentives. We propose that major AI developers commit to providing a legal and technical safe harbor, indemnifying public interest safety research and protecting it from the threat of account suspensions or legal reprisal. These proposals emerged from our collective experience conducting safety, privacy, and trustworthiness research on generative AI systems, where norms and incentives could be better aligned with public interests, without exacerbating model misuse. We believe these commitments are a necessary step towards more inclusive and unimpeded community efforts to tackle the risks of generative AI.

InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

LLM Agents can Autonomously Hack Websites

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly capable and can now interact with tools (i.e., call functions), read documents, and recursively call themselves. As a result, these LLMs can now function autonomously as agents. With the rise in capabilities of these agents, recent work has speculated on how LLM agents would affect cybersecurity. However, not much is known about the offensive capabilities of LLM agents. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously hack websites, performing tasks as complex as blind database schema extraction and SQL injections without human feedback. Importantly, the agent does not need to know the vulnerability beforehand. This capability is uniquely enabled by frontier models that are highly capable of tool use and leveraging extended context. Namely, we show that GPT-4 is capable of such hacks, but existing open-source models are not. Finally, we show that GPT-4 is capable of autonomously finding vulnerabilities in websites in the wild. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLMs.

Removing RLHF Protections in GPT-4 via Fine-Tuning

As large language models (LLMs) have increased in their capabilities, so does their potential for dual use. To reduce harmful outputs, produces and vendors of LLMs have used reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF). In tandem, LLM vendors have been increasingly enabling fine-tuning of their most powerful models. However, concurrent work has shown that fine-tuning can remove RLHF protections. We may expect that the most powerful models currently available (GPT-4) are less susceptible to fine-tuning attacks. In this work, we show the contrary: fine-tuning allows attackers to remove RLHF protections with as few as 340 examples and a 95% success rate. These training examples can be automatically generated with weaker models. We further show that removing RLHF protections does not decrease usefulness on non-censored outputs, providing evidence that our fine-tuning strategy does not decrease usefulness despite using weaker models to generate training data. Our results show the need for further research on protections on LLMs.

Identifying and Mitigating the Security Risks of Generative AI

Every major technical invention resurfaces the dual-use dilemma -- the new technology has the potential to be used for good as well as for harm. Generative AI (GenAI) techniques, such as large language models (LLMs) and diffusion models, have shown remarkable capabilities (e.g., in-context learning, code-completion, and text-to-image generation and editing). However, GenAI can be used just as well by attackers to generate new attacks and increase the velocity and efficacy of existing attacks. This paper reports the findings of a workshop held at Google (co-organized by Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison) on the dual-use dilemma posed by GenAI. This paper is not meant to be comprehensive, but is rather an attempt to synthesize some of the interesting findings from the workshop. We discuss short-term and long-term goals for the community on this topic. We hope this paper provides both a launching point for a discussion on this important topic as well as interesting problems that the research community can work to address.

Exploiting Programmatic Behavior of LLMs: Dual-Use Through Standard Security Attacks

Recent advances in instruction-following large language models (LLMs) have led to dramatic improvements in a range of NLP tasks. Unfortunately, we find that the same improved capabilities amplify the dual-use risks for malicious purposes of these models. Dual-use is difficult to prevent as instruction-following capabilities now enable standard attacks from computer security. The capabilities of these instruction-following LLMs provide strong economic incentives for dual-use by malicious actors. In particular, we show that instruction-following LLMs can produce targeted malicious content, including hate speech and scams, bypassing in-the-wild defenses implemented by LLM API vendors. Our analysis shows that this content can be generated economically and at cost likely lower than with human effort alone. Together, our findings suggest that LLMs will increasingly attract more sophisticated adversaries and attacks, and addressing these attacks may require new approaches to mitigations.

Q-Diffusion: Quantizing Diffusion Models

Diffusion models have achieved great success in synthesizing diverse and high-fidelity images. However, sampling speed and memory constraints remain a major barrier to the practical adoption of diffusion models, since the generation process for these models can be slow due to the need for iterative noise estimation using compute-intensive neural networks. We propose to tackle this problem by compressing the noise estimation network to accelerate the generation process through post-training quantization (PTQ). While existing PTQ approaches have not been able to effectively deal with the changing output distributions of noise estimation networks in diffusion models over multiple time steps, we are able to formulate a PTQ method that is specifically designed to handle the unique multi-timestep structure of diffusion models with a data calibration scheme using data sampled from different time steps. Experimental results show that our proposed method is able to directly quantize full-precision diffusion models into 8-bit or 4-bit models while maintaining comparable performance in a training-free manner, achieving a FID change of at most 1.88. Our approach can also be applied to text-guided image generation, and for the first time we can run stable diffusion in 4-bit weights without losing much perceptual quality, as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 9.

Scaling up Trustless DNN Inference with Zero-Knowledge Proofs

As ML models have increased in capabilities and accuracy, so has the complexity of their deployments. Increasingly, ML model consumers are turning to service providers to serve the ML models in the ML-as-a-service (MLaaS) paradigm. As MLaaS proliferates, a critical requirement emerges: how can model consumers verify that the correct predictions were served, in the face of malicious, lazy, or buggy service providers? In this work, we present the first practical ImageNet-scale method to verify ML model inference non-interactively, i.e., after the inference has been done. To do so, we leverage recent developments in ZK-SNARKs (zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge), a form of zero-knowledge proofs. ZK-SNARKs allows us to verify ML model execution non-interactively and with only standard cryptographic hardness assumptions. In particular, we provide the first ZK-SNARK proof of valid inference for a full resolution ImageNet model, achieving 79\% top-5 accuracy. We further use these ZK-SNARKs to design protocols to verify ML model execution in a variety of scenarios, including for verifying MLaaS predictions, verifying MLaaS model accuracy, and using ML models for trustless retrieval. Together, our results show that ZK-SNARKs have the promise to make verified ML model inference practical.

Proof: Accelerating Approximate Aggregation Queries with Expensive Predicates

Given a dataset $\mathcal{D}$, we are interested in computing the mean of a subset of $\mathcal{D}$ which matches a predicate. ABae leverages stratified sampling and proxy models to efficiently compute this statistic given a sampling budget $N$. In this document, we theoretically analyze ABae and show that the MSE of the estimate decays at rate $O(N_1^{-1} + N_2^{-1} + N_1^{1/2}N_2^{-3/2})$, where $N=K \cdot N_1+N_2$ for some integer constant $K$ and $K \cdot N_1$ and $N_2$ represent the number of samples used in Stage 1 and Stage 2 of ABae respectively. Hence, if a constant fraction of the total sample budget $N$ is allocated to each stage, we will achieve a mean squared error of $O(N^{-1})$ which matches the rate of mean squared error of the optimal stratified sampling algorithm given a priori knowledge of the predicate positive rate and standard deviation per stratum.