Explore, Establish, Exploit: Red Teaming Language Models from Scratch

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/Algorithmic-Alignment-Lab/CommonClaim.

Benchmarking Interpretability Tools for Deep Neural Networks

Interpreting deep neural networks is the topic of much current research in AI. However, few interpretability techniques have shown to be competitive tools in practical applications. Inspired by how benchmarks tend to guide progress in AI, we make three contributions. First, we propose trojan rediscovery as a benchmarking task to evaluate how useful interpretability tools are for generating engineering-relevant insights. Second, we design two such approaches for benchmarking: one for feature attribution methods and one for feature synthesis methods. Third, we apply our benchmarks to evaluate 16 feature attribution/saliency methods and 9 feature synthesis methods. This approach finds large differences in the capabilities of these existing tools and shows significant room for improvement. Finally, we propose several directions for future work. Resources are available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/benchmarking_interpretability

Diagnostics for Deep Neural Networks with Automated Copy/Paste Attacks

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are powerful, but they can make mistakes that pose significant risks. A model performing well on a test set does not imply safety in deployment, so it is important to have additional tools to understand its flaws. Adversarial examples can help reveal weaknesses, but they are often difficult for a human to interpret or draw generalizable, actionable conclusions from. Some previous works have addressed this by studying human-interpretable attacks. We build on these with three contributions. First, we introduce a method termed Search for Natural Adversarial Features Using Embeddings (SNAFUE) which offers a fully-automated method for finding "copy/paste" attacks in which one natural image can be pasted into another in order to induce an unrelated misclassification. Second, we use this to red team an ImageNet classifier and identify hundreds of easily-describable sets of vulnerabilities. Third, we compare this approach with other interpretability tools by attempting to rediscover trojans. Our results suggest that SNAFUE can be useful for interpreting DNNs and generating adversarial data for them. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/snafue

White-Box Adversarial Policies in Deep Reinforcement Learning

Adversarial examples against AI systems pose both risks via malicious attacks and opportunities for improving robustness via adversarial training. In multiagent settings, adversarial policies can be developed by training an adversarial agent to minimize a victim agent's rewards. Prior work has studied black-box attacks where the adversary only sees the state observations and effectively treats the victim as any other part of the environment. In this work, we experiment with white-box adversarial policies to study whether an agent's internal state can offer useful information for other agents. We make three contributions. First, we introduce white-box adversarial policies in which an attacker can observe a victim's internal state at each timestep. Second, we demonstrate that white-box access to a victim makes for better attacks in two-agent environments, resulting in both faster initial learning and higher asymptotic performance against the victim. Third, we show that training against white-box adversarial policies can be used to make learners in single-agent environments more robust to domain shifts.

Toward Transparent AI: A Survey on Interpreting the Inner Structures of Deep Neural Networks

The last decade of machine learning has seen drastic increases in scale and capabilities, and deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly being deployed across a wide range of domains. However, the inner workings of DNNs are generally difficult to understand, raising concerns about the safety of using these systems without a rigorous understanding of how they function. In this survey, we review literature on techniques for interpreting the inner components of DNNs, which we call "inner" interpretability methods. Specifically, we review methods for interpreting weights, neurons, subnetworks, and latent representations with a focus on how these techniques relate to the goal of designing safer, more trustworthy AI systems. We also highlight connections between interpretability and work in modularity, adversarial robustness, continual learning, network compression, and studying the human visual system. Finally, we discuss key challenges and argue for future work in interpretability for AI safety that focuses on diagnostics, benchmarking, and robustness.

Detecting Modularity in Deep Neural Networks

A neural network is modular to the extent that parts of its computational graph (i.e. structure) can be represented as performing some comprehensible subtask relevant to the overall task (i.e. functionality). Are modern deep neural networks modular? How can this be quantified? In this paper, we consider the problem of assessing the modularity exhibited by a partitioning of a network's neurons. We propose two proxies for this: importance, which reflects how crucial sets of neurons are to network performance; and coherence, which reflects how consistently their neurons associate with features of the inputs. To measure these proxies, we develop a set of statistical methods based on techniques conventionally used to interpret individual neurons. We apply the proxies to partitionings generated by spectrally clustering a graph representation of the network's neurons with edges determined either by network weights or correlations of activations. We show that these partitionings, even ones based only on weights (i.e. strictly from non-runtime analysis), reveal groups of neurons that are important and coherent. These results suggest that graph-based partitioning can reveal modularity and help us understand how deep neural networks function.

One Thing to Fool them All: Generating Interpretable, Universal, and Physically-Realizable Adversarial Features

It is well understood that modern deep networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, conventional methods fail to produce adversarial perturbations that are intelligible to humans, and they pose limited threats in the physical world. To study feature-class associations in networks and better understand the real-world threats they face, we develop feature-level adversarial perturbations using deep image generators and a novel optimization objective. We term these feature-fool attacks. We show that they are versatile and use them to generate targeted feature-level attacks at the ImageNet scale that are simultaneously interpretable, universal to any source image, and physically-realizable. These attacks can also reveal spurious, semantically-describable feature/class associations, and we use them to guide the design of "copy/paste" adversaries in which one natural image is pasted into another to cause a targeted misclassification.

Clusterability in Neural Networks

The learned weights of a neural network have often been considered devoid of scrutable internal structure. In this paper, however, we look for structure in the form of clusterability: how well a network can be divided into groups of neurons with strong internal connectivity but weak external connectivity. We find that a trained neural network is typically more clusterable than randomly initialized networks, and often clusterable relative to random networks with the same distribution of weights. We also exhibit novel methods to promote clusterability in neural network training, and find that in multi-layer perceptrons they lead to more clusterable networks with little reduction in accuracy. Understanding and controlling the clusterability of neural networks will hopefully render their inner workings more interpretable to engineers by facilitating partitioning into meaningful clusters.